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2Abstract
Malawi's behaviour in international relations has 
been interpreted largely in terms of the country's 
economic needs. The conventional argument has been that 
the country's foreign and domestic policies were adopted 
for reasons of making the country attractive to donor 
countries and organizations. This argument is so 
prevalent that it is even reflected in the titles of some 
books and articles on Malawi's post-independence political 
and economic history. For example/ a pamphlet kept by the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library is 
titled: "Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development".
This thesis proceeds on the premise that foreign aid 
has not been the main objective of Malawi foreign and 
domestic policies. Accordingly, it looks critically at 
the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's 
foreign and domestic policies. It finds that the 
conventional argument is supported with evidence which is 
erroneous in many cases or at least partial and tries to 
show that the effects which the politics of foreign aid 
have exerted on Malawi are quite different from those 
which are assumed by the conventional argument.
3By contrast/ the argument of the thesis is that 
Malawi's foreign and domestic policies are not the result 
of the politics of foreign aid. Rather they are the 
product of the style and perceptions of the country's 
leadership.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
The thesis is a critical examination of the prevailing 
conviction that the need tor foreign aid accounts for Malawi's 
behaviour in international relations. Therefore, the task 
in this chapter is to state in detail this argument and 
indicate how it is to be considered in the subsequent 
chapters. This exercise is preceded by a discussion of
some key concepts which include foreign aid and its 
political character and effectiveness.
The exercise is also followed by a discussion of the 
nature of foreign policy, the concept of dependence, and 
the method of approach to the subject. The nature of 
foreign policy is discussed largely to indicate the manner 
in which the foreign policies of African countries are 
looked at in this thesis. Similarly, the concept of 
dependence is discussed to indicate the manner in which it 
is treated in the thesis.
Definition of Foreign Aid
Foreign aid is obviously the key concept in the 
thesis and requires, therefore, considerable attention.
11
It consists of many categories such as non-official as 
opposed to official foreign aid. Not every categorr of 
foreign aid will receive attention here. For example, the 
study will not pay much attention to the non-official 
aid. This is not to say that Malawi does not receive this 
type of foreign aid. On the contrary, Malawi receives a 
lot of non-official, or unofficial, foreign aid. Some of 
its charity organizations, particularly the Christian 
Service Committee of the Churches in Malawi (C.S.C.), the 
Malawi Red Cross Society, and the Lions Club, receive aid 
from sister charity organizations abroad such as the 
British OXFAM or Christian Aid or the International Red 
Cross Committee in Geneva. Such aid is used on small 
community development projects in the country such as 
digging boreholes, purchase of school desks, and the 
construction of youth hostels in towns.
However, this category of foreign aid will not be 
considered here because it is small in amount compared to 
the amount of foreign aid which is channeled through the 
Malawi Government. For example, the C.S.C., which is a 
sort of non-official aid receiving agency of the country, 
received in 1979, $2 million worth of foreign aid which
is nothing compared to $80.6 million of foreign aid which 
the Malawi Government received from abroad during the same 
year.1 Therefore, its omission need not create a 
serious gap in the thesis.
12
The category of foreign aid which will be considered 
is the one which is called official foreign aid. This is 
the aid which is from one government to another and also 
consists of two types. One part of it is called food aid 
and another is called the official development aid or 
assistance (O.D.A.). Food aid invokes its own politics, 
the politics of food aid. Though official, it will not 
receive attention here because Malawi did not receive food 
aid until early 1988 when it signed a food aid agreement 
with the United States worth some $10 million. Similarly, 
military aid will not be considered because Malawi has 
hardly received any such aid.
O.D.A. is the type of aid which will receive most 
attention. This is the largest proportion of all foreign 
aid which goes to Malawi. It, too, is sometimes 
categorised into financial and technical aid, a 
categorisation which is not important at this stage of the 
discussion. It will be considered as just one category of 
aid until considerably later in the thesis.
Whatever category one considers, foreign aid, as John
White points out, refers to a "heterogeneous collection of
2
transactions". For example, the term is used to mean
loans, grants, donations, and secondment of personnel. 
However, it has two distinctive features. The first is 
movement, which is described as a transfer, or a flow, the 
former being the more accurate description since foreign
13
aid does not automatically and continuously go to the 
receiving countries. People have to move the resources, 
such as books, funds, and vehicles to mention a few from 
one country to another at intermittent intervals.
The second distinctive feature is concession or the 
helping element. This is the more important feature and
is understood in terms of the way the resource is to be
used (strings), repayment period, and the interest to be 
paid. It is greater when strings are fewer, 
period is longer, and interest is lower. This is what 
distinguishes aid from other economic transactions such as 
financial gifts, commercial loans, and private invest­
ment. Bauer's argument that:
" although the term foreign aid is now so widely
used that it would be pedantic to eschew it, either
gifts or doles would be preferable on logical grounds
as description of these transfers because these words
3
do not prejudge the effects of aid”,
cannot be accepted since unlike gift or dole, all foreign 
aid carries some strings and a greater proportion of it
has to be repaid. Most foreign aid is tied to projects or
to procurement of goods from the donor country. Some of 
it has even to be repaid with interest. For example, 
Malawi's debt-repayment burden in 1985 amounted to 44 per 
cent of the country's export revenues. A gift or a dole 
ceases to be such once it takes on strings such as these.
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Therefore, foreign aid is defined here as the 
transfer of resources on concessional terms. This 
transfer takes place usually from one government, the 
donor, to another, the recipient. No doubt, this 
definition lacks technical precision. The expression, 
"donor government" and "recipient government", make it 
worse. This is because some scholars of foreign aid are 
after precision. For example, White points out that the 
word, "donor", is misleading since aid includes loans and 
further argues:
"In our discussion of donors, we narrowed the focus 
from donor countries and their general interest 
vis-a-vis developing countries, to donor agencies and 
their specific interests vis-a-vis other institu­
tions. Similarly in a discussion of recipients, it 
is necessary to narrow the focus from the interest of 
developing countries in improving their standard of 
living - rather their composite and conflicting 
interests in this respect - to recipient institutions 
and their specific interests vis-a-vis other elements 
of poor countries "societies"
This suggestion is, indeed, followed up by Andrew Hewitt
4and Jonathan Kydd. Apparently, the point is that one 
has to be precise about who receives or gives aid. This 
presupposes that the giving of aid is as important an 
activity to the aid givers as is the receiving of aid to 
the aid receivers. White seems to see a symmetry of aid
15
institutions or aid handling processes between the givers 
and the receivers of aid; that is he assumes the existence 
of an aid-handling agency in each development country. 
However, there seems in reality to be no such symmetry of 
aid institutions or aid-handling process because aid 
fostering is an important activity to developing countries. 
An asymmetry of aid institutions, or aid-handling 
processes, is the order of the day between the givers and 
the receivers of aid.
On the one hand, many aid givers disburse most of 
their aid through one governmental agency such as the 
British Overseas Development Administration (O.D.A.), 
United States Agency for International Development 
(U.S.A.I.D.), or Canadian International Development Agency 
(C.I.D.A.). On the other hand, many aid receivers get aid 
through a couple of government departments. For example, 
in Malawi, a number of government departments including the 
Treasury, the Department of Economic Planning and 
Development and the Ministry of Justice, to name a few, are 
involved in the process of handling foreign aid. The same 
is probably the case in many other aid receiving countries.
In short, White's suggested precision in unnecessary. 
The practice varies. The definition is adequate in so far 
as it indicates the subject to be considered. Therefore, 
the expression, "donor country" will be used in this study 
interchangeably with the expression, "donor government" as 
also will the expression,"recipient country" be used inter­
changeably with the expression, "recipient government".
16
The Political Character of Foreign Aid
Despite their heterogeneous nature, these concessional 
resource transfers have attracted considerable attention in 
terms of whether they are political or humanitarian. The 
controversy has lingered on for some time and is unlikely 
to be resolved because of the heterogeneous nature of these 
transfers.
The expression, "the politics of foreign aid", in the 
title of the thesis indicates the direction into which 
popular opinion has merely swing on this question these 
days. "By its nature, however, aid is highly political" 
says Guy Arnold who, struck by a disparity between 
negligible development on the ground and the amounts of 
foreign aid which have poured into Africa, goes on to
assert that foreign aid "is now big business, whether it
5
solves problems of development is another matter." The 
"basic long range goal", says L. D. Black, "is political" 
and "is not for economic development per se." The current 
literature on foreign aid is littered with the assumption 
that foreign aid is political. In short, foreign aid is 
said to be not humanitarian but political.
The political character of foreign aid is assumed 
to be influenced by selfish motives on the part of 
foreign aid donors. "Donor countries" says Arnold, 
for example, "provide aid for reasons of self-
17
7interest." "The reasons that Egypt gets so much", 
pointed out the Economist /"is that the Carter adminis­
tration established at the time of the Camp David
Agreement in the late 1970s that Egypt should be regarded
by getting roughly as much as Israel." A West German 
Minister also told a Malawian audience that his Government 
"provides developmental aid on the basis of moral respon­
sibility as well as on the basis of far-sighted political
9considerations." Perhaps an American President
expressed the point better. He said:
"Let us remember that the main purpose of .....  aid
is not to help other nations, but to help 
ourselves."
In short, foreign aid, is said to be political because 
donors are said to provide it for their own selfish
motives. Therefore, the politics of foreign aid refer to
intrigues, or selfish motives, for which donors provide 
aid.
However, the self-interest argument, is an 
exaggeration. Not every item of foreign aid is provided on the 
basis of the donor's self-interest. Moreover, it is not 
easy to associate selfish motives with every instance of 
foreign aid such as Band Aid and the British emergency 
food distribution to the starving masses in Ethiopia in 
1985. Vincent Cable makes a detailed dissent to *-Ms 
self-interest argument. He writes:
18
"But this effort tends to detract from the problems 
of the majority of human beings in developing 
countries/ and a large majority of the poorest/ who 
live in rural areas in a small number of populous 
Asian countries. It is not obviously a British 
national interest to assist in alleviating this 
distress. The absolute poor scarcely impinge on the 
government of their own countries let alone on the 
international order. If there is a case for the 
British Government to be more involved in alleviating 
their poverty it is in the first instance a moral 
one/ it is best not to pretend otherwise."11
This is definitely a powerful anti-self-interest 
argument. It emphasises the point that not all foreign 
aid is political. Some of it is humanitarian.
This thesis assumes a political character to the 
foreign aid which is to be considered for two 
reasons. The first is that there is no intention to 
settle the question of whether foreign aid is humanitarian 
or political. As a result/ the motives for which donors 
are said to give foreign aid to Malawi are taken for 
granted. No effort is made to investigate them. For 
example, the thesis does not look into the reasons for 
which the World Bank, or West Germany, gives foreign aid 
to Malawi. Such motives are assumed to be political in 
keeping with the manner in which Malawi's behaviour in 
international relations is often explained. The point is
19
to see if foreign aid has, indeed, exerted the sort of 
influence which it is said to have had on Malawi.
The second reason is that the thesis is concerned 
with official foreign aid which is part of government 
activities. As such, it is reasonable to expect it to 
d q  influenced by, from time to time,tne political character of 
government. For example, a recipient government may 
accept a certain amount of foreign aid simply to demons­
trate that it really wants to maintain friendly relations 
with a particular donor government although it may, at the 
same time, have been offered a similar amount of foreign 
aid on better terms elsewhere. Similarly, a donor country 
may feel that it should promote its exports abroad through 
use of its aid. For example, a British Minister was 
quoted as saying: "...it is right at the present time to
give greater weight in the allocation of our aid to
political, industrial, and commercial considerations
12alongside our basic developmental objectives". In
other words, the category of foreign aid under conside­
ration is deemed political also because governments try, 
from time to time, to make some political gain out of it.
The foregoing does not mean that foreign aid is 
deemed political more or less as writers like Arnold do. 
What it means is that governments try to make political 
gains out of aid regardless of whether the aid was, in the 
first instance, disbursed for selfish motives. Clearly, 
this is different from saying that aid is provided for
20
self-interest reasons. It does not exclude the possibility 
that aid is in some cases provided as a matter of routine 
or the possibility that aid is also provided in the first 
instance for reasons other than selfish motives.
In short, the type of foreign aid under consideration 
is assumed to be political partly because it makes it 
easier to examine the sort of influence which foreign aid 
is said to have had on Malawi and partly because it is true 
that governments try, from time to time, to make political 
gains out of aid. It is only in this limited sense that 
the thesis will attribute a political character to the type 
of foreign aid under consideration.
Foreign Aid Effectiveness
Similarly controversial is the question of foreign aid 
effectiveness. Discussion of effectiveness or lack of it 
presupposes that foreign aid has the power to enable one to 
realize one's objectives. Such an assumption reflects the 
popular belief that money is power or that money can buy 
anything. The controversy has arisen because it is by no 
means certain that foreign aid has, indeed, such a power.
The expression "foreign aid effectiveness" has 
two aspects. One of them is utility. The power of 
foreign aid to cause anything is obviously not 
important per se. What is important is the power of 
foreign aid to bring about something which is desired.
For example, in the medical field, any medication is
21
regarded as ineffective if it does not cure a patient even 
though it may cause other effects in the patient. 
Similarly foreign aid is not effective if it does not 
enable a donor, or a recipient, to achieve its objectives.
The foregoing means that foreign aid can bring about
two sets of effects or influences. These are unintended
and intended effects. The latter are clearly instances of
foreign aid effectiveness. Their identification requires
an advance knowledge of the objectives for which foreign
aid is provided or accepted. This is indeed appreciated
in project evaluation. For example, the USAID insists on
defining clearly the objectives of any project for which
13it is called upon to finance.
The other important aspect is complexity. A little 
reflection shows that the concept covers a very wide 
scope. It can be political, economic, humanitarian, or 
commercial depending on the context in which it is to be 
considered. This means that it is necessary to specify 
the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned. 
Obviously economists are concerned with foreign aid's 
economic effectiveness while foreign policy analysts
at least ought to be concerned with foreign aid's 
political effectiveness.
It may be contended whether it is indeed necessary to 
specify the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is 
concerned. The answer is, yes. Failure to do so gives
22
the misleading impression that one is concerned with 
foreign aid effectiveness in all these aspects; economic/ 
political/ humanitarian, and commercial.Moreover, the
political objectives for which foreign aid is sometimes
said to be disbursed can contradict the economic
objectives for which a recipient country may receive
foreign aid. Certainly , foreign aid which is intended
to prevent a recipient country from industrializing should 
not be expected to promote economic development in the 
recipient country. Thus there is a case for specifying
the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned.
The debate which is currently going on among the
foreign aid experts illustrates the problems which arise
out of the failure to recognize the complexity of the
concept. The talk is simply about foreign aid
effectiveness. "Is foreign aid effective?" or,to put the
question in the terms in which it is expressed, "does foreign
aid work"? Bauer probably provoked the controversy when
he argued that "foreign aid is plainly not indispensable
to economic progress, and is indeed likely to obstruct
it", an argument the last part of which raises doubts
14about foreign aid economic effectiveness. On the
other hand, Robert Cassen has argued that a greater
proportion of foreign aid has been effective, an argument
15which also implies that foreign aid works.
These arguments by Bauer and Cassen need to be read 
with care because they can be quite misleading: not that
23
both Bauer and Cassen are misquoted here but that these 
arguments can be interpreted several ways. For example, 
Cassen's argument can be interpreted as meaning that 
foreign aid has also been politically effective while it 
is actually intended to mean only that foreign aid has 
been economically effective; that is, it has brought about 
some desired economic results. Indeed Cassen's argument
is based partly on a study which enquired whether foreign 
aid has promoted economic development in Malawi.^
Obviously foreign aid political effectiveness is what 
is of relevance to this thesis. This is often taken for 
granted and sometimes even exaggerated by many writers. 
For example, on the 40th Anniversary of the United
Nations, an American Senator was quoted as saying:
"Twenty years ago, Washington decided to open an 
Embassy in every new nation. A fine gesture, but it 
did not improve America's standing with all those
nations. It would do no harm to close a few of 
them. Let these governments pick up their foreign 
aid not in their capital cities, but at the U.S. 
Mission in New York. It would provide an opportunity 
to talk politics off the floor as we say in the
Senate".17
The passage was part of the Senator's suggestion on how to 
make the United Nations less anti-United States. It 
provides incidentally a good contrast between the potency
24
of foreign aid, the new instrument of foreign policy,
and the potency of diplomacy, the old instrument of 
foreign policy. The Senator clearly believes that foreign 
aid is the more effective instrument especially if it can 
be used in the manner he suggests.
Statements which reflect such faith in the potency of 
foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy abound. 
For example, James McManus, reported:
'both the Foreign Office and airline are aware of the 
threat, but for the moment, it is felt unlikely that 
the Zimbabwean leader will take such drastic action 
as banning British Airways from his airspace.
One reason is that British aid is running at £16 
million a year and the military training team is 
providing invaluable service to the Zimbabwe National 
Army".
Foreign aid is here expected to make President Mugabe 
unable to fulfill his threat.
The American Senator and McManus both had in mind the 
behaviour of the recipient governments. However, other 
writers go beyond that. They believe that foreign aid can 
influence even the behaviour of the general public in the 
recipient countries. For example, Dr. N. McMaster claimed:
25
"Delay was, I feel, part of the tragedy of the failure 
of Professor Lule's Provisional Government after the 
fall of Amin. While outsiders waited for evidence of 
success before giving aid, many within the country
vainly awaited manifestations of such support. Thus
. . 19mutual failure was half-anticipated."
The expression, "many within the country", is ambiguous? it 
could mean Ugandans or foreign diplomats who were resident 
in Uganda then. McMaster obviously meant the Ugandan 
public because the gist of his article was that had the 
donor countries then indicated levels of foreign aid 
commitments to Uganda, the Ugandans would have supported 
Professor Lule's Provisional Government. How this might 
have enabled Professor Lule's Government to survive 
opposition from the tanzanian troops who were in the 
country' capital, Kampala, at that time, is for McMaster to 
say, but the point of interest here is his belief that 
foreign aid would have had such an effect even on the 
Ugandan public.
In other words, many writers firmly believe in the 
potency of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. 
The assumption is that foreign aid is politically 
effective, that is, that it brings about desired political 
outcomes.
4
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Though relevant, foreign aid political effectiveness 
per se is not the main concern of this thesis. There is 
no intention to enquire whether foreign aid is indeed 
politically effective. Such an exercise would require 
knowledge of donor political objectives. Therefore, the 
concern here is with foreign aid impact. For example, the 
thesis looks at the impact which foreign aid is said to 
have had on Malawi. Foreign aid political effectiveness 
will be of concern only as one of the assumptions under­
lying the issues which are to be examined in the thesis.
The Concept of Dependence
Faith in the potency of foreign aid as an 
instrument of foreign policy now lies at the heart of a 
perspective, or framework, of political analysis called, 
"dependence". Now a portion of international politics is 
explained in terms of dependence. This was first cast in 
general economic terms and evidence in support it is
sought from various aspects of economics such as, interna­
tional trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid. 
However, some writers are now putting emphasis on foreign 
aid. For example, writing about the "North-South 
Dialogue", which is about relations between the developed 
and the developing countries, Arnold believes that foreign
i • • •  • 20
aid is the ma3or ingredient of the "Dialogue". Neil
Richardson also suggests that "foreign aid may be the
leading edge of dependence, nurturing a more malignant
21form of the syndrome." Leon Gordenker correctly
27
interprets views of certain writers as meaning that 
"foreign aid establishes a dependent relationship".22 
In other words, foreign aid is seen by some writers as the 
cornerstone of dependence.
The concept has found favour in Africa where a 
concept of neo-colonialism which has a similar meaning has 
long been in use. Each concept is used to mean that the 
sovereignty of the African states is not real, but is 
something of an illusion because relations between the 
African states and the former colonial powers remain 
basically the same. It is true that there are some minor 
differences between the two concepts. Neo-colonialism is 
a political concept and refers, at least in terms of how 
its author, the late President Nkrumah of Ghana, sometimes 
used it, to attempts by the former colonial powers to 
subvert the sovereignty of their former colonies. On the 
other hand, dependence is a socio-economic concept, that 
is a concept which is meant to cover economic, cultural 
and political issues. It posits a dominant/subordinate 
relationship. However, the two concepts are now used 
practically as synonyms.
Malawi is one of those countries which are taken as
excellent examples of dependence. "There are several
African countries", says Gerald Helleiner, (among them
Rwanda, Burundi, Niger, Upper Volta, Somalia, and even
such countries as Malawi and Tunisia)with an extraordinary
23degree of dependence. Kathryn Morton, indeed,
28
examines Malawi's relations with Britain in terms of aid 
and dependence.
Though popular, the dependence perspective has many
flaws. The first is vagueness. Indeed, Bauer summarily
dismisses its "sister-concept”, neo-colonialism, on the
ground that it obscures rather than illuminates 
24issues. The various ways by which dependence has been
defined illustrate his point. for example, Christopher
Hill defines it as "the undoubted fact that those
countries that are without hope of escaping from poverty
or low international status ....  share a very real
25condition of reliance on the developed world". This
definition contains the element of poverty which is also
emphasized by Gerald Helleiner who says that "one may well
wonder whether the word "dependence" adds anything to
one's understanding of the Third World's essential dilemma
2 6of poverty and powerlessness." To Christopher Hill
and Helleiner, at least, dependence and poverty are 
synonyms.
On the other hand, Joel Gregory, defines dependence
as "the result of unequal relationship where the weaker of
27the parties is dominated by the stronger." The
element of poverty is absent and "unequal relationship" is 
posited as the important element of dependence. White 
similarly leaves out poverty and defines dependence as a 
condition of constraint in which the "dependent" power is 
unable to make certain domestic choices within some
29
recognized and conventionally accepted range of options, 
unless some sort of permissive or enabling action is taken 
by the dominant power, and in which such constraints are
2 Q
very unevenly distributed between the two." The
important element in this regard is not poverty or unequal
relationship but unevenly "distributed constraints." This
reads like a summary of what Neil Richardson calls
"asymmetrical interdependence" which he equates with 
2 9dependence. Dos Santos , a leading exponent of
concept, defines it as "a situation in which the economy
of certain countries is conditioned by the development and
expansion of another economy to which the former is 
30subjected." Here, the important element is
"situation".
In short, dependence is said to be "poverty", 
"unequal relationship", "unevenly distributed
constraints", "asymmetrical interdependence", and 
"situation", terms some of which are themselves vague. 
Other definitions which have not been quoted here -put 
emphasis on "structural rigidities" or "imbalance". If 
dependence is each one of them, what exactly is its 
meaning?
The second flaw is that features of dependence manifest 
themselves also in the relations among the developed countries 
themselves. For example, a British Econometric Forecast­
ing Association, recently predicted that "a sharp dollar
31depreciation would cut economic growth m  Britain".
30
This is because, as Lord Cromer was also to explain later,
the ’Smithsonian Accord of 1973 endows one national
currency, the U.S. dollar, with the role of benchmark
against which the market value of all other national
32currencies should be measured." Perhaps Enoch
Powell, in a more exaggerated sense, recently made a 
similar observation. He wrote:
"On September 21 this year the American Government
issued summons to the finance Ministers of three
European nations and Japan to attend a meeting at 24
hours' notice to receive instructions. Without
exception they dropped whatever they were doing - the
British Chancellor of the Exchequer dashed from an
E.E.C. financial conference at Strasbourg - flew to
Washington. There they were told that the value of
the dollar against their respective currencies was
too high and that unless they took immediate steps to
reduce it, the United States would retaliate by
penalizing, or excluding their exported goods.
33Without a murmur they submitted and filed out*.
Such an observation uncomfortably suggests that the 
concept is also applicable to relations between the
developed countries themselves. Indeed, Dudley Seers
expressed this view. He wrote:
"No European can fail to hear some echoes in 
dependency of our problems. While structural
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rigidities are not the same as in Latin America, they
are conspicuous here too - especially in countries
geographically on the periphery of Europe, such as
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and
Turkey, but also to some extent Finland, Britain, and
Italy. Such rigidities have been evidenced as in
Latin America - though not quite so drastically - by
chronic inflation and persistent deficits. Moreover,
these countries are increasingly dependent on the
core of Europe and all, even the most advanced, have
been heavily penetrated by foreign based
34transnational cooperations.”
However, to apply the concept to relations between the 
developed countries, as Seers implied, is to defeat the 
very purpose for which the concept is advocated; that is 
to distinguish relations between the developing and the 
developed countries from relations between the developed 
countries. Therefore, the other problem with the 
application of the concept is the arbitrariness in which 
it has to be applied.
Finally, the third difficulty which the application 
of the concept of dependence also raises in practice, is 
that it overlooks competition among the developed 
countries. The validity of the concept requires one to 
visualize relations in totality between the developed 
countries, on one hand, and the developing countries, on 
the other. For example, Jan Jorgensen talks about the
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Ugandan economy as being "subordinate to world 
35economy" while Christopher Hill talks about the poor 
countries as having reliance on the "developed world". 
However, this gives the false impression that the world 
consists of a "developed economy" interacting with a 
"developing economy". The developing economy is then seen 
either in totality or in its parts to be dependent on the 
developed economy for a host of things, particularly 
foreign aid. Seen in that context, there is indeed much 
to be said for the concept.
However, the real world is different. Some 
developing countries, particularly those in Asia and 
Africa, are geographically remote to the developed 
countries. While this is a disadvantage in terms of 
copying and adoption of modern technology, the distance 
actually gives them, certainly the developing countries in 
Africa and Asia, some freedom of action. They can change 
at least from one donor to another with relative ease. 
For example, Somalia shifted its friendship from the 
Soviet Union to the United States in 1977 and Egypt 
similarly not only chased out hundreds of Soviet Union 
advisers after the 1973 Arab/Israeli War but also began to 
receive massive United States foreign aid after the 
conclusion of the Camp David Agreement in 1978. Very few 
Latin American countries can do so without risking 
American military intervention. In other words, the 
relative remoteness of the African countries from the
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major powers, makes the African friendship available to 
the highest bidder.
Moreover, the developed world is not monolithic. It 
consists of a number of economies which fiercely compete 
with each other. This also means some freedom of action 
for each developing country. Indeed, it explains why the 
Cuban sugar industry has survived years of American 
embargo and also accounts for the "economic miracles" of
Taiwan and South Korea, and the up-coming ones of
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, events and 
possibilities which cannot be accounted for in terms of
the concept of dependence.
In short, dependence is here also dismissed as a
vague concept which is arbitrarily applied and which 
overlooks competition among developed countries. This is 
not a novel conclusion. Sanjay Lall makes the same 
argument. He wrote:
"we conclude, therefore, that the concept of 
dependence as applied to less developed countries is 
impossible to define and cannot be shown to be 
casually related to a continuance of underdevelop­
ment. It is usually given an arbitrarily selective 
definition which picks certain features of a much 
broader phenomenon of international capitalist
development, and its selectivity only serves to
3 6misdirect analysis and research in this area."
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This is the manner in which neo-colonialism, or dependence,
will be treated in this thesis.
Some Views About the Foreign Policies of African States
Since foreign aid is seen to bestow a dependence
status upon its recipients, it follows that the developing
countries are "dependence states". This in turn raises
the question of whether the foreign policies of such
states are really foreign policies. One conception of the
foreign policies of African states indeed has it that the
policies are not foreign policies in the conventional
sense, but are merely declaratory because a disparity is
said to exist between the "operational" and "declaratory"
. . 37levels of these policies. Peter Calvert even goes so
far as to say that the foreign policy of a developing
3 8country is an illusion. By "declaratory policy** is
meant a policy which is a mere "pronouncement", or a mere 
expression, of national aspirations which is not supported 
by deeds or actions. The corollary of this is that the 
foreign policies of the non-African states are foreign 
policies in the conventional sense because their "declaratory" 
and "operational" levels are said to match. The "decla­
ratory" argument, in other words, claims that it is only
the stated intentions of African Governments which are in 
most cases not matched with action in foreign affairs.
It is true that the "declaratory" level of the
foreign policies of some African states sometimes falls
35
short of the operational level. One has only to go by 
some of the statements which some African states make 
particularly in multilateral fora like the United Nations 
General Assembly or the Assembly of Heads of State of the 
Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). However, Malawi 
has been a challenge to this "declaratory" conception of 
the foreign policies of African States. This is because 
it has matched its stated intentions with deeds. As a 
result, there has been a difference of opinion on whether 
its foreign policies are merely "declaratory."
McMaster, despite the title of her thesis on Malawi's 
foreign relations, clearly thought that they are 
"declaratory". For example, she wrote:
"Dr. Banda's foreign policy, using policy here in the
sense of his preferences about the direction and
manner in which Nyasaland’s foreign relations should
develop, and his pronouncements about situations
within the international system was an integral part
39of his concept of national interest." -----
Indeed, the appropriate title of her study ought to be;
"Malawi: Declaratory Policy and Development." On the
other hand, the supervisor of her thesis held the opposite 
view. For example, he wrote about Malawi s external relations.
"...unlike the situation elsewhere, however, there is 
a fairly close alignment between the operational and 
declaratory levels at which policy is conducted,
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between, that is, what the state does on a day-to-day
basis and President Banda's more general pronounce-
40
ments about external relations."
The supervisor's observation is correct. The existence of 
the Malawi Embassy in Pretoria, the South African Embassy 
in Lilongwe, and the 1966 Malawi/South Africa trade 
agreement are all evidence that Malawi has matched its 
declared intentions with deeds. McMaster's own thesis, 
despite her argument, is, in a sense, also evidence that 
Malawi's policies are not mere "pronouncements" since the 
thesis is about Malawi's dealings with the Portuguese who 
were in Mozambique, with South Africa, with Rhodesia, and 
with Malawi's other neighbours.
However, the point in this chapter is not that 
Malawi's policies are different from those of other African 
countries but that the concept of "a declaratory policy" is 
not a sound one. The concept raises the question whether 
the disparity between the "declaratory and the operational" 
levels of policy is evident only in the foreign policies of 
African states. The answer has obviously to be in the 
negative because disparities between the "operational" and 
the "declaratory" levels of policy are also evident in the 
foreign policies of many non-African states. For example, 
Henry Kissinger, in reference to the Soviet Union told the 
United Nations General Assembly:
"We shall pursue the relaxation of tensions on the 
basis of strict reciprocity. We know the difference
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between posturing and policy; we will not encourage
the belief that anyone can benefit from artificial 
,.41tensions.
This was clearly a reference to a disparity in the 
"declaratory" and the "operational" levels of the foreign 
policy of even the Soviet Union. It might be contended 
that such disparities are observed more in connection with 
the foreign policies of African states than in connection 
with the policies of non-African states. However, to do 
so is to beg the further question of an acceptable 
criterion on the basis of which such judgment can be 
based. How is one to come to that conclusion? Therefore, 
the view which is entertained in this thesis is that the 
"declaratory" concept is unnecessary and is arbitrarily 
applied to the foreign policies of African states.
Another conception of the foreign policies of African
states has it that those policies are not foreign policies
in the conventional sense but are "mere pronouncements"
made for domestic consumption. John Howell observed that
"it would appear that where foreign policy issues touch
directly on primary Kenyan interests - say national
security, national development - the overt radicalism of
Kenya's broad international policy is subjected to
considerable restraint." This observation is often cited
as supporting evidence of this conception of the foreign
42policies of African states." Its corollary is that 
the foreign policies of non-African states are formulated
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and implemented without domestic considerations. This view 
of African policies probably accounts in part for the 
foreign aid interpretation of Malawi's behaviour in 
international relations. This is because such a view 
implies that scholars should concentrate their attention on 
the domestic factors of the foreign policies of African 
states.
Like the "declaratory argument", this conception also
raises the question of whether domestic considerations are
a feature peculiar to the foreign policies of African
states. This again is a question which can be settled only
on the basis of an acceptable criterion, the absence of
which gives rise to the same charge of arbitrariness. This
is because domestic considerations also enter into the
formulation and implementation of the foreign policies of
non-African states. For example, President Carter's human
rights foreign policy was clearly an attempt to assure,the
American public that American values are not neglected in
the formulation and implementation of the country's foreign 
. . 43policies. To take another example, President Gorbachev
of the Soviet Union said:
"I strive naturally, for the essence, the main
directedness of the Soviet state's foreign policy to
be understood better. Like the foreign policy of any
state, it is determined first of all by internal 
44
requirements."
Moreover, one would expect the opposite to be 
probably the case with regard to the foreign policies of
39
African states. The said "mere pronouncements" on 
international issues are made by the African leaders 
probably for external consumption. This is because, with 
a high rate of illiteracy, a much smaller section of the
public in most of the African states would really
understand such things as "non-alignment" or the
"East/West confrontation." Therefore, the conception 
exaggerates the importance of domestic factors in the
formulation and implementation of the foreign polices of 
African states.
Finally, still another conception of the foreign 
policies of African states has it that the foreign 
policies of African states are not foreign policies in the 
conventional sense because the African states are, 
allegedly, not in a position to influence the "external 
environment". John White summarized the argument better.
He wrote:
"In general, it is characteristic of relatively weak 
countries that they must take the composition of 
their external environment as given. The Government, 
operating in the field of external relations, has to 
use as best it can those elements of which the 
external environment happens willy-nilly to be com­
posed. As conventionally understood, changing or 
sustaining the external environment is the aim of 
foreign policies. They have policies for manipula-
40
ting the way in which the external environment
4 5encroaches upon the domestic."
This passage raises an interesting question concerning the
difference between "changing" and "manipulating" the external
environment. Apparently, there is a difference between
the two. Its disarming expressions are "as conventionally
understood" and "In this conventional sense." It is by
no means clear what White meant by these expressions. By
them, he was probably referring to the opinions of certain
scholars of foreign policy. Probably among them were
those of Rosenau who, in one of his works, says that
"attempts to exercise control over the environment
46constitute" foreign policy and also says, in another
of his works, that foreign policy is "the authoritative
actions which Governments take or are committed to take,
in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of the
international environment, or alter its undesirable 
47aspect." The expressions, "the environment" and "the 
international environment" reflect the assumption of an 
external environment operating uniformly irrespective of 
whether it is a weak or strong state. Rosenau repeats 
this in his more elaborate definition of foreign policy.
He wrote:
"Such an enumeration seems best begun with the 
premise that at the heart of foreign policy is a 
concern with sequences of interaction, perceptual and 
behavioural, which span national boundaries and which
41
unfold in three basic stages. The first or initiatory 
stage involves the activities, conditions, and
influences - human and non-human - that stimulate 
national actors to undertake efforts to modify 
circumstances in their external environments. The
second or implementative stage consists of the
activities, conditions, and influences, through which 
the stimuli of the initiatory stages are translated 
into purposeful actions directed at modifying objects 
in the external environment. The third, or response 
stage denotes the activities, conditions, and
influences that comprise the reaction and the
objective of the modification attempts. The three 
stages so defined encompass reflectively the
independent, intervening, and dependent variables of
4 8foreign policy analysis."
As a definition of foreign policy, it is a poor 
demarcation of the subject matter. True to the prevailing 
belief that such entities as Lonrho, or the Mobil Oil 
Company, are also important actors on the international 
scene, it does, indeed, blur the importance of governmental 
decisions and encompass almost everything which criss­
crosses the national boundaries. However, foreign policy 
is a governmental activity and cannot properly be under­
stood without attaching importance to governmental 
decisions. What followed the death of 35 Italian football 
fans after a stampede in 1985 by English football fans in 
Belgium was, indeed a sequence of interaction which spanned
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almost all the international boundaries in Western 
Europe. However, one is also struck by the ease and 
swiftness with which the British Government decided to 
let a group of some of the English football fans face 
trial in a court of a foreign power. No doubt this was 
possible for the House of Lords to do because the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office obviously had nothing to do with 
the incident in the first place. One only needs to 
contrast this with what the Green Peace incident affecting 
New Zealand and France led to. The latter was clearly a 
foreign policy matter.
The definition will receive further attention later. 
At the moment, the point relates to the assumption in the 
passage of an external environment operating uniformly 
with respect to each state and overpoweringly to small 
states, an argument which is expressed more forcefully by 
ChristopherClapham who writes:
"At one extreme, there are states such as Swaziland
or Lesotho which are so closely tied to South Africa
that they are scarcely in a position to have a
49foreign policy at all..."
Though forceful, this argument overlooks frequent 
complaints by some Western powers against the politici­
zation of some specialized international organizations 
allegedly by the developing countries and the adverse 
economic consequences of the activities of the oil-
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exporting countries' cartel for the past decade. Plainly,
it was a handful of African states which really brought
about the collapse of the Portuguese empire world-wide in
the middle of the 1970s. Such profound changes in the
external environment brought about by the weak states can
only be overlooked to satisfy biased analysis of foreign
policy. Moreover, the argument is a sad retrogression on
an issue in foreign policy analysis which was thoroughly
dealt with by Harold and Margaret Sprout in their article,
"Environmental Factors in the Study of International 
. . 50Politics." It is so m  so far as it implies that the 
external environment operates the same way with respect to 
each state. It raises anew the question of the definition of 
the environment and its relevance in decision making.
The view subscribed to in this thesis is that of the
Sprouts, which in simple terms says that the importance
of environmental factors in decision making consists of 
51two parts. The first part is a set of factors,
physical as well as cultural, which environs, or 
surrounds, the decision makers of a state or institution. 
The factors could be lack of access to the sea or the 
existence of an obnoxious regime in a neighbouring 
country. The Sprouts call the set of such factors, 
"operational environment." The other part is the decision 
maker's perceptions of their operational environment. The 
importance of the environment in decision-making comes 
only when the "operational environment" is perceived by 
the decision makers and after having been perceived is
44
taken account of in the decision-making process. The 
question of perception will receive attention latter, but 
it is important to note that what the Sprouts mean, in 
essence, is that the importance of environmental factors 
in decision-making is largely a matter of human judgment.
The foregoing means that the importance of environ­
mental factors in decision-making can sometimes be over­
looked or down-played by the decision makers. It also 
means that the "operational environment" varies in
relation to each state. The existence of Apartheid in 
South Africa is clearly an important environmental factor 
for Lesotho, Swaziland, and, indeed, many other countries 
in Southern Africa. On the other hand, the existence of 
Lesotho is itself an important environmental factor for
South Africa because Lesotho, so long as it exists, is a 
potential operational base of African Nationalist
guerrillas against Apartheid in South Africa. Such
environmental factors are not strictly speaking important 
to the United States, or the Soviet Union, and are not of 
their making.
The foreign policies of the United States and the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), illustrate the point better. 
On the face of it, both countries are committed to 
fighting Communism. However, a close look at the
objectives of their foreign policies shows an interesting 
difference between the attitudes and goals of the two
countries towards communism. The United States is
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committed to eradicating communism per se wherever it is
whereas Taiwan is committed to eradicating only
Chinese Communism. Were the Mainland Chinese to give up
communism, Taiwan would see its present anti-communism
crusade as having come to an end while the United States
would see its present anti-communism crusade as having
come to an end only after communism had been eradicated
52everywhere in the world.
In short, the external environment varies with 
respect to each state. This is because it has partly to 
do with local circumstances for each state. To paraphrase 
Bertrand Russell's "qualitative description of Epstein's 
law of gravitation", each state finds its own external 
envi ronment.^
The thesis regards the foreign policies of African 
states as foreign policies in the conventional sense. 
Accordingly, it treats Malawi's foreign policies as 
foreign policies and not as illusions, or mere pronounce­
ments of the country's President. Naturally this raises 
the question of the definition of foreign policy. How 
then is the nature of foreign policy to be understood in 
this thesis? The expression, "foreign policy", includes 
two words each of which is not easy to explain. However, 
to simplify matters, by "foreign" is meant here anything 
which has to do with whatever is beyond a country's 
national borders. This leaves policy which is the more 
difficult word to define. One thing to say about it, is
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that it has to do with problems or issues. This is 
because it is problems, or issues, which raise the need 
for policy. In the case of foreign policy, problems or 
issues are sometimes called the external stimuli or even 
the operational environment. In short policy has to do 
with problems, particularly in government which is largely 
a problem solving oriented institution.
For example, in government the operational slogan
. . 54is: "better any decision than no decision." In fact,
policy is simply another term for decision, or a term for
a certain type of decision. As Hilsman emphasises: "what
55is decided is policy." Where there are decisions in 
government, there may be policy or policies, but certainly 
there is no policy where there are no decisions in 
government.
However, not every decision is policy. Some decisions 
merely explain how something or how certain things should 
be done. Such decisions are guidelines or operational 
procedures. Policy is that decision of the government 
which demands certain action. It involves choice in that 
it permits certain activities at the same time that it 
forbids, or shuns, others and sometimes has explicit 
objectives which are defined in reference to a problem. 
Therefore, foreign policy is a government decision which 
demands the performance of certain activities in relation 
to a country's operational environment.
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The "Foreign Aid Argument"
Some writers explain Malawi's behaviour in interna­
tional relations on the basis of the country's need for 
foreign aid. Their focus is on foreign aid and the 
country's foreign and domestic policies are seen as 
resulting from the country's need for foreign aid in order 
to achieve development. Implicit in all this are the 
assumptions that foreign aid is politically effective and 
that development is an overriding priority of the Malawi 
Government. In a nutshell, this is the "foreign aid 
argument" which is to be considered in this thesis. It 
posits a link between the politics of foreign aid and 
Malawi's foreign and domestic policies.
The argument is so prevalent that it permeates almost
alx post - independence political literature on Malawi.
"The emergence of one of the most conservative political
regimes in Africa in the 1960's from a country with one of
the most militant nationalist movement", says John
McClacken, "took place because of Malawi's dependence on
the south",56 a point which is also maintained by Speck
who says "that Malawi has been increasingly attracted
into the southern orbit is a result, above all else, of
57economic factors". "As he saw it", says Derek Ingram 
about the President of Malawi, "the only hope of improving 
his people's lot was to cooperate with the White
C Q
South." The list of such arguments can easily be 
extended.
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It is true that the arguments in the foregoing 
paragraph attribute economic motive to Malawi's behaviour 
in the Southern African regional politics. However, 
emphasis is often placed on foreign aid. For example, 
Henry Richardson claims that Malawi was attracted by South 
African offers of foreign aid. He writes:
"It is orchestrating its expanding influence with a
subtle harmony of technical assistance, liberal trade
arrangements, soft loans and massive propaganda
efforts punctuated by an occasional threatening blast
of military retaliation under the guise of rigorous
and consistent anti-communism. To a small nation in
urgent need of vital resources, it is a siren's song
59not easily resisted."
This emphasis on foreign aid is centred on Malawi's new 
capital city project. The argument is that Malawi turned 
to the south in order to get South African foreign aid for 
the construction of its new capital city. It seemed to 
the President, says Philip Short, "that the only country 
which might be willing to take the risk of this magnitude,
if he could offer enough in return, was South Africa which
badly needed a breakthrough in its outward looking
policy."60 David T. Williams, despite his misgivings 
with this emphasis on foreign aid for explaining the 
policy, expresses the same point more succinctly, saying 
that the President "was much obligated to South
*
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Africa for that country's assistance in removing Malawi's 
seat of Government from Zomba to Lilongwe."
This "foreign aid argument" is the content of a
pamphlet which is titled: "Malawi: Dialogue and
6 2Development." Its author, or authors, chose to remain 
anonymous apparently to enhance the authenticity of the 
information and validity of the argument in it. As most 
development activities in Malawi are financed with foreign 
aid, the title might as well have read; "Malawi: Dialogue 
and Foreign Aid", "Dialogue" being one of two words by 
which Malawi's policy towards South Africa is known. 
Thus, the pamphlet links Malawi's policy of "Contact and 
Dialogue" to foreign aid considerations. The argument is 
that this policy was adopted, and has been pursued, for 
reasons of obtaining foreign aid from South Africa.
Richard Hall apparently found confirmation in the 
operation, or implementation, of the policy. He wrote:
"In financial terms, this has paid off for Malawi. 
Banda's plansfor moving his capital from Zomba in the 
extreme south of Malawi to the more central town of 
Lilongwe were condemned by an economic team from 
Britain. The team said the idea was wasteful. So 
the South Africans were invited to make a study and 
Vorster sent up one of his advisers, Dr. L.S. 
Rutenback. This time, the response was favourable 
and Pretoria went further - it offered Malawi
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£4,700/000 loan to build the new capital. Private
investment followed and Banda could boast an economic
upsurge in a country which three years before had
6 3been called a rural slum."
In short, Malawi's behaviour in Southern African
politics is explained in terms of its desire to obtain 
foreign aid from South Africa.
The pamphlet confines the argument to Malawi's
behaviour in Southern Africa. On the other hand, Carolyn
McMaster extends it to Malawi's behaviour in international
relations in general. Her book is also titled: Malawi:
Foreign Policy and Development. linking the country's
64foreign policy to foreign aid consideration. Her
argument is that Malawi adopted, and has pursued, the 
foreign policy it has been following for reasons of 
attracting foreign aid. For example she wrote:
"Malawi's participation in the global international 
systems is modest, the main objectives of her foreign 
policy with respect to countries outside Africa being 
to achieve the maximum development benefits from 
these contacts through loans and grants, technical 
assistance, private investment and assured markets 
for her agricultural produce.
McMaster's suggestion of how the policy should be 
considered, in keeping with her emphasis on foreign aid,
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leads her also to link the country's economic policies to 
foreign aid considerations. For example, she suggests that 
"because these contacts are primarily economic ones, the 
extent and nature of the link can most conveniently be 
considered in the context of an examination of the 
direction of Malawi's economic development since indepen­
dence."66 In keeping with this suggestion, she argues 
that "the course of development pursued in Malawi has not 
been accompanied by a socialist philosophy such as that 
outlined in President Nyerere's Arusha Declaration or by a
declaratory commitment to the nationalization of foreign 
6 7enterprises." This latter quotation is from a
paragraph which comes in her book immediately after a
6 8subheading: "Attracting Aid and Foreign Investment."
Thus the country's foreign policy is here presented
as being just one of the country's policies which have
been pursued for foreign aid considerations. The others
are the economic policies. These are also said to have
been adopted, and to have been pursued, for similar
reasons. Kapota Mwakasungura agrees with her. "Is it
coincidental", he inquired, "that in the same year as the
World Bank moved into Malawi with a big bang .... Malawi
officially proclaimed it would adopt a capitalist path to
development?", an inquiry which clearly portrays the
Malawi Government as having adopted a capitalist economic
6 9policy in order to woo the World Bank to itself. 
Mwakasungura elaborated the point. He wrote:
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" the realization of such a strategy of
development has inevitably meant relying heavily on
foreign sources of capital to finance rural
development programmes and consequently on pandering
to the material needs of those foreign sources of 
"70finance...
In short, Malawi's economic and development policies are 
often presented as having been adopted to make Malawi 
attractive to donor countries and organizations.
This alleged link between the country's policies and 
foreign aid touches on the question of perception. 
Obviously/ this is an important element in decision­
making. For what is decided upon depends in the first 
instance on whether it had been perceived. As decision is 
currently an important analytical concept in foreign
policy analysis, it is not surprising that this question
71has received considerable attention m  some studies.
According to psychologists, a perception consists of
two important elements. These are a stimulus and an
interpretation. The former is said to be capable of
several interpretations while the latter presupposes an
agent which can be a person or a dog. When presented with
a stimulus, a person selects an interpretation which makes
sense to him. He selects one interpretation without being
aware of several other possible interpretations of the 
72stimulus.
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The foregoing means that when one perceives, one is 
involved in an exercise of choice without being aware of 
it. Naturally, this raises the question of how a parti­
cular interpretation of stimulus gets selected. Again, 
the experts say that an interpretation of a stimulus gets
selected on the basis of one's existing personal values or 
73beliefs. An interpretation of a stimulus which is
consistent with one's beliefs, or system of beliefs, gets 
selected and may be acted upon.
This in turn means that the importance of any factor 
in decision-making is largely a matter of human judgment.
It is up to the decision - makers whether to attach 
importance to foreign aid or a country's geography in 
decision-making. The alleged link between foreign aid and 
the country's foreign and domestic policies implies that 
the Malawi decision-makers, particularly the President, 
attached importance to attracting foreign aid in the 
formulation of the country's foreign and domestic 
policies. This is apparently evident from the quotations 
which are made from some statements made by the President, 
alleged origin of the country's foreign and domestic 
policies, references to certain events, the interpretation 
made from the role of geography in the policy” making of 
the country, and the allegedly capitalist nature of the country's 
economic system and development strategy.
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The alleged link between the country's foreign and 
domestic policies and foreign aid confines the role of 
foreign aid to that of influencing the perceptions of the 
Malawi decision-makers. It leaves some scope for the 
decision-makers' initiative. At least, the decision makers 
are assumed to have made the decisions. However, the 
"foreign aid argument" goes further than that. It also 
projects the Malawi Government as having merely oeen. • 
endorsing policies particularly the economic policies, 
which in practice, are said to have been made by foreign 
experts.
For example, the foreign experts, in the first place,
are said to have preferred "tough advice" to the Malawi
Government. "He has been fortunate," claimed a Times
correspondent in reference to the President, "in being
generally well advised by the large number of white
74expatriates who continued to work m  Malawi." Here
almost every expatriate is portrayed as having advised the
President. "Official help from outside," said the
Economist , "has been most effective where tough advice
has been taken by African Governments (Malawi and Botswana
75in the 1970s, Ghana and Zambia recently)."
In the second place, the foreign experts are said to 
have exercised disproportionate influence. A forward note 
to Andrew Ross's article claims that the "expatriate civil 
servants and advisers retained quite a disproportionate 
political importance (by comparative standards) since the
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incumbent ministers are in general singularly ill-equipped
to initiate or supervise coherent, consequent developmental
7 6policies." This means that expatriates have been de-
facto decision-makers.
The expression, "tough advice", and "disproportionate 
political importance" are euphemisms for saying that the 
expatriates were the ones who formulated policy. "The 
reality of the second half of the century", Gordenker 
wrote, "is that economic and social programs may have 
steadily eroded the margins of de facto domestic juris­
diction." 77 The economic and social programs which are 
seen to have eroded part of the domestic jurisdiction are 
those recommended by the international personnel, according 
to Gordenker. Hodder Williams makes this point explicit in 
connection with Malawi. He wrote:
"Nevertheless the impact of the expatriate community 
must have been considerable especially in the crucial 
period immediate after independence when long-term 
strategies in both domestic and foreign policies were 
established."7 8
This is an argument which at least suggests that the 
expatriates influenced the country's foreign and domestic 
policies. Mwakasungura is similarly explicit. He wrote:
"The record of British "aid" to Malawi after 
independence and the amount of influence at the
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highest levels of government exercised by the
officials has been well told by Kathryn Morton.
Others have written about the role played by
expatriates in determining policy direction and even
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the choice of priorities...m  development."
The word, "aid", is put in the passage in inverted commas. 
No doubt this is intended to indicate that what it refers 
to is not aid at all but something else. A footnote 
explains that the last sentence of the passage refers to 
Henry Richardson's article, part of which has also been 
quoted here. Therefore, the point is that Morton and 
Richardson are the ones who say that Malawi policies were 
decided upon by the expatriates.
No doubt there is an element of misinterpretation of 
Morton's book and Richardson's article which Mwakasungura 
refers to. However, there is much in support of what 
Mwakasungura says about what the two authors wrote 
concerning Malawi. Mwakasungura himself belies that the 
expatriates made the country's economic policies. For 
examples, referring to the domination of Malawi's civil 
service by British expatriates in the early days of the 
country's independence, he says that the "British took full 
advantage of the situation to introduce their pre­
independence plans and to shelve the 1962-65 Development 
Plan which did constitute a people's plan with its 
emphasis on peasant agriculture." "It is no wonder,
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therefore," he went on, "that a discredited agricultural 
policy pursued throughout the colonial period with
disastrous effects on African development was now being
8 0revived." This point is echoed by Simon Thomas who says 
that the President "returned to the colonial master farmer 
policy, although it was now called the Achikumbe 
(progressive farmer) policy." 81
In short, the British expatriates are said to have 
proffered "tough advice", "retained quite a disproport­
ionate political importance", and "reintroduced their pre­
independence development and agricultural policies." In 
other words, the expatriates played the role of de facto 
decision-makers of the country.
This is as far as the "foreign aid argument" goes. 
It consists of three distinct but related arguments. These 
are:
1. That Malawi's foreign and domestic policies were 
adopted and have been pursued for reasons of 
making Malawi attractive to donor countries and 
organizations ?
2. That, in addition to have been adopted for 
foreign aid consideration, the country's economic 
and development policies are said to have 
themselves been formulated and decided upon by 
the British expatriates, and
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3. That the British expatriates were de facto 
decision-makers of the country.
Underlying the arguments is the assumption that
development is an overriding priority of a developing
country’s government. Leon Gordenker makes this
assumption explicit. "Because economic development is the
very stuff of politics - the kernel of crucial decision -
in many less developed countries (L.D.C.)", he says, "the
work of international organizations necessarily and
increasingly touches on controversial delicate national 
8 2issues." Therefore, if the expatriates made the
country's economic and development policies, they were 
Malawi's de facto decision-makers.
This is the "foreign aid argument" with which the 
thesis is concerned. It will be examined in all its three 
aspects. To that end, attention will centre on the 
evidence which is often cited in support of it as well as
the assumption underlying it. In addition, a look at the~
sort of impact which foreign aid really has had in Malawi 
will be made with a view to seeing if it tallies with the 
"foreign aid argument".
The Approach To The Subject
The thesis reflects a state-centric approach to
international politics. By state-centric approach is
meant the assumption that sovereign states are the chief
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actors of international politics. A sympathy for this 
approach runs through the thesis as is attested to by the 
criticism earlier against Rosenau's definition of foreign 
policy. The reason for it is largely the result of the 
nature of the subject-matter of the thesis.
As already explained, the thesis is concerned with 
that type of foreign aid which passes from government to 
government. It is true that part of the foreign aid to be 
considered is from the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), African Development Bank 
(A.D.B.) and the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) to 
the Malawi Government. Although these organizations have 
policies of their own, the funds which they give to 
developing countries as aid come in the first place from 
governments and are much influenced by the views of the 
rich countries which provide their funds. The aid which 
they provide is, as a result, regarded as part and parcel 
of official aid. In other words, the context of the thesis 
is state-centric largely because the thesis is an analysis 
of state interaction.
The treatment of the data in the thesis is a simple 
one. Efforts are made to relate the meaning of this of that 
idea or claim to this or that known and available item of 
information on Malawi. In short, the method is simply that 
of a critical analysis of ideas and facts in search of the 
truth. Its purpose is to clear the way for a study which 
hopefully others will undertake to provide a correct and 
accurate understanding of Malawi's behaviour in 
international relations.
i
60
Organization
The thesis is divided into six chapters and a
conclusion. The introduction forms the first chapter of
the thesis. This is followed by chapter two which will
examine the evidence often cited in support for the
alleged link between foreign aid and the country's foreign 
policies. Implicit in the discussion will be the question 
of perception. This will receive some attention at the 
end of the chapter. Similarly chapter three will look at 
the evidence which is often cited in support for the 
alleged link between foreign aid and the country's 
economic policies.
Chapter four will examine some alleged affects of 
Malawi's foreign and domestic policies. Attention will 
centre on some misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient 
of foreign aid. In a sense, the discussion will be a 
consideration of additional evidence which apparently also 
supports the alleged link between foreign aid and Malawi’s 
foreign and domestic policies.
Chapter five will look at the role of foreign experts 
in Malawi. Attention will centre on the evidence which is 
often cited in support for the argument that foreign 
experts were the ones who decided on Malawi's foreign and 
domestic policies particularly the economic policies. In 
other words, the chapter will look at an issue which goes 
beyond the question of perception. It will touch on the
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question of the role of bureaucracy in decision-making. 
Finally, chapter six will look at the major assumptions of 
the "foreign aid argument". These are the assumption that 
development is the "stuff of politics" in developing 
countries and the assumption that foreign aid is 
politically effective. In addition, the chapter will look 
at the impact which foreign aid indeed has had in Malawi.
The conclusion will not only summarize the important 
points to be covered in the thesis but also spells out 
further important issues which can only be touched upon in 
the thesis. In all, the thesis is a critical examination 
of the effects which the politics of foreign aid are said 
to have had on Malawi.
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Chapter Two 
Foreign Policies 
Introduction
This chapter looks at the evidence which is often 
cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid 
and Malawi's foreign policies. To that end, it will look 
at some quotations from speeches made by the President of 
Malawi, the origin of the policies, some events, and the 
country's geographical position, all of which are often 
cited as evidence for the alleged link between foreign aid 
and Malawi's foreign policies.
The discussion is divided into four parts. The first 
part is an explanation why the chapter will deal with 
several foreign policies rather than with one foreign 
policy. The second part is a consideration of Malawi's 
African policy which is less well known. ' The third part is 
a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in 
support of the alleged link between foreign aid and the 
policy of "discretional alignment and nonalignment." 
Finally, the fourth part is a consideration of the evidence 
which is often cited in support of the alleged link between 
foreign aid and the policy of "contact and dialogue."
i
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Several Foreign Policies
The expression, "foreign policies", indicates that 
several rather than one policy will be considered in this 
chapter. This means that the discussion will be unorthodox 
for two reasons. The first reason is that Malawi will be 
presented as having followed several foreign policies at 
the same time. This will be done largely as a matter of 
convenience. Otherwise it is fully appreciated that this 
way of looking at foreign policy as a phenomenon is not in 
keeping with the common practice in foreign policy analysis 
in which each sovereign state is assumed to pursue only one 
foreign policy. For example, one often reads about British 
foreign policy rather than foreign policies.
The second reason is that the talk about Malawi's 
foreign policies has some merit. The practice of looking 
at each sovereign state as if it pursues only one foreign 
policy reflects a time when the international political 
system consisted of a handful of sovereign states most of 
which were in Europe. One sovereign state could then 
handle the affairs concerning the other sovereign states 
under one policy; the foreign policy. The affairs concern­
ing other peoples or territories were handled under other 
policies. For example, in addition to foreign policy, 
Britain had a "dominion policy" under which the affairs 
concerning Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, 
were handled; and a "colonial policy" under which affairs
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concerning the likes of what is now Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, 
and Tanzania, to mention a few, were handled.
However, this practice is no longer valid because the 
international political system has enormously expanded to 
the far corners of the globe. It is no longer valid to 
view a great power like Britain as if it were pursuing 
only one foreign policy. Those who still do so run the
risk of ignoring reality. For example, are the British
refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa and the 
British advocacy of sanctions against Libya, part and
parcel of one foreign policy? Are not these two separate 
foreign policies? These are some of the questions which 
now arise out of the long established practice of looking 
at each sovereign state as if it pursues only one foreign 
policy.
The procedure in this thesis is different. Foreign 
policy being a response to a problem, a country is 
accordingly seen to pursue sometimes several foreign 
policies at the same time and sometimes just one foreign 
policy depending upon the number and type of problems 
which it faces. Therefore, this thesis presents three 
foreign policies which Malawi has followed since its
independence.
Malawi's foreign policies have been the policy of 
"discretional alignment and nonalignment", the policy of 
"contact and dialogue," and the African policy. Each is a
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policy because it has focused on a distinct problem as 
will be shown later in the thesis. No doubt it can be 
contended that the three policies can be aggregated, or 
lumped together, into one, the foreign policy of Malawi, 
so that each is treated merely as aspects of the foreign 
policy of Malawi. McMaster indeed does this. For example 
she says that "Malawi's policies towards Southern Africa 
comprise only one aspect of her overall foreign 
policy However, the results are quite unsatis­
factory. The expression "Overall foreign policy," is 
clearly a recognition on her part that the policy of 
"contact and dialogue" has been a distinct foreign 
policy. Therefore, the three policies will be discussed 
here separately.
African Policy
On its own, the African Policy has nothing to do with
the argument under consideration here. It is going to be
considered because it is often seen as merely part and
parcel of the "contact and dialogue" policy. For example,
McMaster calls it the declaratory level" of the latter 
2policy." It is considered here in order to throw some
light on Malawi's membership of certain Pan-African
regional economic groupings, particularly the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which
apparently poses a problem to some scholars. For example,
Don Lee Sparks regards it as a change in the "contact and
3dialogue" policy.
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The policy was adopted at the time that the question 
of African Unity was a topical issue. It was Malawi's 
response to the demands for immediate creation of a 
continental political union, a kind of a "united states of 
Africa", proposed by President Nkrumah of Ghana and 
supported by President Sekou Toure of Guinea. All 
African leaders agreed on the question of African Unity. 
The point of difference among them was the method of 
approach to the idea. Some led by Nkrumah advocated a 
revolutionary approach, the immediate creation of a conti­
nental union, while others advocated an evolutionary, or 
functional approach. The latter approach entailed the 
creation of regional cooperation, or economic communi­
ties, which would serve as the building blocks of the 
envisaged continental union. Therefore, those that 
favored this approach opposed the revolutionary approach.
Adverse Developments To African Unitv
The merits and demerits of each approach are beside 
the point. Of relevance is the fact that the contest 
between them was one of the important political issues to 
which Malawi had to address itself at the time that it 
attained independence. Malawi indeed did so. For example, 
an official publication stated:
"We feel, however, that in order to achieve the final 
objectives of a United Africa, we should first 
develop and build on the human ties which exists
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between ourselves and our neighbours, with some of
whom we share a common origin, despite the artificial
divisions between us created by the boundaries of a 
4
colonial era."
This is the African policy. Though functional in approach, 
it accepted the idea of a united Africa.
Short and McMaster alleged that Malawi paid only a 
lip service to the question of African Unity while in 
actual practice paying more attention to Malawi's economic 
interests. For example, McMaster argues:
"On the declaratory level, this policy was marked by 
broad proclamation of faith in the principles ot 
non-alignment and African Unity, but at the opera­
tional level, his policies were clearly defined in
terms of Nyasaland's interests which he saw primarily
. . 5as strengthening her economic position."
This is a false allegation. The truth is not that Malawi 
did not genuinely believe in African Unity but that some 
developments adversely affected the question of African 
unity itself. Among them was the phenomenon of military 
coup and counter-military coup. Country after country on 
the continent fell to the military beginning in the late 
1960s. This raised the question of legitimacy of many 
governments on the continent. Since membership of the OAU 
makes it almost impossible for a country to avoid inter-
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mingling with another African country which it might wish 
not to recognize, a practice was established whereby 
recognition was bestowed on states rather than on 
governments. The latter are regarded as a matter for the 
people of the state or states concerned, a device which 
masks serious differences among the African states. In 
other words, the effect of this development was the 
freezing of the question of African unity.
Nationalist fission was another development which 
also adversely affected the question of African unity. 
This started with an attempted breakaway of the Katanga (now 
Shaba) Province from the rest of what is today Zaire. 
Although it did not cause disunity among the African 
countries, it was the first nationalist breakaway on the 
continent. The attempted Biafran secession from the 
Federation of Nigeria was another. This caused divisions 
among African countries. Some countries recognized 
Biafra; others refused to do so. Malawi refused to 
recognize Biafra and clung to the idea of Federal - 
Nigeria. Meanwhile, the question of African unity further 
receded into oblivion.
The third development was the phenomenon of subversion 
carried by one African country against another. In part, 
this was the result of ideological differences. After 
some years of independence, some African countries came to 
embrace the socialist ideology while others followed the 
capitalist ideology. Since the latter ideology is
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association with the former colonial powers, those African 
countries which followed it earned the derisive name of 
"neo-colonialist" while those that embraced the socialist 
ideology came to be regarded, "the progressives", despite 
their relative poor economic performance. To be regarded 
as "neo-colonialist" was, and still is, tantamount to be 
declared legitimate for subversion. Therefore, the result 
of the inter-African subversion was a further distraction 
of the attention of African states from the question of 
African unity.
Finally, the formation of the Organization of African 
Unity (O.A.U.), was another development which, paradox­
ically, also contributed towards the freezing of the 
question of African unity. The Organization was formed as 
a compromise between the revolutionary and the functional 
approaches to achieving African unity, a sort of interim 
measure prior to a realization of the cherished goal of a 
united Africa. However, the Organization has had the 
opposite effect. Going by the proceedings of the 
Organization's summit meetings the preoccupation is not 
with what steps should be taken towards African unity but 
with how to make the most out of the Organization. In 
other words, the Organization has so far functioned not as 
a means to unity but as an end in itself, a policy 
instrument at the disposal of each member state. As a 
result, the O.A.U. shares the current frustrations of 
multilateral organizations in general: impotency on
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political issues and even threats of withdrawal from it by 
some of its member states.
With the fading of the question of African unity on
the continent's political landscape, Malawi's African
Policy also came to be less active or less known. For
example, Malawi questioned on several occasions whether
some African leaders, particularly those that Malawi saw as
being engaged in subversion against other fellow African
states, genuinely believed in the question of African 
6
unity. However, this did not mean that Malawi abandoned 
its faith in African unity. The policy only came to be 
less publicized simply because the question of African 
unity itself ceased to be important as a result of these 
developments.
The Triumph of Functionalism
Though somewhat frozen, the question of African unity 
was not entirely abandoned on the continent. In some form, 
it has been transferred by default from the O.A.U. to a 
United Nations Regional Commission for Africa (E.C.A.). 
The latter is what is actively promoting African unity in 
the form of economic integration. A look at the reasons 
for which the E.C.A. was formed would be a digression. 
Suffice it to say that promoting economic integ­
ration on the continent is one of its main tasks. It is 
true that the African heads of state and government met in 
their economic summit in 1980 in Lagos, Nigeria, during
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which they decided among other things, to create an African 
common market by the turn of the century. However, the 
Plan of Action in which this decision is contained was 
drafted by the E.C.A. officials.
The United Nations regional commission has achieved 
some successes in carrying out this task. These include 
the creation of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), a Central African Common Market which 
covers Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Zaire, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe, and the 
Preferential Trade Area (P.T.A.) of Eastern and Southern 
African States. These are successes, not so much in terms 
of economic performance such as promoting inter-African 
trade but at least in terms of bringing the countries 
together by means of a binding treaty or agreement. In 
part, these are due to the demonstration effect of the 
success of the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) 
everywhere. Also they are due to the fact that economic 
integration is a relatively less sensitive issue than 
political integration.
Outside the E.C.A., efforts were also made to create 
an economic grouping now known as the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Its task is 
to enable its member states to reduce their "economic 
dependence on other states including South Africa." Going 
by what has been done so far, it is, perhaps, the most 
advanced economic integration unit on the continent. It has
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implemented an impressive number of transport and tele­
communications projects which are bringing its member 
states closer together.
In other words, the adverse developments recounted 
earlier had the effect of merely freezing the question of 
African unity. While completely discrediting the revolu­
tionary approach, they made the functional approach to the 
issue more attractive or widely accepted. ECOWAS, P.T.A.,
S.A.D.C.C., and the Central African Common Market are all 
evidence of the triumph of the functional approach and of 
the survival of the idea of African unity. Though in a 
less glittering fashion, the idea is alive. The next step 
towards it could very well be the envisaged common market 
for the whole continent.
Malawi is a member of both the P.T.A. and S.A.D.C.C. 
Its membership of the latter has puzzled some scholars. 
It is commented upon as if Malawi were the only member of 
SADCC which has economic ties with South Africa. For 
example, Don Lee Sparks wrote:
"Malawi finds itself in a curious role in the 
Southern African subsystem. It maintains extensive 
economic relations with South Africa, yet it has also 
joined a regional grouping (Southern African Develop­
ment Coordination Conference - SADCC) whose major 
goal is to try to redirect these economic ties in the
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region away from South Africa and towards each other."
This is a misleading passage. As can be seen from it, 
it presents Malawi as if it were the only member state of 
SADCC which has economic ties with South Africa. That is 
wrong. For example, Joseph Hanlon shows that many other 
member states of SADCC also have economic ties with South 
Africa, ties some of which are even more extensive and
o
binding than those which Malawi has with South Africa.
It also treats economic integration as if it were the same 
as normal economic ties. Trade between Malawi and any 
other country can still take place regardless of the 
distance which may exist between Malawi and the country 
concerned. However, economic integration such as that 
advocated by SADCC is a different matter. This takes 
account of the distance and location of the countries 
concerned. Three of the countries which make up SADCC are 
Malawi's immediate neighbours. It is only logical that 
Malawi has to be in SADCC and there is nothing curious 
about that.
Finally, Malawi membership of SADCC as mentioned 
earlier, has also been seen as a change in its policy 
towards South Africa. For example, Sparks also wrote:
"Malawi's participation and support of SADCC, 
however, signals a change in its basic economic 
orientation within the subsystem. For the first
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time in its history it has seriously begun to look
9
North for its economic ties."
Although the expression, "basic economic orientation" 
is ambiguous, the passage clearly implies two things. The 
first is that Malawi had never addressed itself to the 
question of African unity. The second is that Malawi's 
policy of "contact and dialogue" has been about promoting 
Malawi's economic ties with South Africa. The President, 
says McMaster, "has evidently accepted the concept of an 
economic community of some form in Southern Africa, 
encompassing Malawi."1  ^ Both these claims are wrong.
It is understandable that writers like Sparks reflect 
a lack of knowledge of Malawi's commitment to African 
unity. Perhaps matters would have been different had the 
question of African unity remained a topical issue. 
However, the fact that Malawi's Africa policy has not been 
well known is not evidence that Malawi had never addressed 
itself to the question of African unity. The policy has 
been less known because the question of African unity 
itself has not been as topical as it was before the 
formation of the O.A.U. Otherwise, Malawi has remained 
committed to the idea of African unity. This is why it is 
a member of both P.T.A. and SADCC.
The passage also reflects lack of understanding about 
the main objective of the policy of "contact and dialogue." 
It is true that Malawi does not endorse the imposition of
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sanctions against South Africa and prefers to maintain its 
trade with South Africa. It is also true that partly as a 
result of the policy/ trade between Malawi and South 
Africa has increased. However, the policy of "contact and 
dialogue" has had nothing to do with the promotion of 
Malawi's economic ties with South Africa. The policy has 
been about the "problems of black and white" in Southern 
Africa, about how best to approach such problems. The 
increase in trade between the two countries has been an 
incidental development to the policy.
In short, Malawi's belief in African unity accounts 
for Malawi's membership of Pan-African groupings such as 
the P.T.A. and S.A.D.C.C.
"Discretional Alignment and Nonalianment"
The "discretional alignment and nonalignment" policy 
has been one of the country's two major policies. The 
other is the well known policy of "contact and dialogue" 
which will be considered later. Compared to the Africa 
policy, this has been somewhat better known although less 
so than the policy of "contact and dialogue". Its focus 
has been on the East/West relationship. For example, a 
paragraph of a speech made by the President of Malawi 
reads:
"on the relationship between East and West, there is 
nothing new I can say. On this subject, Malawi's
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policy is well known. It is not one of dogmatic 
non-alignment. It is a policy of discretional 
alignment and nonalignment."11
The words "discretional alignment and nonalignment"/ 
have been and will be kept in inverted
commas. This is to indicate that they have been quoted
from the speech from which the foregoing quotation was
made. The four words, moreover, will be kept together for
reasons of accuracy. Philip Short in his book, Banda.
left out the last two words and presented the policy
12simply as "discretional alignment." This is incorrect 
as it can be seen from the foregoing quotation. Such a 
presentation amounts to distorting the policy since it 
prejudges Malawi's alignment on the question of
East/West relations.
Quotations from President's Speeches
The "discretional alignment and nonalignment"
policies are one of the country's policies which are said 
to have been adopted in order to make Malawi attractive to 
foreign aid. Apparently, the point is that the country's 
President was influenced by the availability of foreign 
aid, particularly in the West, into adopting this policy. 
The evidence which is often cited in support of this 
argument are some quotations made from the President's 
speeches. For example, Philip Short quotes the President
as follows:
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"Only if the West were to treat me like de Gaulle
treated Sekou Toure would I be forced to look 
13elsewhere."
As it stands, this shows the President’s preference for 
Western donor countries to Eastern donor countries. It 
gives the impression that the President was clearly 
committed to alignment with the West for reasons of 
foreign aid.
However, placed in the full context of the statement 
from which it was made, the sentence has a different 
meaning and is not evidence that the President was 
pre-committed to alignment with the West for reasons of 
foreign aid. This is because the context makes it clear 
that the statement was made for reasons other than that of 
attracting foreign aid. For example, the full paragraph 
from which the sentence was quoted reads:
"They call me a "communist." I could never be a
communist because I consider myself to be a good
Presbyterian. These are incompatible. I will not
look to the East for economic help to Nyasaland as
long as I can get help from the West. Only if the
West were to treat me like de Gaulle treated Seko
14Toure would I be forced to look elsewhere."
As can be seen from this passage, the sentence was part of 
the denial of the charge that the Malawi leader was a
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"communist." This was at the time that some white 
settlers in Southern Africa were trying to discredit the 
nationalist cause in Malawi. Any slightest indication of 
a willingness to accept aid from the East on the part of 
the President would have been construed as evidence that 
he was a communist.
On another occasion, the President was actually asked
if he would accept aid from Russia. The inquiry was not
intended to determine whether he preferred Western aid to
Eastern aid. Rather it was an attempt to extract from him
evidence to support the charge which was made by the White
settlers in Central and Southern Africa that he was a
"communist." For example, the interviewer put emphasis on
the word, "yourself", in his question. This prompted the
Malawi leader to emphasize that "he would rather have
dollars, or pounds, but if they were not forthcoming he
would accept roubles rather than let his people 
15starve."
In short, these two quotations, on their own, do 
indeed, mean the President's preference for Western aid to 
Eastern aid. However, the quotations are made from the 
two statements which had nothing to do with the President's 
preference for aid from any particular bloc. Both state­
ments were an emphatic denial of the charge that he was a 
"communist."
i
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The charge that the President was a communist was a
serious one which could not be taken lightly. This was
because the West was at that time in the grip of, to use
former President Carter's phrase, "inordinate fear of 
16
communism." As Sir Geoffrey Howe recently put it:
"In 1960 Macmillan saw the issue of the second half of
the 2 0th century as whether the uncommitted peoples of
Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the 
West."
This was precisely the time during which the question of 
Malawi's independence was being considered and the same 
Macmillan was the British Prime Minister who was to make 
the hard decision of dissolving one of the most cherished 
postwar British colonial schemes - the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland - to pave the way for Malawi's
independence. The white settlers were clearly raising the 
"communist" charge in order to influence Macmillan's mind 
on the question of Nyasaland's secession from the
Federation. Therefore, foreign aid was not on the 
President's mind when he made the two statements. It was 
the implication of the effect of the charge on Nyasaland's 
demand for independence, not foreign aid, which prompted 
him to make them.
The Origin of the Policy
Another evidence which is also often cited in support 
of the argument under consideration is the origin of the
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policy. When writers like McMaster and Short argue that 
the policy was adopted for foreign aid considerations, 
they are, in part, expressing the belief that the policy 
was thought out and adopted well after Malawi gained 
independence. This belief is, indeed, made explicit with 
regard to the policy of "contact and dialogue." It is 
made implicit with regard to the policy of "discretional 
alignment and nonalignment. Apparently this is because 
it is only after the attainment of independence that a 
country starts receiving foreign aid.
This is one of the problems which the foreign aid 
argument presents. When was the policy of "discretional 
alignment and nonalignment" formulated and adopted? Was 
it after the attainment of independence? It is true that 
the policy was adopted as soon as Malawi attained inde­
pendence. However, the President had explained the policy 
in full before the county's independence. The first time 
that he did so was in April 1961, three years before the 
country’s independence. At that time, the country's 
independence was by no means a foregone conclusion. The 
British Government had not by then made up its mind to 
dissolve the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Therefore, the President was preoccupied, not with foreign 
aid, but with the achievement of the country's 
independence.
It is true that the foregoing does not completely 
exclude the possibility that foreign aid might, all the
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same, have been uppermost in the mind of the President. 
For example, the President has often stated that he 
planned the move of the country's capital and the
construction of the country's lakeshore road while he was 
in detention in Gwelo (now Gwelu) in present day 
Zimbabwe. These are among the many other major projects 
which have, indeed, been implemented in the country. 
However, it is still inconceivable that foreign aid was 
uppermost in his mind because it was not certain then that 
the country would achieve independence.
The last part of the last sentence of the foregoing
paragraph contradicts what many writers say about African
independence. It implies that Malawi’s independence was
not inevitable while the popular view is that the European
colonial powers were committed to a programme of giving
independence to their colonial peoples after the second
World War. Richard Hall goes so far as to say that "in a
score of countries independence had been a gift from
metropolitan countries resolved to shed their imperial 
18burdens." This is probably intended to produce a
sense of complacency among the public in African countries 
or to ridicule the African leaders who assumed
power on the day on which the countries became indepen­
dent. If the independence were really a gift, a manna 
from heaven, it follows that such leaders are, or were, 
nothing but opportunists.
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No doubt Richard Hall's argument is an exaggeration.
However, what he says is in keeping with the belief of
many scholars that the independence of African countries
was inevitable after the second world war. This belief is
held for three reasons. The first one is the growth of
liberalism in Britain. This is said to have begun in the
19th century and to have undermined then the only
effective means for maintaining empires - the massacre of
recalcitrant natives. "The moral sensitivity says
Brian Lapping, of the most powerful nations, expressed
by the reluctance of their leaders to be publicly revealed
19as mass murders, brought the end of the empire."
The second reason is said to be the War of American
Independence. This is said to have given rise to the
principle of self-determination. More important, Britain
is said to have learnt from that war the lesson that "iron
rule from the imperial capital leads to revolt, war and
humiliation." This, in turn, is said to have led to the
adoption of a colonial policy which put emphasis onthe
20eventual granting of self-government to the colonies.
Peter Dalleo seems to attest to this. "One hallmark of
British colonial policy in Africa," he wrote, "was the
tradition of a steady devolution of political power aimed
21at eventual self-government."
The third reason is said to be the second world war. 
"The bankruptcy brought on by the 1939-45," says Brian 
Lapping "-was the principal reason why the British empire
ended so much more quickly than anyone expected."22 This
argument is fully embraced by many leading African
scholars. The second world war", Ali Mazrui wrote, for
example, "was an important divide in respect of
Africa's history." "There is widespread consensus", he
continued, "that the war contributed towards Africa's
23political liberation." The word, "political", is
printed in small letters. In doing so, Mazrui obviously 
intended to remind readers that the liberation of Africa 
is incomplete at the economic level.
How is the the second world war said to have 
contributed towards Africa's "political" independence? 
The answer which is often given to this question is that 
the war undermined Europe's capacity to hold on to the 
empire. Mazrui wrote, for example:
"The war facilitated Africa's transition to modern 
statehood partly by undermining Europe's capacity to 
hold on to the empires. Britain was exhausted and 
also impoverished by the time the war ended. France 
had been humiliated by Germany. Related to this 
exhaustion and impoverishment of Western Europe 
following its own fratricidal war was the destruction 
of the myth of European invincibility in the eyes of 
the colonized peoples. Suddenly somebody noticed in 
Bombay that the Emperor's clothes of modern technology 
were not clothes at all - the British Raj was naked. 
And when the Indians started pointing fingers and
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exposing the nakedness of their emperor, other 
subject peoples elsewhere heard it too."^
In short, African independence is said to have been 
inevitable because of the growth of liberalism in Britain, 
the colonial policy which emphasized the eventual granting 
of self-government to the colonies, and the second world 
which undermined Europe's capacity to hold on to the 
empires and destroyed the myth of European invincibility 
in the eyes of the colonized peoples.
The claim that liberalism undermined the means by
which empires were maintained is obviously false. For
example, Lapping traces this effect of liberalism on the
empire to as far back as the days of Gladstone's premiership
25of Great Britain. That was actually the time when
European empire-building in Africa was just about to
start. For example, the Cape Colony in South Africa was
established and maintained largely by means of extensive
2 6extermination of the Khoisan people. In 1915, the
British suppressed the Chilembwe rising in Nyasaland by
killing some 900 people and , as Lapping acknowledges,
France managed to maintain its rule over Madagascar by
massacring 30,000 recalcitrant natives as late as 
271947. Liberalism did not undermine the means by which 
empires were maintained.
As for the liberal colonial policy, Dalleo and many 
other writers mistake form for substance. It is true that
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beginning with the late 1920s, British colonial policy towards
East and Central Africa became very liberal in form. It
emphasized the paramountcy of "native interests" over
28those of the white settlers. However, in practice,
colonialism in East and Central Africa was being
strengthened. The Central African Federation comprising 
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland was to 
create a white settler -dominated colony with a dominion 
status in Central Africa which would have become a realitywere 
it not for the 1959 state of emergency in Nyasaland.
Finally, the second world war did indeed contribute 
towards the liberation of Africa. However, the manner in 
which it is said to have done so is a sheer misinterpre­
tation. The argument is valid to a small number of
colonies particularly India and Burma. To colonies in 
Africa, the argument raises more questions than it
answers. If the war undermined Europe's capacity to hold 
on to the empires, why did the Indonesians have to fight a 
bloody war against the Netherlands for their independence?
Why did the Algerians similarly have to fight a bloody war 
against the supposedly "weakened and humiliated" France?
If Europe's capacity to hold on to the empires collapsed 
by the end of the second world war, why did decolonization 
in Africa take so long after the end of the war and at the 
time that Europe is regarded to have practically recovered 
economically from the ravages of the war? Moreover, many 
of the trouble spots in the empires after the war were of 
the type which could easily be dealt with by an army
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brigade or so. Is it really true that in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s Britain, or France, were incapable of 
dispatching an army brigade to the trouble spots in the 
empire? Obviously that is not true.
The second world war did indeed contribute towards 
the liberation of Africa, not by weakening the European 
colonial powers versus many of the colonial peoples, but 
by bringing home to the European colonial powers the full 
implications of empire ,in modern times. The successful 
Japanese offensive on parts of the European empires in 
Southeast Asia meant that an imperial power would have to 
fight everywhere any time that there might be another 
major war. This would be true particularly for Britain 
which had a worldwide empire.
Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons led Britain 
to embrace a policy of preventing the occurrence of 
another major war. In part, this meant dismantling the 
empire. The onslaught of the cold war years during which 
the superpowers saw almost every political issue around 
the world in terms of their total confrontational 
relationship also created a sense of urgency in 
dismantling the empire.
The foregoing does not mean that the European 
countries decided to dissolve their empires soon after the 
war or soon after the beginning of the cold war. It does 
not mean that. What it means is that the major powers saw
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each colonial issue as a potential source of a major
conflict among them. By coincidence, many of the colonial
issues occurred at the time that the cold war was at its
height. For example, Peter Wright, the former British
Intelligence Officer, has revealed that Prime Minister
Eden halted his invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956 because
of some threats from the Soviet Union which the British
Intelligence Officers detected through the bugging of the
29Egyptian Embassy m  London. In other words, decolo­
nization in Africa came about because colonial peoples 
just happened to have stepped up their demands for 
independence at the same time that European countries were 
pre-occupied with the cold war.
Therefore, there was nothing inevitable about African 
independence. Indeed the dissolution of a greater part of 
the British empire in Africa had to do with some specific 
decisions especially those made by Ian Macleod and Harold 
Macmillan in response to events which confronted them
then, foremost of which, was the state of emergency in
30 .Nyasaland. There was nothing inevitable about their
decisions. Macmillan’s own famous "Wind of Change" speech
in Cape Town, South Africa, makes all this clear.
After years of frustrations, the people of Nyasaland 
decided in 1958 to step up their demands for independence. 
That decision was a gamble, the success of which was not 
guaranteed. This is only to say that Malawi’s 
independence in 1961 was not a foregone conclusion.
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Reference To Certain Events
Still more evidence which is often cited in support of 
the link between "discretional alignment and nonalignment" 
policy and foreign aid are references to certain events. 
A passage in McMaster's book illustrates the point. She 
argues that the President:
"has enunciated three principles which govern Malawi's
foreign policy: non-interference in the affairs of
other countries, judgment of individual situations on
their own merits rather than by the alignments of the
countries involved, and willingness to accept the aid
of any country prepared to help Malawi. In practice,
however, her trade and aid partners are almost without
exception non-communist countries, and the hand of
financial friendship extended from the People's
31
Republic of China was spurned."
The link between foreign aid and the policy in the 
passage is not obvious. It is noticeable only after a 
closer look at the passage. For example, the passage has 
two parts, the first of which ends with the expression, 
"to help Malawi." That part is what McMaster called 
"declaratory policy". The rest of the passage is
obviously what she regards as the country's real policy. 
The point in the passage is clearly that since Malawi's
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pattern of both its external trade and aid is with the
West, Malawi is aligned with the West.
There are details in the passage which require a 
little more attention. The word "enunciated", is 
misleading. The Malawi Government has "enunciated" such 
"principles." The first "principle" in the passage is 
actually a well known principle which is found in the
United Nations Charter and all that the Malawi Government 
has done is simply to endorse it. The rest of the said 
"principles" in the first sentence of the passage are
actually what the Malawi Government itself has presented 
as policy, that is the policy of "discretional alignment
and nonalignment."
The last sentence of the passage provides information, 
part of which is presented in a misleading manner. 
Malawi's pattern of external trade is typical of most of 
the former British colonies in Africa. There is nothing 
peculiar about it. Communist China's offer of aid was
turned down by Malawi because of the conditions which were 
attached to it. It was not turned down simply because it 
came from China. Therefore, the country's pattern of 
external trade and aid is not necessarily proof of 
Malawi's alignment with the West.
Philip Short made references to certain events as 
evidence in support of the alleged link between foreign
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aid and the policy of "discretional alignment and 
nonalignment." He wrote:
"Conversely, Malawi's Western orientation grew 
stronger. After a visit to Berlin in the middle of 
1965, Banda pronounced himself in favour of the 
re-unification of Germany, and subsequently advocated 
it at the United Nations. West Germany showed its 
appreciation by increasing its aid and making 
available funds for the construction of the first 
stage of the lakeshore road, the "Great Kamazu 
Highway," as it came to be called. De Gaulle, whom 
Banda met at about the same time, proved altogether a 
wilier ally, and his request for finance for the 
Nacala railway was courteously refused. But France 
did make available technical assistance, and Banda 
afterwards paid eulogistic tribute to the General's 
statesmanship. By 1966 Malawi's relations with the 
United States had normalized, and after Banda's 
declaration that he supported Johnson's Vietnam 
policy "150 per cent," aid and friendship flowed more 
strongly than ever. Denmark continued to provide 
development aid, and Israel technical assistance. 
And in 1968, after Banda had paid a state visit to 
Formosa, the Nationalist Chinese expanded their 
agricultural training schemes in Malawi. Britain, 
the United Nations Development Programme, the World 
Bank, and the African Development Bank all made 
available substantial development loans, and Britain
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also made annual grants-in-aid to cover Malawi's
budgetary deficit."**2
Malawi, as can be seen, is here presented almost as if it 
embarked upon a successful crusade for foreign aid. 
Unrelated events, some quoted out of their sequence, are 
in the passage juxtaposed to create the maximum impression of 
a Malawi in quest for foreign aid. The "support for 
German reunification," the "150 per cent support for 
President Johnson's Vietnam policy", and the visit to 
Formosa", for example, are all presented as having been 
undertaken for reasons of acquiring foreign aid. The rest 
of the other donors are presented as if they were almost 
falling upon each other in haste to reward Malawi for its 
alleged alignment with the West. The passage, in short, 
creates the impression that the policy of "discretional 
alignment and nonalignment" was undertaken for reasons of 
attracting foreign aid.
Some of the pieces of information and the events 
which are distorted in the passage require a little more 
attention. Others require detailed attention. The 
British grants-in-aid will receive fuller attention at a 
latter stage in the thesis. For the moment, it is enough 
to say that the aid was part of the outcome of the 
dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Britain did not give the assistance in response to 
Malawi's policy of "discretional alignment and nonalign­
ment." The corollary of this is that Malawi did not have
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to adopt such a policy in order to receive the British 
grants-in-aid.
Further, the United Nations Development Programme has 
a membership which is divided into two parts: the donor
member states and the recipient member states including 
Malawi. The latter are the beneficiaries of the 
organization's resources. In addition, the organization 
has a resident representation in almost every recipient 
member state. What this means is that Malawi did not have 
to adopt the policy of "discretional alignment and 
nonalignment to solicit for the organization's 
assistance. Malawi got, and still gets, assistance from 
that organization by virtue of being its recipient member
state. In fact, Malawi, as Gordenker points out, has not
. . . . . 33been a favorite recipient of the organization's aid.
For example, the UNDP aid to Malawi in 1987 was a mere 
pittance of $2 million.
As for the African Development Bank, one has only to 
bear in mind that the Bank was created to provide to its 
member states soft loans for infrastructure and indus­
trial development. This is because such development 
activities are not looked upon with favour by the Western 
donor countries. Malawi as a member state is entitled to 
receive loans from that Bank and did not have to adopt 
"discretional alignment and nonalignment" to get them.
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Several other details in the passage similarly require 
some attention. With regard to the French refusal with 
their aid, one needs only to note that Malawi is not on the 
list of the recipients of French aid, not because de Gaulle 
provided altogether a "wilier ally", but because France 
regards any former British colony as "England's business" 
and not theirs. The "visit to Formosa", too, requires 
little attention. Suffice it to say that the visit was 
undertaken for reasons other than foreign aid which, 
indeed, did not even feature in the communique that was 
issued at the end of the visit. With Israel, one has only 
to recall that Israel had a technical assistance programme 
in most of the African countries up to the 1973 Arab/ 
Israeli war. Malawi was not special then in relation to 
the Israeli technical assistance. Finally, Denmark was and 
still is an important donor of foreign aid to Malawi. 
However, Denmark often coordinates its policies with those 
of Sweden which is known for its policy of neutrality. 
Therefore, it is doubtful if it gave, or gives, aid to 
Malawi in response to Malawi's policy of "discretional 
alignment and nonalignment." That Nordic country probably 
does so out of the desire to assist Malawi.
The two distortions in the passage which require 
detailed attention are those concerning German re-unifica­
tion and the "150 per cent support for President Johnson's 
Vietnam policy." With regard to the former, the word, 
"advocated", in the passage is misleading. It gives the 
impression that Malawi was the only country which called
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for German re-unification at the United Nations General 
Assembly. The truth was that German re-unification was 
one of the items concerning divided sovereignties which 
were each year placed on the agenda for the General 
Assembly. The others were the question of Korea which is 
still unresolved in terms of representation in the United 
Nations, the question of Vietnam, and most important of 
all, the question of the representation of China in the 
United Nations. Member states used to express their views 
on these issues each year. What Malawi did was similarly 
to express its views on these issues. The following are 
the relevant passages in the speech which the Malawi 
President made:
"In my view, the government in Peking, that is the
Government of Mao-Tse-Tung, should be recognized by
the United Nations, by this Assembly, by the Security
34Council as legal Government of China now," 
and with regard to Germany:
"Therefore, history, logic, justice and fair play
leave Malawi with no choice but to recognize the
Government in Bonn as the legal Government of 
35Germany.
So the support was accorded not only to German re-unifica- 
tion but also to Chinese re-unification. The reasons for 
which Malawi called for the recognition of the Government
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in Bonn as the legal Government of Germany, and of the 
Government in Peking as the legal Government of the whole 
China were, for China:
"The Government in China, the Government in Peking 
exercises an effective authority and control over a 
vast area of China and a vast population. She 
exercises authority and control over an area of
4.300.000 square miles and population of 700,000,000 
or some claim 760,000,000 people. The Government in 
Formosa on the other hand, exercises authority and 
control over a very small area and a very small 
population in comparison. The area which the 
Government in Formosa exercises authority and control 
is only 13,800 square miles and the population is 
only 10,000,000 people."
Under these circumstances Malawi has no choice. I 
have no choice. Justice and fair play demand that 
the Government in Peking presided over by Mao-Tse-Tung 
be recognized as the legal and rightful government of 
China.1,36
For Germany:
"In Germany there is a government in Bonn, the 
government of Federal Republic of Germany which 
exercises authority and control over the area of
95.000 square miles and a population of 54,000,000
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people. There is another government in East Germany, 
the Government of the German Democratic Republic 
which exercises authority and control over an area of
41,000 square miles and a population of 20,000,000 
people. Here the problem is much simpler than in 
China. The Government in East Germany, the Govern­
ment of German Democratic Republic did not exist 
during the Second World War. It is not a founder 
member of the United Nations as the Government of 
Formosa is. It exercises authority and control over 
an area and population smaller than the area and 
population over which the Government of Federal 
Republic of Germany exercises authority and
control.
It is true that West Germany was by then an important 
donor of foreign aid. In comparison, the People' Republic 
of China was not. Therefore, to attribute Malawi's 
support for German re-unification to foreign aid 
considerations is to be selective in the treatment of 
available information. The manner in which Malawi 
supported both the Chinese re-unification and German 
re-unification was the same and the reasons given for the 
support were also the same. The People's Republic of 
China is Communist while the West German Government is 
capitalist. Therefore, the support can only be attributed 
to the President's perception of the issues and not to 
foreign aid considerations.
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Finally, with regard to the "150 percent support of 
President Johnson's Vietnam policy", one has only to bear 
in mind that this is a quotation from a statement which 
the President made in the context of improving relations 
between Malawi and the United States. Relations between 
the two countries were cool and began to warm up at the 
time that the statement was made. It would have been 
correct to associate the statement with foreign aid
considerations if relations between the two countries were 
normal in the first place. As this was not the case, the 
statement focused on further improvement in the relations 
between the two countries and not on foreign aid.
That the policy has had nothing to do with foreign 
aid is borne out by that it focuses on the East/West 
relationship which was confrontational then. The
President's speech in Cairo also stated:
"But if African states are to strengthen the hand of 
the United Nations and to make it more effective in 
its endeavour, for peace and human progress and 
advancement, they must at all times steer clear of 
automatic alignment with one bloc or the other. I 
say this because no one power or group of powers is 
always right. Equally, no one power or group of
powers is always wrong. For example, in the Suez
Canal crisis of 1956, the British, French and others, 
were wrong in attacking Egypt over the Suez Canal 
question, and the Russians and the Americans were
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right in not joining the British, French and others 
in their attack on Egypt. So wrong were the British 
in fact, that even some members of the British
Commonwealth condemned them and supported Egypt, and 
the British Government fell over the issue.
"Yet the Russians belong to one bloc, the Eastern 
bloc. They are the leaders of the Eastern bloc. The
Americans belong to the other bloc, the Western
bloc. They are the leaders of the Western bloc. And
very often they take opposing sides on major issues 
in international affairs. But in 1956, on the Suez 
Canal question, they saw eye to eye.
"More recently, in 1960, over the Congo crisis, again
the British, the French and the Belgians were wrong
in their implicit support for Tshombe when Tshombe
wanted to take away Katanga from the Republic of
Congo. And the Russians and the Americans were right
in insisting that the political and territorial
integrity of the Congo state must not be interfered
with. Here again you had the Russians and the
Americans who are traditionally in opposing camps
coming together, agreeing on an issue of international
importance, while the supposed traditional allies,
the British, the French, and the Belgians on the
other hand, and the Americans on the other, were
39divided and took stands on opposing sides."
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The policy of "discretional alignment and nonalignment" 
actually had nothing to do with foreign aid considera­
tions. This is borne out by the fact that the policy was 
presented as the right policy for Africa at the first 
O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1964, 
in Cairo, Egypt. For example, the President, then the 
country's Prime Minister, said before the Assembly:
"Thus in my view, no African state should ally itself 
permanently or automatically with one bloc or the
other; because neither bloc, the Western bloc nor
the other, the Eastern bloc, is always right or
always wrong. Each bloc is sometimes wrong, some­
times right. And the only wise policy and wise
course for any African statesman and any independent 
African state to take or follow is to judge each 
international issue strictly on its own merits at any 
given time. This means using discretion. It means 
common sense; uninfluenced either by this ideology or 
that."38
Some of the heads of state and government probably did not 
heed this policy. All the same it was presented as the 
right policy for African states. Therefore, it cannot 
sensibly be supposed that the President, in so doing, was 
telling his fellow African leaders how best to attract 
foreign aid from the Western donor countries. Quite 
contrary to the argument by McMaster, Short, Williams, and 
the anonymous author of the pamphlet, the President was
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here alerting Africa to the dangers of permanent and 
automatic alignment with any of the existing great power 
blocs.
In short, the Suez Canal and the Congo Crisis were 
clearly perceived by the President as evidence that even 
Africa was not immune from the cold war, or the great 
power rivalry. Therefore, the "discretional alignment and 
nonalignment" policy has been about the East/West confron­
tational relationship and has had nothing to do with the 
question of attracting foreign aid to Malawi.
"Contact and Dialogue" Policy
The policy of "contact and dialogue" is the other
foreign policy of Malawi which is also said to have been
adopted for reasons of attracting aid to Malawi. Though
the best known, it has not been properly understood. For
example, David Williams regards it as Malawi's detente
40with South Africa. This is correct only if detente 
means merely keeping contact with anyone. However, 
detente means the easing of relations or thawing of
relations. It presupposes the existence of tensions 
between two countries. Understood in this way, detente 
cannot mean the same as Malawi's policy of "contact and 
dialogue" since no tension in the sense of a confronta­
tional relationship existed in the first place between 
Malawi and the countries towards which the policy has been 
directed.
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The expression "contact and dialogue", is also 
kept in inverted commas. This is also to
indicate that the expression has been quoted from the 
President's speech which expounded the policy. The 
relevant part of it reads:
"i will tell the Honourable House what is of use. Two 
words, contact, dialogue, those are the two things. 
Contact between us the African leaders North of the 
Zambezi and further elsewhere on our continent and 
leaders of white people to the south of us in the 
Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and
Angola, Portugal itself in Europe.
"Dialogue between us the African Leaders North of the
Zambezi and further elsewhere in our continent and
leaders of white opinion to the South of us in the
Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, is,
in my opinion, what is of use, indeed, what is
useful. Not denunciations from a distance thousands
of miles away in Addis Ababa, London, New York, not
shrieking our heads off, calling for boycott and
isolation of the whites in south Africa, Rhodesia,
Mozambique, and Angola, not uttering empty idle and
childish threats which we ourselves know we cannot
41implement."
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This is the part of the President's statement in 
Parliament from which the expression "contact and 
dialogue"/ has been quoted.
The policy is largely the basis on which Malawi's 
behaviour in international relations has been interpreted. 
The alleged link between foreign aid and the other two 
policies considered earlier, to some extent, arises 
because these other policies are lumped together with, or 
treated merely as aspects of this policy. However, the 
policy focuses only on the problems of black and white in 
Southern Africa. It is concerned with the question of 
Apartheid in South Africa, and with colonialism in 
Namibia, and was concerned with colonialism in Angola and 
Mozambique and the unilateral declaration of independence 
(U.D.I.) in Rhodesia. It has had nothing to do with the 
question of Korea or the cold war. "Discretional 
alignment and nonalignment ' is the policy which was 
addressed to these other issues.
Quotations from President's Speeches
The alleged link between foreign aid and the policy 
of "contact and dialogue" is also often demonstrated by 
means of some quotations from the President's speeches. 
The frequently quoted speech to this end is the one which 
the President made in Cairo in 1964. For example, 
McMaster interpreted it as follows:
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"At the O.A.U. Heads of State Conference in Cairo,
i
Dr. Banda made it clear that although Malawi's 
particular position subjected the country to 
conflicting demands, he would not support measures, 
even on the declaratory level, which other O.A.U. 
members felt would further the liberation of the 
states still under white dominion, if such measures,
in his estimation, would threaten Malawi's
. . . 42development priorities, or her sovereignty."
McMaster is here giving equal emphasis to both "develop­
ment priorities and Malawi's sovereignty." This is a 
misinterpretation of the speech. It did not mean that. 
The relevant part of it read:
"But having said that, it is necessary to point out 
that not all independent African states are in the 
same position to help those countries which are not 
free and independent as much as they should or as 
much as they wish. Colonial history and colonial 
geography has placed some countries in a much more 
favorable position to help than others. Some of the 
independent African states are almost helpless to 
help others by geographical position. Malawi, my own 
state, is one of these countries. Zambia, when it 
becomes independent on October 24 will be one of 
them. And Basutoland when it becomes independent in 
12 or 18 months time from now will be still another.
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Malawi and Zambia have been denied ports of their own 
by colonial history and colonial geography. Neither 
Malawi nor Zambia owns a port. They use a port or 
ports of neighbouring territory or territories which 
is or are under the control of a foreign power. They 
could not export a single product, agriculture or 
mineral, without the goodwill or the tolerance or 
sufferance of the power owning or claiming to own and 
controlling the territory in which the ports are 
situated.
"Therefore, while I feel strongly against imperialism 
and colonialism in any form; while I am just as 
anxious as anyone in this conference to help our 
brothers and sisters still under colonial rule in 
neighbouring territories, Malawi's power, my own 
power, to help, is limited and circumscribed by 
geographical position. I am quite certain that it is 
not the will or wish of anyone in this assembly that 
in order to help his brothers and sisters still under 
colonialism and imperialism a man must cut his own 
throat. I am equally certain that it is not the 
policy of the Organization of African Unity that in 
order for any country to be a good and loyal member 
of this Organization, that country must cut its own 
throat.
"I am saying all this because I want to make it quite 
clear here at this conference that the geographical
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position of Malawi makes it impossible for me and my 
country to sever alliance, diplomatic, economic, and 
cultural with a certain power now still controlling 
great portions of our continent. I cannot promise 
here that I and my country will be in a position to 
carry out to the letter any resolution which demands 
total severance of all relations, diplomatic, 
economic and cultural with that power.
'this is not because I do not agree with any such
resolution; not because I do not want to help my
brothers and sisters now still under colonial rule in
that territory, but simply because it would be
impossible for me and my country to carry out such a
resolution to the letter without economic
strangulation of Malawi, and with economic
strangulation would come political strangulation. The
government would fall and there would be chaos;
another Congo. Is that what anyone wants in this
43Assembly? I do not think so."
As can be seen from the passage, there is no mention 
of development priorities. The flow of thought clearly 
led to the last sentence of the passage. From the last
sentence, it is clear that what was uppermost in the mind
of the President was not economic benefits but the
survival of the new state of Malawi itself. The 
President, was clearly concerned, not with the economic 
chaos as such, though that in itself would be bad enough,
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but with the political consequences which would result 
from economic chaos.
Perhaps the most misquoted of the President's
speeches which apparently provides irrefutable proof that
the policy was undertaken for foreign aid reasons is the
one from which the expression, "Alliances with the devil",
has been adopted by a host of writers. For example, a
sub-heading of chapter V of McMaster's book reads:
44"Alliance With The Devil." Similarly Gail-Maryse
Cockram's book has a sub-heading which reads: "South
45Africa and Malawi - "The Devil's Disciple", an article
by Edwin Munger bears the title: "Trading With The
Devil," and the Washington Post and Herald Tribune also
46carried an article titled, "Alliance with The Devil."
The following passage from McMaster's book illustrates how 
the speech in question is often misinterpreted:
"In the short term, there were two specific objectives 
which he wished to fulfill by closer association with 
the white states. The first was Portuguese agreement 
to the construction of a new rail link to Nacala; the 
second was the financing for the project and for the 
move of the capital to Lilongwe. It was with refe­
rence to the latter that Dr. Banda declared, as early 
as January, 1966, that "I am sending delegation to
some countries I need not mention I don't mind
47alliance with the devil."
117
This is a misquotation of the speech. The President 
actually said as follows:
"Well, we are going ahead with the capital whether 
anyone agrees with us or not. (Applause) (pointing to 
Mr. Blackwood) you see, I may be sending you to London 
to see some of your friends, and even to some places 
which I need not mention on that capital, or on this 
country, I don't mind alliance with the devil himself. 
(Applause) so that I want to make it quite clear that 
we are going ahead with the capital, whether anyone 
agrees with us or not."^
The statement was made on 18th January, 1966 in 
Parliament. This is what it meant. What was clearly 
intended to be a pre-emptive scathing remark, a give, at 
anticipated criticisms against what Malawi was about to do 
is misinterpreted and offered as proof of the President's 
penchant for foreign aid. Whatever interpretation which 
one makes, the speech refers to dealings which Malawi was 
about to make with some countries. Therefore, it refers to 
what is incidental to policy and not to the determinant of 
policy because the policy of "contact and dialogue" was 
already in place by 1966, as will be shown here.
The Origin of the Policy
The alleged link between foreign aid and the policy 
of "contact and dialogue" is also demonstrated by means of
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the origin of the policy. This is placed well after the 
country's attainment of independence. The policy is said 
to have originated in the late 1960s. Apparently it was 
adopted in response to South Africa's offers of foreign 
aid. For example, Adekunle Ajala wrote:
"While this psychological warfare was going on, South
Africa, as the undisputed leader of the white
redoubts, embarked on measures to prop up the regimes
of Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies as well as
make inroads into Pan-African United Front. The
easiest prey in this battle to win over Black Africa 
49was Malawi."
The expression, "easiest prey" is interesting. It is not 
clear what exactly Ajala has in mind. For example, it is 
not clear the sense in which Malawi, and not say, Zambia, 
Tanzania, and indeed Nigeria, was the easiest prey.
However, Ajala is possibly implying that Malawi was the 
one country which felt obliged to respond to South 
Africa's outward looking policy in the late 1960s. Thus, 
he implies that Malawi's policy of "contact and dialogue" 
originated in the late 1960s in response to South Africa's 
outward looking policy which included offers of foreign 
aid to African countries. The pamphlet written by the 
anonymous author makes the point explicit. A passage in 
it reads:
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"It was only in 1966 that Malawi sought to open
relations with South Africa. The immediate cause was
Dr. Banda's desire to build a new capital city in the
50centre of the country."
In other words, the pamphlet firmly links the policy to 
the construction of the country's new capital in 1966.
Naturally, Malawi was not in a position to adopt a 
foreign policy prior to the attainment of its independence 
since the pursuance of a foreign policy by a country 
presupposes independence. The three foreign policies 
which have been considered here were indeed adopted soon 
after independence. However, the policies were formulated 
prior to the country's attainment of independence. For 
example, the 1964 Cairo speech which was referred to 
earlier, explained the policy before the O.A.U. Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government. As this was just a few 
days after Malawi's attainment of independence on 6th 
July, 1964, the speech is itself proof that the policy was 
formulated a few months prior to the country's attainment 
of independence.
In short, the origin of the policy was not in the 
late 1960s. The policy was clearly formulated prior to 
Malawi's independence and was not adopted as a response to 
South Africa's outward looking policy.
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Geography and the Making of Policy
Further, the alleged link between foreign aid and the 
policy is demonstrated by means of the role which the 
country's geography is said to have played in formulation 
of the policy. The geography is said to have left Malawi 
with no choice but to adopt the policy of "contact and 
dialogue." Here is a sample of statements which make such 
claim:
(1) The Guardian stated that Malawi'srelations with
the white south have been determined largely by
its geography", geography is here said to have
(51)determined policy;' 7
(2) David Humphrey says that Malawi's options are
severely constrained by her geographical
position", geography is here said to have
(52)constrained options";' 7
(3) Richardson says that "with half of its territory
lying in the lap of the Portuguese - landlocked
Malawi has been increasingly drawn to the
white-dominated states of Southern Africa",
geography is here seen to have drawn Malawi
53towards the south, and
(4) Hunter says that "harsh realism dictates Malawi
policies", geography is here said to have
. . 54dictated the policies.
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In short, these statements present the country's geography 
as having determined Malawi's relations with the south, 
"constrained options", "drawn Malawi towards the south", 
and "dictated policies". Harold and Margaret Sprout call 
such statements, "deterministic" or "environmentalist"
rhetoric; that is, statements which ascribe human-like
55
purposes to non-human factors. Here such statements
will in short be termed "deterministic" interpretations 
of the role of a country's geography or operational 
environment in policy making.
Malawi's operational environment consists of several 
important components. Together, they constitute a delicate 
operational environment in relation to the country's policy 
making. The first component is obviously the size and 
shape of the country. It is narrow and longish with some 
parts of it being as harrow as 50 miles of 75 kilometres. 
The second component is that the hub of its modern 
communication and economic activity is still n a place, 
called Blantyre, in the south of the country. This is less 
than a hundred miles of 125 kilometres from either the 
eastern or western border with what was, at the time of the 
country's attainment of independence, Portuguese 
Mozambique. It is true that many infrastructural changes 
have now taken place a over the country, but Blantyre 
together with two neighbouring tea-growing districts of 
Thyolo and Mulanje still bear the imprint of modern Malawi.
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The third component is that all of Malawi's major
exports are agricultural. These include tea, tobacco,
sugar, and groundnuts. They are, in economic terms, low
value exports which necessitate the use the shortest and
most reliable routes to the world markets. Finally, the
fourth component consisted in itself of two parts. The
first was the use of the Port of Beira which was governed
56by the 1950 Convention between Portugal and Britain.
The second was the use and ownership by Malawi of the
Lower Zambezi Bridge, then said to be the longest water
bridge in the world, and the Trans-Zambezi Railway in
Mozambique up to a point on Malawi's southern border.
According to a South African by the name of Rhoodie, the
bridge was sold to the then Portuguese Government of 
57Mozambique. Together with the railway line and the
use of the port of Beira, it constituted the fourth 
component of geography.
Each of these factors enhances the significance of 
the other so that it makes sense to regard them as 
constituting the country's geography, in this case, 
geography being a short-hand for the country's problems of 
landlockedness. For example, the agricultural exports 
necessitated the use of shorter routes to the sea which, 
in terms of the concentration of modern economic activity 
in the south of the longish country, meant the trade 
routes to the south.
123
The foregoing is the country's geography which is 
relevant to the foreign policy making of the country. It 
is true that it was perceived by the country's decision­
makers when they were formulating the country's foreign 
policies. It is also true that after perceiving it, the 
President decided to take account of it in the formulation 
of the policy of "contact and dialogue." For example, a 
Government publication stated:
"We cannot at this stage contemplate severance of
5 8these links imposed upon us by our geography."
Indeed, the policy of "contact and dialogue" is in tune
with the country's geography.
However, this does not mean that the "deterministic 
interpretation" of the country's geography in relation to 
policy making is correct. It is not. Such an interpre­
tation overlooks the historical relativ ity of the
problem. For example, the British Protectorate of 
Nyasaland operated almost as if it did not have the 
problem of geography. It is true that the problem of
landlockedness was there but the 600-year-old Anglo- 
Portuguese Alliance enabled Nyasaland to have an easy 
access to the sea through the Portuguese-controlled
Mozambique. What brought the problem into importance in 
relation to foreign policy making was the emergence of the 
state of Malawi: the first African state to emerge in the
then still Anglo-Portuguese dominated southern Africa.
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This made the country cease to be a beneficiary of the 
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Therefore, Malawi had to find 
on its own a modus ooerandi with the Portuguese-controlled 
Mozambique. In other words, geography was not in itself 
important. What suddenly gave it importance was the 
emergence of Malawi as an African state.
In addition, some information is available which 
points to the possibility that geography might not have 
been fully taken into consideration. This is because some 
of the country’s leaders held views which clearly mean 
that they would not have put much importance to geography 
in the policy making of the country. For example, one of 
them put on record the view:
"Portugal would not close its ports to Malawi’s
massive fee-paying traffic without doing harm to her
own economy in Mozambique, nor can South Africa and
Rhodesia expel their thousands of Malawi workers,
some of whom are highly skilled and experienced
59without wrecking their own economies."
This is a viewpoint which also endorsed by some experts. 
For example, McMaster says in her book:
"The benefits of the existing links were not after 
all, one-sided. Neither South Africa nor Rhodesia 
accepted Malawian workers as an act of charity. The 
Malawians were known to be hard workers and were not
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a long term responsibility for the governments. 
Malawi was a convenient outlet for Rhodesian goods, 
and Mozambique benefited financially from the transit 
trade through Beira."6^
The appalling unsoundness of these arguments is 
incredible. The crucial point in both of them is, "mutual 
benefit arrangement". How indispensable this is thought to 
have been to South Africa and Rhodesia is by no means 
clear. For it does not take a sophisticated mind to 
appreciate that this was a false argument. It is true
that South Africa did not recruit Malawian labour out of
charity. However, one has to bear in mind that both South
Africa and Rhodesia also had domestic black labour
deliberately kept in reserve. In addition, they had 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana from which 
they could make up any shortfall arising from cessation of 
their labour recruitment in Malawi.
As an outlet of Rhodesian goods, Malawi was not also 
important. Rhodesia had alternative outlets. In fact, 
South Africa was Rhodesia's most important outlet of its 
goods. Malawi's allegedly "massive fee-paying traffic" 
was similarly unimportant to the Portuguese in Mozambique.
In fact Jorge Jardin provided an answer to this. For 
example, using 1966 Port of Beira Statistics, he described 
Malawi as a small market of about 60,000 tons of fuel a year 
as compared to 180,000 tons of fuel a year for Zambia and 
400,000 tons of fuel a year for what is now Zimbabwe.^1
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However, the foregoing is a mere digression. The 
passage is quoted here to show that there were such 
arguments about the county's geography. These indicate 
that the geography might not have been fully taken account 
of in the making and implementation of the country's 
foreign policies. In this regard, the Sprouts' interpre­
tation of the role of geography in policy making is fully 
in tune with Malawi's experience. The country's geography 
became important only because the country's President, 
unlike some of the other leaders of the country, not only 
perceived the geography but also decided in his best 
judgment to take account of it in the formulation of the 
policy of "contact and dialogue".
Arising from the "deterministic interpretation" of
the country's geography in relation to foreign policy
making is a certain conception of the policy of "contact
and dialogue". Because of its being in tune with the
country's geography, the policy is seen as the least cost
or easiest option for Malawi. For example, McMaster makes
a comparison of Malawi’s situation with that of Botswana
with a view to demonstrating that Malawi chose the easier 
6 2option. Mwakasungura endorses this view and claims
that "Malawians were prepared to sacrifice a lot", meaning
that the policy of "contact and dialogue" does not involve
63any sacrifice. Richardson expressed the "least cost 
argument" better. He wrote:
I
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"A strong argument can be made for the premise in the
short run that friendship with the south is the only
course open to Malawi that is in the economic
64interests of its people."
This argument rests on a superficial treatment of the 
relative costs of the policy. It implies an emphasis on 
the magnitude of the cost of the alternative option. 
However, what is important in foreign policy formulation 
is not simply the magnitude of the cost but its incidence. 
This is because almost any policy option involves a 
sacrifice. The important question is not about how much 
is the cost but about who actually pays the price for a 
decision or who actually meets the consequences of a 
decision. Therefore, the correct way of assessing the 
relative cost of the policy is not to make a comparison 
between Malawi and any other country. That leads to 
glossing over some important differences. It is to 
consider where the incidence of the cost of alternative 
policy options falls. This is what will be attempted here.
The alternative to the policy of "contact and 
dialogue" had been that of boycott and isolation of the 
then Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, of Rhodesia, and 
still of South Africa. This is the policy which is 
endorsed by the O.A.U. A modified version of it is what 
McMaster recommends for Malawi.^ This thesis has no 
intention to prescribe policy for Malawi. That is the 
business of the Malawi decision makers. Therefore, it
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confines itself to considering where the incidence of cost 
of the policy option which McMaster recommends falls and 
where the incidence of cost of the policy of "contact and 
dialogue" falls.
No doubt a good example of the policy option
favoured by McMaster is that which was followed by 
independent Mozambique towards South Africa before the 
Nkomati Accord. South Africa used to call it, "a hostile 
but pragmatic policy" which consisted of cooperation at the 
economic level but hostility at the political level with 
the target country.^ Paradoxically, it presupposes 
internal political stability in the target state. This is 
because the target country is expected to separate 
political hostility from economic cooperation. This is 
what McMaster recommends in her book that Malawi should
have adopted. In practice, it would have meant that only 
the country's Minister of Transport and Communications 
should deal with the Portuguese in connection with 
Malawi’s use of the Port of Beira and the Railway lines in 
Mozambique. On the other hand, the Malawi Minister of 
External Affairs would be expected, not only to shun but 
also to blast the Portuguese and other colonialists in the
subcontinent at the O.A.U., the Commonwealth, and United
Nations meetings.
Where then would have the incidence of cost of 
"contact and dialogue" and of "hostile but pragmatic" 
option fallen? For "contact and dialogue", the cost would have been
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and has indeed been, political. The O.A.U., as stated 
earlier, favours the policy of boycott and isolation and 
would have no doubt been happier if Malawi had adopted at 
least a modified version of this policy. For example, 
another anonymous writer argued:
"The issues with regard to Portugal are at two 
levels. The more sophisticated Africans worry that 
by not "just living with, but loving" the Portuguese, 
Malawi's prestige in Pan-African circles is very 
low."
The adoption of the policy of "contact and dialogue", 
in short, involved going against the popular positions in 
the O.A.U. This is the political cost which some of the 
country's leaders found unacceptable. Its incidence fell 
directly upon the country's decision makers.
It is true that unlike that of the "hostile but 
pragmatic" option, the cost of "contact and dialogue" is 
easy to assess because it is the policy which Malawi has 
followed. However, the former is now possible to assess 
for two reasons. , The first is the availability of the 
experience of some of the southern African countries which 
have followed the "hostile but pragmatic" option. The 
second is the availability of some information on what 
might have been the Portuguese reaction. On the basis of 
these two pieces of information, it is possible to get at 
least an impression of what might have been the cost of 
the alternative option.
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The Mozambiquan experience shows that the South 
Africans have ignored economic cooperation and have, 
instead, heeded political hostility between the two 
countries because they have themselves faced internal 
political instability. The result has so far been almost 
catastrophic only on the Mozambiquan side. Since they 
similarly faced internal political instability soon after 
Malawi's independence, the Portuguese would have also 
heeded only the political hostilities. Indeed, Jardin also 
stated in his book what might have been undertaken by the 
Portuguese. He wrote:
"However, not all was running smoothly in senior 
circles of Lisbon. It was also contended that Malawi 
was double-dealing by furthering Pan-Africanism of 
which Dr. Banda was supporter, while pretending to 
keep normal relations with Portugal.
In my frequent visits to Lisbon, that first six months 
of 1973, I felt the weight of these pressures extended 
on the government. Among them stood out the influence 
of General Costa Gomes who during his term in 
Mozambique as Military Commander had already 
postulated extreme retaliatory measures against the 
neighbouring African countries.
All the while, sabotage actions were taking place one 
after the other along the border with Malawi against 
the railway line of Matarara to Moatize which served
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the huge Cabora Bassa hydro-electric project and the
coal mine. The road from Tete to Zobue was now the
target of terrorist actions, although it carried
68
essential supplies to Zambia."
In short, the Portuguese would probably have reacted 
against Malawi more or less like the South Africans have 
done against Mozambique. Therefore, the incidence of the 
cost of the "hostile but pragmatic" policy would have 
fallen directly on the ordinary people.
In terms of magnitude, the cost of the "hostile but 
pragmatic" option would, indeed, have been quite 
unacceptable. However, its incidence would not have fallen 
on the leaders. Instead, it would have fallen directly on 
the ordinary people. For example, it would have been the 
ordinary people in border districts of Malawi, Mangochi, 
Mulanje, Thyolo, Nsanke, Chikwawa, Ntcheu, Dedza, Lilongwe, 
and Mchinj i who would have had to stomach the Portuguese 
ammunition or suffer the consequences of Portuguese 
military reprisals. Perhaps this is what Mwakasungura 
refers to when he claims that "Malawians were prepared to 
sacrifice a lot."
No doubt, the leaders would have been concerned with 
the suffering of the people. Nonetheless, they would not 
have felt the brunt of the policy directly. At the same 
time, they would have received sympathy from and gained 
popularity in Pan-African circles. This means that
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the incidence of the cost of the option would not have 
fallen directly on the decision makers. Therefore, from 
the decision making point of view, the "hostile but 
pragmatic" option was actually the easier to take.
On the other hand, the incidence of the cost of the 
"contact and dialogue" option has fallen directly on the 
country's decision makers. The Malawi government have 
publicly acknowledged this. They have accepted the
consequences of the option. Therefore, from the decisiorr- 
making point of view, the "contact and dialogue" option 
was the more difficult one to take by the decision-makers 
because the incidence of its cost fell directly upon
them. It required special courage on the part of the 
country's leadership. The fact that some of the country's
leaders found it unacceptable is a case in point.
This means that the "deterministic" interpretation of 
a country's geography in relation to decision making 
obstructs rather than facilitates an accurate
understanding of the policy making of a country. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that those who interpret 
Malawi's geography that way think of the policy of
"contact and dialogue" as the easier option and have
mistaken the acquisition of foreign aid as the main
objective of the policy.
'4
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References To Certain Events
Finally the alleged link between foreign aid and the 
policy of "contact and dialogue" is supported with 
references to certain events. A passage from Ajala's 
article, part of which was quoted earlier illustrates the 
point. It reads:
"Before the end of 1966, Malawi started secret
contacts with the South Africa regime in an effort to
secure a loan for her development projects including
the building of a new capital. As soon as there were
indications that the aid would be forthcoming, Malawi
started to attack openly the O.A.U. policy on
apartheid. The immediate outcome of this was the
signing of trade agreement between Malawi and South
Africa in March 1967. This was quickly followed by
South African financial and material aid for
installing strong radio transmitters in Malawi. The
day before the O.A.U. summit began in Kinshasa,
Malawi established diplomatic relations with
Apartheid regime. Shortly afterwards, South Africa
offered Malawi a loan to build a railway linking
6 9Malawi with Northern Mozambique."
The passage is littered with distortions some of
which are quite amusing. In the first instance it also 
places the origin of the policy late in 1966. As already 
stated, this is incorrect. The policy was adopted
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immediately after the country's attainment of independence. 
The "secret contacts" referred to by Ajala, if at all such 
contacts took place, were incidental to and not the start 
of the formulation of the policy. Moreover, the sentence 
contains inaccuracies. What Malawi did was to accepta 
South African offer of assistance for the construction of 
its new capital. Malawi did not seek from South Africa a 
"loan for its development projects". Malawi's develop­
ment projects are financed mostly with foreign aid. For 
development projects Malawi at that time approached not 
South Africa but the World Bank, U.N.D.P., and the donor 
countries which did not include South Africa.
The second sentence is amusing. Malawi is said to 
have "started attacking openly the O.A.U. policy on 
Apartheid" as soon as it saw that South Africa's foreign
aid would be forth coming to it. Of course, this in
keeping with Ajala's belief that Malawi's policy of
"contact and dialogue" was undertaken in order to attract 
South African foreign aid to Malawi. However, the 
allegation is false. ^s Ajala would know, there was then
no such a thing as the O.A.U. "Policy on Apartheid*. 
There was the O.A.U. policy towards all the Southern 
African problems: Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia,
and South Africa. In fact, the topical issue then was the 
U.D.I. in Rhodesia and later, Mozambique. South Africa's 
Apartheid was very much in the background.
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The third sentence is curious. A trade agreement is 
said to be the out-come of Malawi's open attacks against 
the "O.A.U. policy on Apartheid." Apparently South Africa 
was so pleased with Malawi's attacks against the "O.A.U. 
policy on Apartheid" that it just invited Malawi to sign a 
trade agreement. No such thing took place. The trade 
agreement was the result of deliberate negotiations 
between the Governments of South Africa and Malawi. It 
had nothing to do with Malawi's attacks against the
O.A.U. The fourth sentence is also inaccurate. The South 
African donation was a transmitter for a sub-studio 
station of the country's Broadcasting Corporation (M.B.C.) 
at the foot of Zomba Mountain in the south of the country. 
The powerful national and regional transmitters of the 
Corporation came from West Germany and the United States.
Finally, the rest of the sentences in the passage 
need no further attention because they merely juxtapose 
facts, or events which were quite unrelated to each other 
and some of which Ajala takes out of their sequence. For 
example, the establishment of the diplomatic relations 
between Malawi and South Africa, was not deliberately made 
to coincide with the O.A.U. summit in that year. These 
were two events which simply happened that way. There was 
no significant relationship between them.
Conclusion
Underlying the evidence which has been considered so 
far in this chapter is the question of perception. The
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"foreign aid argument" says that the perceptions of the 
country's decision makers were influenced by geography and 
by the availability of aid in other countries. the 
question of geography had already been considered at 
length in connection with the policy of "contact and 
dialogue." The point to be stressed is that the effect of 
geography on the perceptions of decision makers does not 
preclude human judgment and did not have that effect even 
in Malawi's case. Indeed it is itself subject to human 
judgment. The rest of the evidence examined is cited to 
demonstrate the manner in which the availability of aid in 
donor countries allegedly influenced the perception of the 
country's President.
The question of foreign aid influencing the 
perceptions of the Malawi authorities is what needs to be 
summarised in a little more detail. Applying the 
psychological analysis, the "foreign aid argument" means 
that the President of Malawi first perceived the availa­
bility of foreign aid and then decided to acquire it. He 
then formulated and adopted policies which would enable 
him to do so. This is how the formulation of the policies
of "discretional alignment and nonalignment" and "contact
and dialogue" would be explained psychologically by the 
advocates of the foreign aid argument."
According to psychology, the sharper, the message,
the easier it is perceived. In terms of the question
under consideration, this means that the well known donor
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countries and organizations easily influence the percep­
tions of the decision makers in the aid recipient 
countries. No doubt, the President of Malawi is and was 
aware of the countries and organizations in Europe and 
North America which are important as donors of foreign 
aid. However, it is doubtful, to say the least, if at all, that 
the President, as he is often supposed, really perceived 
Portuguese-controlled Mozambique, U.D.I. Rhodesia, and 
even South Africa as sources of foreign aid to Malawi. It 
is doubtful if he perceived them that way because these 
countries were not even potential donors of aid.
Because of the loans and some aid which it has given 
to Malawi, South Africa is now regarded by some writers as 
a foreign aid donor. However, compared to Japan, Denmark, 
or Canada, South Africa is not yet an aid donor. If the 
importance of foreign aid in the formulation of Malawi's 
foreign policies lay in influencing the perceptions of the 
President, then Malawi should not have followed at least 
the policy of "contact and dialogue" because more foreign 
aid has since then been available in countries other than 
those in Southern Africa. Moreover foreign aid should 
have by now influenced the President's perceptions away 
from South Africa to more lucrative sources of foreign aid 
if foreign aid did indeed influence his perceptions into 
formulating and adopting the policy of "contact and dia­
logue." The fact that Malawi has not changed its policies 
is its proof that these policies were not adopted for 
reasons of attracting foreign aid to Malawi.
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Sweden has been one of the major contributors towards
the late 1970s foreign aid boom and is an important donor
of foreign aid to a number of countries in Southern Africa.
No doubt Sweden provides aid to some Southern African
countries for a number of reasons. However, one of them is
clearly a recipient country's type of policy towards South
Africa. "The concentration of the Nordic Development
Assistance to Southern Africa", read a Policy Statement of
Nordic Countries, for example, "should, besides the obvious
economic needs of the region, also be seen against the
background of the overall foreign policy orientation of
Nordic countries in the region; i.e. to support and
strengthen the independent states and to combat apartheid
. . 70and minority rule in South Africa and Namibia." 
Therefore, the distribution pattern of the Swedish aid to 
the region is a reasonable basis for examining the 
contention that the availability of foreign aid influences 
the perceptions of the decision makers in a foreign aid 
recipient country.
In connection with a military coup in Lesotho in 1985, 
Sweden revealed the main motive for which it provides aid 
to Southern African countries. For example, Borger, a 
Swedish proponent of "dependency theory," reported in 1986 
that Sweden had warned the military government of Lesotho 
that Sweden's "involvement in Lesotho would be cut
drastically if the new Government now aligns itself
71 . . .
too closely with Pretoria." The distribution pattern
of the Swedish foreign aid to South Africa, therefore
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is a very useful means for testing the contention that the 
availability of South African foreign aid influenced the 
perceptions of the Malawi decision makers.
Table I on the next page shows figures of Swedish aid 
to Southern African countries. Apart from Swaziland, the 
recipients are clearly countries with espouse policies 
other than that of Malawi towards South Africa. Moreover, 
the aid figures are quite impressive and attest to the 
importance of Sweden as an aid donor.
The foregoing means that Malawi should have been 
swayed away from its current foreign policy towards South 
Africa if the availability of foreign aid does indeed 
influence the perceptions of decision makers in a foreign 
aid recipient country. That Malawi has not done so is, 
therefore, a matter which raises doubts about the validity 
of the claim that the perceptions of the Malawi authorities 
were influenced by the availability of South African 
foreign aid at the time that they formulated the country's 
policy of "contact and dialogue."
In other words, the claim that foreign aid influenced 
the perceptions of Malawi's President at the time that he 
formulated the country's foreign policies does not stand 
closer examination. At least the distribution pattern of 
Swedish foreign aid to Southern Africa has not so far 
swayed Malawi away from its policy towards South Africa.
T
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TABLE I
Swedish Foreign Aid To Eastern And Southern Africa In $Million 
64 65 66 67 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Botswana 0.1 0.3 0.5 1.2 4.7 6.9 8.4 10.2 10.7 13.0 14.8 13.2 15.2 13.2 11.6 11.0 7.3 16.3
Kenya 0.12 1.47 2.69 3.8 2.8 3.7 7.7 12.1 17.5 18.9 22.3 18.0 14.3 24.4 28.4 14.5 14.7 15.2 14.2 9.7 14.5
Lesotho 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.7 2.5 2.3 1.4 3.5 3.8 3.8 2.1 3.4 2.6 2.9 6.7
Malawi 0.1
Swaziland 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.3 1.0 3.1 0.8 1.6 4.1 1.2 0.8 3.4 0.6 2.5
Tanzania 1.07 1.62 2.72 2.20 8.6 7.0 11.2 17.0 31.9 34.4 54.8 51.3 57.4 64.2 93.4 78.1 76.5 73.8 69.3 55.1 | 59.0
i
106.4
Uganda 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.4 2.4 3.8 0.4 0.7
i
0.2 j 1.9
Zambia 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.3 6.1 14.8 7.1 24.3 19.4 23.9 31.1 28.8 27.5 29.4 20.4 S ?2.9 44.9
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) Annual Reports of Financial Flows To Developing Countries.
Gap: (1) 1968 figures were not available in the O.E.C.D. Reports
(2) Botswana/ Lesotho/ and Swaziland figures start from 1969. Two of them became independent in 1968.
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Chapter Three 
Economic Policies 
Introduction
This chapter looks at the evidence for the alleged
link between foreign aid and the Malawi economic
policies.1 The discussion will centre on Malawi's
economic system and development strategy. These policies
present no problems for discussion here because, unlike
the foreign policies, they have not been treated as 
2"illusions”. It is true that there have been some
criticisms against them, particularly the country's
3agricultural policies. However, the criticisms have 
not been that these policies are "illusions" but that they 
are not appropriate for the country.
In addition, the chapter will look at the relation 
between these policies and technical aid which is the 
secondment of personnel from a donor government to a 
recipient government. The issue to consider is the claim 
that these policies were decided upon by foreign experts. 
In other words, the discussion will also touch on an issue 
which goes beyond the question of perception. It will be 
the start of the consideration of the role of foreign 
experts which will receive fuller attention in the fifth 
chapter.
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The discussion is in two parts. The first part is a 
consideration of the evidence which is often cited in 
support of the alleged link between foreign aid and 
economic policies. The second part is a consideration of 
the evidence which is often cited in support of the claim 
that Malawi's development strategy was decided upon by 
foreign experts.
Economic System
At the time they gained independence, the African 
states were concerned with two economic issues. The first 
issue was the question of economic system and the other was 
the question of economic development. The latter will be 
considered later. For the moment, attention will turn to 
the question of economic system.
The question of economic system is concerned with the 
place of the individual in an economy. It is about 
ownership of property or the means of production in a 
country, about whether it is the individual who should, or 
the state which should, own property or means of 
production. According to economic theory, a capitalist 
system is one which embraces the principle of private 
ownership of property while the socialist system is one 
which embraces the principle of state ownership of 
property. In between these two economic systems is an 
economic system which is a mixture of private and state 
ownership of property. Therefore, it follows that
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The question of economic system is concerned with the 
place of the individual in an economy. It is about 
ownership of property or the means of production in a 
country, about whether it is the individual who should, or 
the state which should, own property or means of 
production. According to economic theory, a capitalist 
system is one which embraces the principle of private 
ownership of property while the socialist system is one 
which embraces the principle of state ownership of 
property. In between these two economic systems is an 
economic system which is a mixture of private and state 
ownership of property. Therefore, it follows that
capitalist policies promote and protect a capitalist 
economy, or economic system, while socialist economic 
policies promote and protect a socialist economy, or 
economic system. Since the Western economies are generally 
regarded as capitalist and are, indeed, the major sources 
of foreign aid, it follows that a developing country which 
embraces capitalist economic policies would be favoured by 
the donor countries and organizations.
Quotations from the President's Speeches
Some of the evidence which is often cited in support 
of the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's 
economic policies is the capitalist description of the 
policies. This is done on the basis of quotations from
some speeches made by the country's President. For
4example, The Times quoted the President as saying:
"I personally don't like communism and I do not 
believe in it. But I understand it and know why it 
came about in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."
This was a part of a statement which the President made 
when he received in audience members of a Romanian 
delegation in Malawi. It portrays the President as a firm 
believer of capitalism. Mwakasungura also quoted him, 
telling a Malawi Congress Party Annual Conference that:
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"On the subject of different systems of government and 
economics - Communism, Socialism, and Capitalism - I 
am glad that you have decided that whatever our 
neighbors may do or say, the only practical system of 
government and economics is that which passes for 
capitalism." 5
Mwakasungura made this quotation in support of his claim 
that the President spoke in a language consistent with the 
World Bank "philosophy". Andrew Ross similarly wrote that 
the President told a meeting of the Malawi Tea Association
g
that nationalization "would be suicide for Malawi." ]n
short, the evidence is in part the claim that Malawi's 
economic policies are capitalist. This claim is in turn 
used as evidence for the argument that the country's 
domestic policies were adopted for foreign aid reasons.
The quotations look like evidence only because they 
are made out of context. It is true that the Malawi 
Congress Party made a decision on the question of the 
country's economic system at its annual conference in 
September, 1968. However, foreign aid was not the reason 
for which the decision was made. For example, foreign aid 
did not even feature in the deliberations among the Party 
delegates, nor did it feature at an earlier conference at 
which the issue was also considered. The latter
conference was a political educational conference of the 
Party which was convened exclusively to consider the
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different socio-economic systems existent in the world then. 
That the decision was not made for foreign aid reasons is, 
perhaps, amply demonstrated by the reasons for which the 
party education conference was convened. These were the 
prevailing world situation and some developments in 
neighbouring countries.
The prevailing world situation was the superpower 
confrontational relationship arising from the ascendance 
of a communist ideology which led the world to be divided 
into two blocs: Eastern and Western blocs. Cuba had
emerged from a Batista regime and was moving fast along 
the socialist path to development as also was the new 
state of Algeria in North Africa. In North Vietnam and 
North Korea, national reunification issues were similarly 
being pursued on the basis of socialist programmes. The 
fashion, among the emerging states, was to go socialist.
This created pressure upon the wther newly independent states to 
indicate their alignment. In political terms, it meant 
that a new state had to align itself with the East, with 
the West, or with none. In economic terms, it meant that 
a new state had to embrace socialism, capitalism, or a 
mixture of socialism and capitalism. Like many other new 
states, Malawi had to make a choice among these three 
economic systems.
The second factor, perhaps the immediate cause of the 
Party's decision, were developments in the neighbouring
7
countries. To the north, Tanzania adopted the Arusha
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Declaration which set it on a socialist path to develop­
ment. To the West, Zambia adopted the Mulunoushi 
Declaration which also set that country on a humanist path 
to development. Even in far off Uganda, a Common Man's 
Charter which would have set that country on a socialist 
path to development was adopted. For Malawi, the question 
then was: which way to go?
In short, the two important factors were the 
ascendance of the socialist ideology in the world and the 
adoption of some varied versions of this ideology in the 
neighbouring countries. It was these developments rather 
than foreign aid which accounted for the convening in May 
1968 of the Party political conference on the question of
what economic system the country should follow.
It is true that these two factors do not preclude the 
possibility that foreign aid might have also influenced 
the Party's choice of the economic system for the country. 
Therefore, hypothetically, it can be legitimately
contended that the choice was made with a view to
enhancing Malawi's prospects of securing foreign aid. 
However, such a hypothesis is not valid because, as 
already pointed out, foreign aid was not on the agenda of 
the conference and did not feature in the deliberations
among the Party delegates. Moreover, the politics of 
foreign aid is really a matter among a handful of people, 
usually civil servants, in the developing countries so
that it cannot sensibly be assumed that the delegates went
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to the conference conscious of the country's requirements 
for aid.
If there were anyone who might have gone to the 
conference conscious of the country's need for aid, then it 
must have been the President himself. Obviously, he was 
the most important factor in the decisions at the 
conference. Indeed, the President had, on other occasions, 
made speeches which explained in great detail the 
differences among the different economic systems in the 
world. One other such occasion was the Party political 
conference already referred to and another was a meeting at 
a debating club in Zomba, the country's former capital, as 
far back as April, 1964. If at all foreign aid had in 
advance influenced the perceptions of anyone at the 
September 1968 Party conference, then that someone must 
have been the President. Therefore, the question which 
needs to be considered is that of whether foreign aid was 
indeed uppermost in the President's mind when he addressed 
the Party conference.
However, even if one concentrates attention on the 
President, there are still not sufficient grounds to 
suppose that foreign aid influenced the Party decision. 
For example, the President did not even make any reference 
to foreign aid in his speech. In addition, capitalism was 
not exactly what he preferred. An examination of the 
speeches which he made at the time shows exactly what he 
preferred and what the Party decided upon.
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When looking at his speeches, one finds an interesting, 
delicate balance of thought in them. Therefore, one has 
to be careful when quoting them. For example, the balance 
of thought is sometimes in a paragraph or between 
paragraphs in a speech. Sometimes, the balance is between 
two different speeches. A good example is a paragraph in 
a speech to the 1968 Party conference in May. Its second 
sentence reads:
"Therefore, I do not believe in either communism or
g
socialism for Malawi - I believe in capitalism."
Left on its own, this sentence indeed gives the impression 
that the President was advocating here a full blown 
capitalism for the country. However, this would be to 
misunderstand the President because the next sentence in 
the paragraph balances it. It reads:
"But I believe in honest and fair capitalism - that
is the cooperation between private enterprise and the 
9
government."
This clearly takes much of the heat out of the full blown 
capitalism he is supposed to espouse. Similarly, another 
paragraph in the speech to the September Party Conference 
creates a misleading impression if left on its own. It 
reads:
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"Therefore, I am not afraid of the word, capitalism, 
at all. Here in Malawi, we cannot afford anything 
else. Where are the rich people for us to tax? We 
have got no millionaires here. Therefore, we cannot 
afford it."10
As can be seen, this gives the impression that full blown 
capitalism was also being advocated here for the country. 
However, this would be to misunderstand the President 
because the next paragraph provides balance to it. This 
reads:
"But even in America, rigid capitalism is no longer 
permitted. The Government has certain control. In 
Britain, it has even more control. So here,too, we 
will not let capitalism run wild and get away with 
murder in this country. Capitalism under control and
regulated, but capitalism just the same, not
• • „11communism or socialism."
This clearly put in an important qualification to the 
capitalism which Malawi would follow. It was what the 
leader preferred and what the Malawi Congress Party 
decided on.
The speech at the debating club in Zomba actually 
elaborated on the sort of system which Malawi would 
follow. A paragraph of it reads:
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"For myself, if I may be honest and frank with you, I
prefer the kind of economic and political life, or
political and economic system, which they have in
Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Under the
economic and political system, such as operates in
Britain and the Scandinavian countries, the state has
a great deal of power of control over business and
businessmen, but without owning all the means of
production and distribution and without power of
conscription over both capital and labour, except in
times of war. As I have stated, in Britain, the
state owns some means of distribution, such as
airways and railways. Outside and beyond this
control, business and businessmen or individual
citizens are free to do what they like. They have a
choice. In Russia, it is not a question of just
exercising control at all. There, the state is the
owner of everything and it orders you what to do.
There is no question of persuasion first and control
afterwards. No. From the very beginning, you are
ordered what to do, whether it be to till the land or
12to work m  the factory."
Clearly, this was the sort of socio-economic system which 
the President actually preferred. It is a mixed economic 
system in which the state and private enterprises would 
cooperate.
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Finally, another example of the balance of thought in 
the President's speeches is discernible in connection with 
the question of nationalization. A brief statement which 
was published in a journal called World Development 
reads,for example:
"Last year, the Companies Act was amended to give the 
government power to initiate discussions with these 
firms on the question of local participation. In view 
of some of the fears expressed, I emphasize that this 
amendment was designed solely to facilitate emergence 
of mutually acceptable arrangements. There can be no 
question of using it as a sort of back door nationa­
lization, a policy we do not entertain in Malawi.
"On the other hand, Malawi must not and cannot be 
allowed to be anyone's commercial or industrial 
colony."13
The thought in this passage balanced in another statement 
on nationalization, a part of which reads:
"I just wanted to make that remark, Mr. Speaker, so 
that anyone who thinks, if say, "we are pulling out, 
we are going to be left in the lurch, in the air," 
they are deceiving themselves. I organized the 
Development Corporation so that whenever private 
enterprise is hesitant or afraid, the Government 
itself, through the Development Corporation can go
160
in. This is not state socialism/ but, if private 
enterprise is afraid and hesitant, I will be forced 
to introduce in this country state socialism or the 
alternative.
nI am not going to wait. We want development in this 
country, and we are going to develop this country by 
all means, by all ways open to us. Private 
enterprise, if private enterprise is willing; state 
enterprise if private enterprise is afraid and 
hesitant."
The passage, if not read very carefully, gives one the 
impression that the Malawi Government would go for outright 
nationalization. This, indeed, is the impression which 
some observers got from it. However, such an impression 
is incorrect because the passage makes it clear that 
nationalization would be carried out only if private 
enterprise would be afraid and hesitant to operate in 
Malawi. Otherwise, the Malawi Government has indeed 
shunned nationalization as was made abundantly clear in 
the statement quoted earlier.
In short, the quotations are taken out of context and 
distort the President's thoughts. The president expressed 
preference for a mixed economy and not for a capitalist 
economy. Therefore, these quotations are not a sound 
evidence for the argument that these policies were adopted
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to make Malawi attractive to donor countries and 
organizations.
The Nature of Malawi*s Economic System
The other evidence which is also cited in support for
the argument that the country's economic policies were
adopted for foreign aid considerations is the nature of
Malawi's economy, or economic system. For example, the
economy is described by some writers as capitalist or
market-oriented. "We shall also examine some of the
policy options open to the government," wrote Thandika
Mkandawire, "given its resource-based, international
15conjuncture, and the capitalist mode of production," a 
point which is endorsed by Mwaskasungura who also wrote:
"... the organization of production has been geared 
towards a fetish of capitalist methods of production 
and marketing."16
"Countries which have followed a more market-oriented
strategy," wrote Acharya, a World Bank expert, "includes
17Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi." In short, Malawi's 
economy is said to be "open", "market-oriented", or 
"capitalist".
Some of these quotations are indeed mere descriptions 
of the country's economic policies. However, it will be 
recalled that the capitalist label is used fcy some
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writers, including McMaster and Mwakasungura, as evidence
that the country's economic policies were adopted in order
18to attract foreign aid. Therefore, the question which 
has to be considered now is whether Malawi's economy has 
really been "capitalistic".
That the country’s economy has, or economic policies
have, not really been capitalist is a point which is made
even by some observers. "Policies to enhance agricultural
and industrial performance," reported an International
Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) representative, "focus on a
restoration of liberal market-oriented economic and
financial policies, and particularly on appropriate price
and production incentives to encourage private sector
production," a surprising comment in the light of the
19claims examined earlier. Andrew Meldrum also reported
that although the President "professes to be an advocate
of free enterprise, the I.M.F. team found his control of
20the economy excessive."
This observation is not new. For example, Simon 
Thomas wrote at the beginning of the 1970s that the 
President "has at the same time led a movement towards 
large scale enterprise which, given its political backing, 
might be more accurately described as quasi-state 
capitalism " He went on:
"While large Western enterprise has been encouraged, 
there has been no hesitation in setting up state
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enterprises, taking shareholdings in private
21enterprise, or outright nationalization."
Holder Williams made a similar observation. He wrote:
"The conservatism of Malawi can be overstressed. In
recent years, there has been a growing programme of
central control. The wholly government - owned
Malawi Development Corporation, and Malawi Railways
control between them upwards of 30 per cent of the
22country's economy."
Of late, Kydd and Christiansen have put it plainly "...
that economic policy in Malawi has been much less
23market-oriented than Acharya would have us believe." 
Thus some writers think that the country's economy, or 
economic policy, has not been as market-oriented as other 
writers say.
What is one to make of these conflicting views about 
the nature of Malawi's economy or economic system? The 
answer here is that the conflicting views attest to the 
point which was made earlier in this discussion; that is 
the point that the President expressed preference not for 
a capitalist economy but for a mixed economy. The latter 
is what the country’s economy actually has been. A look 
at it shows just that.
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The main features of the country's economy are public 
and private enterprises. The word "public" is used here in 
a Malawian sense. It means the same as "state", 
"statutory", or "parastatal" when used in reference to 
economic enterprises. Of these three words, "public" and 
"statutory", are the most popular terms in Malawi, the word 
"statutory" being the term frequently used by the 
Government. Therefore, by public enterprise is meant 
enterprises which are owned by the State or enterprises in 
which the state owns a controlling interest, or majority 
shares. On the other hand, by private enterprise is meant 
those enterprises in which the State owns no share.
A study of these features of the economy can 
conveniently be done by dividing the economy into external 
and domestic sectors. The former is essentially the 
country's agricultural sector. This is the mainstay of the 
country's economy because it is the main foreign exchange 
earning sector for the country. Its products include 
tobacco, tea, sugar, and ground nuts, a list which in the 
past also included cotton and rice. The sector can also be 
subdivided into sub-sectors: the small holder sub-sector 
and the estate sub-sector. The former sub-sector comprises 
almost the whole 80 per cent of the rural population of the 
country. The participants in this sector are called small 
holders because they produce crops for home consumption and 
for sale on small holdings of land ranging from three to 
even ten acres per person.
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Together, they produce all the ground nuts and cotton for 
export and almost half the country's tobacco export.
As the mode of production is geared towards private 
gain, the small holder sub-sector is indeed market- 
oriented. The farmers retain what they produce or retain 
what they earn by selling the surplus of what they 
produce. The main public element in this sub-sector is 
the government controlled marketing operation. This is in 
the form of a statutory body (or QUANGO, to use the late 
1970s popular term in Britain), called the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which 
purchases all the small holder crops and sell them on the 
world market. The Corporation was created to act as a 
countervailing force to a monopsonistic situation, that 
is a situation of a few buyers facing the numerous small 
holder producers. This is the only public element. 
Otherwise, the sub-sector is by and large indeed market- 
oriented .
The estate sub-sector is small in terms of its 
participants, but produces more than half of the export 
crops, tobacco and tea. The holding in this sub-sector is 
really large and ranges from twenty-five acres to even a 
thousand acres. It has expanded quite considerably in the 
independence era because many local Malawians are now 
participants in it. These new estate owners, like the old 
ones, are independent producers and are not supported with 
foreign aid. In fact, most of them own estates outside
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the integrated development project areas. Their market 
operations are capitalist. For example, each one of them 
sells his crop directly on the country's auction floors, 
one of which is among the largest and most modern in 
sub-Saharan Africa. However, their mode of production is 
mixed. While many of the estate owners are indeed private 
individuals and companies, the state is also an estate 
owner, in fact, one of the largest, through ADMARC which 
owns many tea and tobacco estates.
In summary, the agricultural sector is mixed in terms 
of mode of production and marketing. However, the private 
enterprise in it is larger than the public enterprise.
In comparison, the domestic sector is smaller than 
the agricultural sector in terms of foreign exchange 
earnings. However, the sector is larger than the 
agricultural sector as a domestic revenue-generating 
sector. For example, the Government gets most zt its 
revenue through duties and surtax levied on imports and 
manufactured goods. Because of the size of the public 
enterprise in it, it can conveniently be subdivided into 
public and private sub-sectors.
The public sub-sector has seen the fastest growth 
since the country's attainment of independence and . ; the 
basis of development planning in Malawi. Its part. . mts 
are the Government itself and the Governre'-• ~»ned 
companies, the statutory bodies, including ADMAP* The
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Government's involvement is in the form of development 
projects, including the large integrated rural development 
projects which are a form of large government economic
intervention.
The statutory bodies are also a form of Government 
involvement in the country's commercial sector. Unlike 
the integrated rural development projects, they are a sort 
of indirect state involvement in the economy in that the 
corporations are run autonomously of the Government. The 
largest of them are ADMARC and the Malawi Development 
Corporation (MDC). Through them, the Government owns 
majority shares in a host of companies called MDC and
ADMARC subsidiaries. To these two statutory giants and 
their subsidiaries have to be added other equally 
important statutory bodies like the Electricity Supply 
Commission of Malawi (ESCOM), the Blantyre and Lilongwe
Water Boards, Malawi Housing Corporation (M.H.C.), Malawi 
Railways, and Air Malawi, to mention a few. Together,
they form quite a substantial public enterprise.
The private sub-sector has also grown quite conside­
rably since the country's attainment of independence. 
However, its pace of growth has been slower than that of 
the public sub-sector and its symbol of growth was, up to 
1984, a locally-based private company called Press 
Holdings. This has its own subsidiaries and stands head 
and shoulder with the statutory giants, ADMARC and MDC. 
Other private companies include LONHRO and its
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subsidiaries, Mandala Motors, the British and American
Tobacco Company (B.A.T.) and a mechanical engineering 
company called, Brown and Clapperton Limited. In 
addition, most of the wholesale and retail trade are in
private hands, mostly Asians. Together, these form quite 
a substantial private enterprise though probably smaller
than the public enterprise.
This large public enterprise did not come about as a 
result of a deliberate nationalization policy. On the 
contrary, the Malawi Government has all along shunned
nationalization. Rather, the public enterprise grew out 
of a swift pace of economic development which the country 
has experienced since the attainment of independence. It 
is true that the country has also received substantial 
private investments from abroad. However, these foreign 
private investments, to say nothing of local private
investments, could simply not cope with the pace of 
economic development which has taken place in the
country. Therefore, the Government had to move in through 
ADMARC and MDC. This is why the public sector is also
large.
This means that neither the capitalist label nor the 
socialist label would be accurate as a description of 
Malawi's economy. Malawi simply has a mixed economic 
system which is more or less like the one for which the 
President expressed a preference during the early years of 
Malawi's independence. Therefore, the nature of the
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country's economy is often mistakenly cited as evidence 
for the argument that the country's economic policies were 
adopted to attract foreign aid.
Development Strategy
Among the economic policies which are said to have
been adopted for reasons of foreign aid is the country's
development strategy. This is also seen to be capitalist
or market-oriented. The Malawi Government, Mkandawire
wrote, "has been remarkably consistent in pursuance of a
24capitalist path of development." This is a point
which was also made by David Humphrey, former lecturer at
the country's University. "In development terms," he
wrote in connection with the President's long stay in
America and Britain, "this appears to have been a
significant factor in the formulation of an essentially
2 5capitalistic development strategy for the country..."
The issue to be considered at the moment is not that 
this policy was undertaken in order to attract foreign 
aid. That has already received adequate attention in the 
discussion. What is to be considered now is the argument 
that this policy was decided upon by foreign experts, 
particularly the country's ex-colonial civil servants.
This is a policy which is concerned with a controversial issue
development. So, before examining the evidence wni'h is 
often cited in support of the argument that the poi: y was
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decided upon by the expatriate officers, some considerable 
time has to be devoted to the definition of development.
Development refers to economic growth in relation to 
population growth of the country. The key concept is 
economic growth which is the increase in the volume of the 
value-added of goods and services produced in a country in 
a year. This is measured in terms of the concept of gross 
domestic product (G.D.P.). Development is said to occur 
if the increase in it, in G.D.P., is greater than the 
increase in a country's population. This is called G.D.P.
per capita or gross per capita product which can be
.1 GDP
presented mathematically as D = A Pq , where "D"
stands for development, the symbol " A  M stands for the
expression, "increase in" and "PO" stands for
population. If A  G.D.P. is equal to A  PO,
development is said to have not taken place. This is the
basic definition of development although it is often
subjected to severe criticisms and is regarded as
27old-fashioned '‘cold utilitarian calculations."
Malawi attained independence in 1964 with a low 
G.D.P. or per capita product of K160 million and a 
population of 3 million. This was one of the lowest 
G.D.P. s and the basis on which Malawi has since then been 
classified by the United Nations as one of the least 
developed, or during the impolite moments, poorest 
countries. Since then, the G.D.P. has grown to K2,6j '.’.8 
million and the population to 8 million by 1987, giving a
2 8gross per capita product of K342.4. "Since
independence in 1964," says a World Bank report, "Malawi
has presented one of the major development successes in
Africa." "Although Malawi is a small landlocked country,
without major mineral resources, with little manpower, and
rudimentary industrial development," the report goes on,
"it has been able to increase G.D.P. per capita at almost
29six per cent a year..." This favourable presentation
of the country's economic performance by a prestigious
Western multilateral institution has naturally provoked
some acidic and angry criticisms against the Malawi
Government from the opponents of the Government. "In
Malawi," Mwakasungura objects, for example, "the present
30government seems to glory m  production statistics..."
The foregoing criticism is a good reflection of
certain views which object to defining development in
terms of G.D.P. on the grounds that such a definition of
development takes the distribution of the benefits of
economic growth for granted. The critics say that the
adherents to this definition of development assume that
economic growth would on its own trickle down to every
section of the country's population. This, the critics
say, does not happen in reality. Instead, economic growth
can and does take place without benefiting the poor masses
in a developing country. This is the ground on which the
G.D.P. per capita dubbed, "trickle down theory", is often
31objected to as a measure of development. For example, 
the Brandt Commission argued that "statistical ~»Msure-
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ments of growth excludes the crucial element of social
welfare, of individual rights, and of values not measured 
32by money," a point which is also echoed by Walter 
Rodney who says:
"in considering the question of development away from
the state of underdevelopment, it is of supreme
importance to realize that such a process demands the
removal of the gross inequalities of land
distribution, property holding and income, which are
33camouflaged behind income figures."
How is development to be defined? "It is widely
recognized " claims the Brandt Commission, "that
development involves a profound transformation of the
34entire economic and social structure."
These criticisms against the G.D.P. per capita, 
though quite noble sentiments, need not be taken 
seriously. They are merely pious platitudes because when 
it comes to comparing levels of economic prosperity among 
states or when it comes to determining what is happening 
in a country's economy, the tendency is even by the 
critics themselves, to fall back on the same good old 
"cold utilitarian calculations"; the G.D.P. per capita. 
For example, Rodney confessed:
'Nonetheless, the per capita income is a useful 
statistic for comparing one country with another;
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and the developed countries all have per capital
incomes several times higher than any one of the
35
recently independent African nations."
He then went on listing a number of countries in Africa,
including Malawi, with their low per capita income figures
36
to show that they have not yet achieved development. 
This tendency to fall back on the G.D.P. as a measure of 
development is due to the fact that many of those 
definitions of development which are thought to be better 
than the G.D.P. per capita vary in emphasis and are vague. 
The "transformation of entire economic and social 
structure", for example, is vague and lacks the 
mathematical precision of the G.D.P. per capita and thus 
cannot serve as an indication of what is really happening 
in an economy.
Therefore, development is taken here to mean economic 
growth as measured by G.D.P. This is also the Malawi 
Governments definition of development as well as the World 
Bank's. The manner in which Malawi has been going about 
realizing economic growth each year is what constitutes the 
operational approach to development, or the development 
strategy. This is what writers like Thomas and 
Mwakasungura claim was the work of foreign experts, 
particularly the British expatriates.
References to Certain Agricultural Schemes
Part of the evidence which is cited in support of the
argument that the country's development strategy was
decided upon by foreign experts are references to some
agricultural development schemes of the country. These
are the Achikumbe scheme, a land ownership which has now
locally gone on record as Ndunda, the farmers clubs, and
development of estate agriculture. These schemes are
regarded as a revival of the country's past colonial
schemes of "master farmer" and estate agriculture. This,
it will be recalled, is the argument which Thomas and
3 8Mwakasungura made. "Little difference can be seen,"
Thomas argues, for example, "between the approaches of
3 9President Banda and the colonial regime." "The
Achikumbe", Mwakasungura also argues "were to be the
"white guards" of a resurrection of the colonial "master
or Progressive Farmers" scheme that the colonial
government had assiduously tried to promote without
40success towards the end of their rule."
Humphrey is the one who started this argument. For 
example, he wrote in connection with what he regarded as 
the capitalist nature of Malawi's development strategy:
"This is likely because of the Achikumbe policy 
outlined earlier by which resources for rural 
development are being channeled towards commercially 
most successful small holders who are increasingly
175
becoming a capitalist farming elite often employing
41considerable numbers of labour."
This is an incorrect assessment, or presentation, of the 
Achikumbe scheme. However, the point of interest at the 
moment is that this sentence links the scheme to several 
other agricultural schemes in the country. The key 
expressions are "capitalist farming elite" and "employing 
considerable numbers of labour. These expressions and 
others in the sentence portray Achikumbe as privileged and 
progressive farmers able to employ many workers.
Though incorrect, Thomas draws from it and in turn,
Mwakusungura draws a lot from Thomas's argument. Both
Thomas and Mwakasungura have then proceeded to present the
Achikumbe scheme as a revival of past colonial schemes of
"master farmer" and "estate farming". For example,
Mwakasungura wrote that "the policy choice of a rural
development strategy based on estate agriculture by the
Malawi Government, therefore, was fundamentally
ideological, intended to benefit the few who would
graduate into Achikumbe as against the majority of Anthu
Wamba (the ordinary people) who would be victims of
42exploitations."
Thus the Achikumbe scheme is linked explicitly to 
estate agriculture and implicitly to the colonial "master 
farmer" scheme by Mwakasungura. This is done through the 
use of the expression, "would graduate", which portrays
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Achikumbe as being "progressive", a term which Thomas
presents as the common feature between a "master farmer"
scheme and the Achikumbe scheme. Mwakasungura makes the
links among these schemes explicit in another argument
which says that the country’s President "... assumed the
role played by Sir Harry Johnston, that of issuing land
ownership certificates to individuals and companies
43bestowing them the land title of Achikumbe..." Sir
Harry Johnston was the first Commissioner and Consul-
General (Governor) of the British Protectorate of
Nvasaland. now Malawi, who is associated with the
distribution of land into estates to white settlers or 
farmers in the country. This means that Achikumbe is a 
land ownership scheme and a revival of colonial
agricultural policies.
In short, Humphrey started the argument that 
Achikumbe. the colonial "master farmers", and estate 
farming schemes in Malawi are one and the same scheme. 
Thomas and Mwakasungura have not only endorsed this 
argument, but also used it to support their own arguments 
which say that these schemes are a revival of past 
colonial schemes of "master farmer" and estate 
agriculture. It is on this ground that Mwakasungura, at
least, explicitly states that the country's development
. . 44strategy was decided upon by the British expatriates.
The way Humphrey, Thomas, and Mwakasungura 'onfuses 
these schemes is by attributing a feature of one scheme to
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another. The key schemes have been Achikumbe and the
"master farmer" schemes. The former is presented as a
land ownership scheme, as a "privileged farmers" scheme,
as a "progressive farmers" scheme, and as employers of
considerable numbers of farm labourers. By doing so,
these writers have presented the Achikumbe scheme as being
the same as the other schemes. However, a close look at
the history of the agricultural sector of the country's
45economy sheds a different light.
The country's agriculture in the colonial days
consisted of two sub-sectors; the estate agriculture, or
farming, and the African agriculture which was sometimes
46scornfully referred to as "native agriculture". 
After independence, they came to be known as "sma 11-holder 
agriculture". The former was dominated by the white 
settlers who owned the land on private ownership basis. 
These produced tea, tobacco, and at one time, tung oil for 
export. Their holdings are large running thousands of 
acres and employing hundreds of workers called tenants. 
Only a handful of Africans or "natives", as they were 
called, participated in this sub-sector.
The other sub-sector consisted of numerous small 
holders, some of whom produced such crops as maize and 
cassava mainly for home consumption. The others grew such 
crops as tobacco, cotton ground nuts and rice for sale to 
ADMARC, which in turn exported them. Their land holdings 
varied in size from less than half an acre to even twenty
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acres in some cases. They owned land by custom which was 
regarded then as belonging to the crown in Britain. The 
customary land, as it was called, was utilized by the
small holders only at the pleasure of the Crown which in 
practice meant the colonial Government of the territory. 
They could be dispossessed of it as and when the situation 
necessitated by,say, the arrival of new European settlers.
Late in the 1950s, the colonial Government introduced 
the "master farmer" scheme in the small holder agricultural 
sector. This was a private land ownership and new farming 
methods scheme. It involved issuance of a deed to a small 
holder for his holding which varied in size from fifteen
to twenty acres. This was surveyed and demarcated, and
fenced by the agricultural officials. Once registered,
the "master farmer" received preferential treatment in 
terms of the Government's extension aid services, credit 
facilities like farm implements and fertilizers, and the 
marketing of his crops, particularly tobacco and cotton. 
He was really the privileged farmer that Humphrey talks
about. He was like an estate owner in that he owned the
land on strictly private ownership basis, but was different
from the former because his holding was very
small. He could not employ "considerable numbers of 
labourers" because of the small size of his holding. In 
fact, the "master farmer" used to employ mostly family 
labour while the estate owners do indeed employ hundreds 
of labourers or tenants.
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This scheme which was known in the local language, 
Chichewa, as Malimidwe was aimed at promoting good land 
husbandry by giving the small holder security of land 
tenure. However, the scheme fell into disrepute for three 
reasons. The first reason was that it was used as a means 
for recruiting, among the small holders, supporters of the 
now defunct Central African Federation which was bitterly 
opposed by an overwhelming majority of the country's 
population. The second reason was that some coercion was 
used for enforcing some agricultural measures such as soil 
conservation, crop rotation, and early uprooting of 
tobacco stalks. As the work on the farm was done largely 
on a family labour basis, this meant a lot of hard work, 
failure of which meant paying fines to the Government or 
three months imprisonment. The third reason was, in the 
view of the writer, the mistaken belief that Africans 
practise communal as opposed to private ownership of 
land. This shut off the authorities from a proper study of 
the implications of the scheme once its implementation 
started.
One of the still persistent old myths about Africa is 
the belief that Africans practise communal ownership of 
land. Many Africans, particularly the "progressive" or 
the "patriotic third world scholars", to use Mwakasungura's 
term, have fully clasped this idea to their hearts and 
brandish it as a natural favourable condition for building 
socialism in Africa. By it is meant that the land is 
regarded as belonging to everyone and that African chiefs
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are mere custodians of the land. Europeans regard this 
form of land ownership as wasteful and uneconomic because, 
they argue, it does not provide an incentive for an 
individual to take good care of the land he uses. The 
"master farmer" scheme was intended to change it.
However, the actual situation, at least in some parts 
of Malawi, has been different from what the popular myth 
of communal ownership of land portrays. For example, 
traditional land utilization in some parts of Malawi fall 
into two parts. A portion of land in a locality or area 
is for communal use such as grazing livestock, fetching 
firewood, and burying the dead. This is the portion of 
land which is indeed for communal use and not for private 
use. Another portion of land in the same locality is for 
private use, such as building one's hut or huts or 
cultivating crops. Those pieces of land which are put to
such private uses are to all intent and purposes regarded
as belonging to each of those who utilize the land in that 
way and it is better not to pretend otherwise. The 
implication of this tor the attempts to collectivise 
farming at least in some African countries should be 
obvious.
Moreover, each locality has identified owners known 
in Chichewa as eni ntunda (owners of land or area), eni 
nthaka (owners of the soil), or eni dera (owners of the
area). These are one or two extended families, members of
whom own a portion of the land or area. These are
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recognized as owners of the land by virtue of having been 
the first to settle in the area or the first to cultivate 
the land. This means that there are two groups of people 
in each area, the owners of the land and those who are not. 
The latter are those who came in search of land to settle 
or cultivate. They are known as akudza or atikhale nao 
(land seekers). These utilize or used to utilize the land 
at the pleasure of the former group.
This means two important facts as far as traditional 
land utilization is concerned. The first is that there 
have always been owners of land in African society, at 
least in some parts of Malawi. The second is that 
individual ownership of land has also always been latent in 
African societies, particularly African agricultural 
societies. This became increasingly pronounced as the 
number of the members of the extended families in ownership 
of a given piece of land increased. In other words, the 
communal use of the land decreased as the population of an 
African agricultural society increased in a locality.
The "master-farmer" scheme was offered to anyone 
interested and cultivated (not owned) a piece of land 
large enough to be demarcated into a "master farm." This 
was largely a matter between an individual and the 
agricultural officials in a given locality. As a result, 
the implementation of the scheme blurred the distinction 
between the "owners of the land" and the "land seekers". 
The consequences were that the scheme was opposed. It was 
seen as a scheme designed to take the land away from the
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rightful owners. Azunau afuna kutilanda dziko kudzera 
msikimu imenevi (Europeans want to take away our land 
through this "master farmer" scheme) was the suspicion 
among the small holders. In brief, this is the history of 
the agricultural sector of the country’s economy.
Upon the attainment of independence, the Malawi 
Government embarked upon a development strategy which has 
put emphasis on the small holder agriculture. The first
two loans which the Government obtained from the
International Development Association (I.D.A.) went to the
small holder agriculture. These were used to finance the
first two large small holder development projects which 
are now known as the integrated rural development 
projects, such as the Lilongwe Land Development Project. 
In the process of implementing these projects, 
sub-schemes mushroomed* The need to distribute
improved crop seeds and fertilizers led to the emergence 
of the farmers club schemes while an attempt to reorganize 
land ownership in the Lilongwe scheme led to the emergence 
of the Ndunda scheme. Also the need to motivate small 
holder farmers led to the introduction of the Achikumbe 
scheme.
The exact origin of these sub-schemes need not 
receive further attention. This is because the argument 
by Thomas and Mwakasungura is not that these schemes were 
initiated by the expatriates, but that the schemes are the 
same as the colonial "master farmer" scheme. Therefore,
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attention is here centred only on whether the schemes are 
similar to the two colonial schemes of "master farmer" and 
estate agriculture.
The Ndunda scheme evolved out of the Government's 
attempt to reorganise land ownership in the Lilongwe Land 
Development Project area. In its evolved form, the scheme 
consists of a deed which is issued to an extended family, 
the members of which are listed in the deed. Each member 
listed has an equal right to a piece of land which varies 
in size from two to fifteen acres. within the 
Ndunda, the inheritance of the piece of the land passes 
on to the children and grandchildren of each member listed 
in the deed. The issuance of the deed and the Government 
recognition of the family, which is a relatively narrower 
basis of ownership, are what distinguish Ndunda from the 
communal ownership of land and its purpose is to make 
members of the extended family aware that their land is 
limited.
The implementation of the scheme shattered the long 
standing myth of communal ownership of land. Its 
introduction was premised on the prevailing conviction 
then that the small holders in the area to which the 
scheme was confined, like other Africans, practised 
communal, as opposed to individual ownership of land. The 
new scheme was initially intended to bestow to each small 
holder private ownership of land. However, the executors 
of the scheme, some of whom were expatriate project
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officials, soon discovered that, contrary to popular
belief, there ha all along been owners of land on the 
basis of a family in every part of the area which was 
covered by the scheme. The successful implementation of 
the scheme owes much to the Government's acceptance of 
this fact. Thomas argued that the scheme was modified 
because of opposition from the small holders. "To obtain 
acquiescence from those affected," he wrote, "the
government had to alter ownership proposals from an
. . . . 47individual to an extended family basis."
It is true that there was initially some opposition 
to the scheme in its original form. However, the 
opposition was not to the scheme as such but to its 
implications. The problem was that it would have led to 
giving land even to those who did not own land by custom 
in a locality. This realization led to changes in the 
implementation of the scheme. Emphasis shifted from 
treating everyone in a locality as being eligible for land 
ownership to identifying owners of the land first and 
bestowing the ownership of land only after everyone in a 
locality had been consulted to ascertain those who truly 
deserve to receive land ownership.
The word Ndunda refers to a mold of earth or soil 
which small holders make to separate one small holder, 
Munda. from another. The word now has acquired a new 
meaning. It denotes an area or piece of land for which a 
deed is issued by the Government to a family, family in a
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local sense. The owners of the Ndunda enjoy no privileges 
and the scheme has so far been confined to the Lilongwe 
Land Development Project area.
The Achikumbe scheme is an award scheme. It is not a 
land ownership scheme and was established to encourage 
farmers to do well in farming. The scheme involved the 
award# not of a land title, but of a certificate of
distinction to a successful farmer, mainly the small
holder, regardless of whether such a farmer owned land
privately or was in an area covered by a development
project. Almost all the recipients of the certificate 
were small holders, meaning peasants who own by custom 
one, two, three, or even five acres of land. To qualify 
for the certificate, they had to produce, on their 
holding, or Munda. better and increased yields of maize, 
rice or cotton. The scheme is really nothing more than a 
system of incentives which can be made operational in any 
economic system whether socialist or capitalist.
The word, Achikumbe. is a Chichewa word and comes 
from the verb Kumba. meaning dig or till. The digger is 
called Mchikumbe. and the diggers, Achikumbe. It is, in
this case, used in a figurative sense because digging even 
in Chichewa does not necessarily mean tilling, or 
farming. The Chichewa word for tilling or farming is 
kulima and for tillers, or farmers, alimi. The word 
Mchikumbe is used because tilling by the country's small 
holders is done by hand, using a hoe. It looks as if one
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is digging. Since this is the harder and energy-sapping 
part of the small holder's work, the small holder who 
excels in terms of the size of the holding and the quality 
and quantity of the yield of crops grown on a Munda is 
called Mchikumbe. meaning a successful hard worker or 
farmer. This is why the term was selected for the scheme.
The scheme, unlike Ndunda which is confined only to 
the area covered by the Lilongwe Land Development Project, 
is countrywide in its coverage and ownership of the 
certificate is not, on the contrary, accorded any 
privileges. It recognizes progressive farming not on the 
basis that someone has dutifully followed modern methods 
of farming prescribed to him but on the basis that someone 
has achieved, by whatever means, increased and better 
yields of the crops which he grows.
The farmers clubs are voluntary associations which 
have been set up to facilitate the distribution of farm 
inputs, particularly in the integrated rural development 
project areas. The reason was that these projects 
involved, among other things, distribution of fertilizers 
and improved crop seeds on a credit basis. Therefore, the 
small holders were encouraged to form farmers clubs to 
serve as distribution reference points. Membership is 
voluntary and carries the privilege of easy access to 
credit facilities as well as the burden of debt repayment.
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Finally/ the Malawi Government has also encouraged 
the development of estate agriculture. What prompted this 
was the need to diversify the country's tobacco export. 
For years, Malawi was exporting mainly what is called 
fire-cured Virginia type of tobacco which was and still 
is grown by the small holders. Other varieties included 
flue-cured tobacco, burley tobacco, and sun-cured 
tobacco. These varieties were grown by the white estate 
agriculture. They formed a very small proportion of the 
tobacco export despite the country's potential for these 
crops.
The colonial era had left the small holders without 
the skills for growing and handling the flue-cured and 
burley varieties of tobacco. The flue-cured variety is 
not a small holder's crop because it requires heavy 
investment, particularly the flue-curing equipment. 
Therefore, the Malawi Government either had to increase 
production of this crop, which meant developing estate 
agriculture, or leave it out altogether. The burley 
tobacco is better grown on estate basis, but it can also 
be grown on a small holder basis. To do it on the latter 
basis would have taken years before production could reach 
even a small percentage of the fire-cured tobacco produc­
tion. Anxious to wipe out a recurrent account budget 
deficit which was being funded by Britain, the Government 
took the feasible method available —  the estate agricul­
ture method. As a result, Malawi is now one of the major 
producers in Africa in all these varieties of tobacco.
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Let the "master farmer" scheme be used here as the
basic scheme for clarifying the characteristics of these 
schemes. The following, in summary, is how it compares 
with the other schemes. To begin with, the scheme carried 
the privileges of easy access to credit facilities and 
preferential treatment with regard to the marketing of 
crops and was a countrywide scheme among the small 
holders. In that sense, it was like the farmers clubs
scheme. However, the scheme was different from the latter 
because the farmers' club is really nothing more than a 
mere voluntary association. To interpret the farmers club 
as a revival of the colonial "master farmer" scheme is to 
indulge in wild exaggerations.
The "master farmer" scheme was a land ownership
scheme among the small holders. In that broad sense, it 
was like the Ndunda scheme. However, the scheme was 
different from the Ndunda scheme because it was a 
countrywide scheme which carried certain privileges, 
involved new methods of farming, and was an outright 
individual ownership of land. The Ndunda scheme carries 
no privileges, has been confined to the Lilongwe Land
Development Project area, involves no new methods of 
farming, and is a family ownership of land. Therefore, to 
interpret the Ndunda scheme as a revival of the colonial 
"master farmer" scheme is to indulge in a gross 
misinterpretation of the scheme.
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The "master farmer" scheme, as already stated, was 
country-wide among the small holders. This is the only 
similarity between it and the Achikumbe scheme. Other­
wise, the scheme differs from the Achikumbe scheme in that 
it was an individual land ownership scheme involving new 
methods of farming and carrying certain privileges. The 
Achikumbe scheme has none of these features. It simply 
has been a certificate-of-award scheme.
The "master farmer" scheme, as already mentioned, was 
a countrywide individual land ownership scheme involving 
new methods of farming. In this sense, it was like the 
estate agriculture scheme of both the colonial times and 
the present times. The "master farm" was, indeed, a sort 
of small estate. However, the scheme differed from the 
estate farming in that the individual land ownership was 
on a small scale involving ten to twenty acres whereas an 
estate farming involves individual land ownership on a 
larger scale ranging from hundreds to even thousands of 
acres. The "master farmer" scheme also carried privileges 
while the new estate owners do not carry any privileges.
Finally, the new estate agriculture scheme is what is 
obviously similar to the past estate agriculture 
development scheme. Both schemes are commercial farming 
on a large scale. However, there are some important 
differences. The colonial estate farming was 
predominantly private land holding and covered all sorts 
of crops: tea, tobacco, citrus fruits, tung oil, sisal,
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coffee, and even tree plantations. It was a means for 
supporting the newly-arrived European settlers in the
country. The new estate agriculture scheme has been a 
mixture of state and private commercial farming and 
reflects the limited need for which it was undertaken: 
the diversification of the tobacco industry. Therefore, 
to regard it as a revival of the colonial estate 
agriculture scheme is to gloss over these important 
differences.
Therefore, the arguments by Humphrey, Thomas, and
Mwakasungura are based on a confusion of these schemes. 
For example, some disparities in the numbers mentioned in 
a passage by Thomas illustrates the point. It reads:
'‘Though the programme itself was not popular, with
only 260 Achikumbe being enrolled out of a target set
at 3,000 and was allowed to lapse during 1972, the
philosophy has still been continued especially on the
large projects. Thus, during the six years of German
development aid to the Salima Lakeshore project, a
group of 570 privileged farmers has been established
with annual incomes in excess of K350 while the
poorest farmers (about 20,000) were still obtaining 
48K2 0.
The first sentence in the passage states that cnly 260 
small holders out of a large number of 3,000 qualified as 
Achikumbe. This is in a country-wide context as is made
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explicit by the expression, "especially on the large 
projects". Up to this point, Thomas is correct.
The second sentence in the passage speaks of 570 
"privileged farmers" as having been established in the 
Salima Lakeshore Project alone. These are regarded as 
Achikumbe by Thomas as can be seen from the passage. 
Assuming that the Achikumbe are "privileged farmers",
which they are not, Thomas is here implying that the 
Salima Lakeshore Project alone put up 570 successful 
candidates for the Mchikumbe certificates. It is almost 
impossible, as Thomas himself would admit, for the Salima 
area to do this because it is small in relation to the 
rest of the country and is not the country's best 
agricultural area.
The figure K350 illustrates another disparity in the 
arguments of these writers. If this is the income of
these "commercially successful farmers" as Humphrey says
or "privileged farmers" as Thomas puts it, would they be 
in a position for each to "employ considerable numbers of 
labour'? To induce some small holders to give up their
holdings in order to accept employment on the Achikumbe 
farms, each of the "privileged farmers" would have to pay 
each labourer at least K20 a year. This translates into 
14 labourers assuming that each Mchikumbe would use all 
his annual income on wages, an assumption which is simply 
unrealistic.
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These disparities in Thomas's figures arise because 
Thomas confuses these schemes as being one and the same
scheme. The figures in themselves are correct. The 
problem is that the argument is incorrect. The 570
"privileged farmers" whom Thomas refers to are not
Achikumbe. but members of the farmers' clubs in the Salima 
Project area. Their voluntary membership of the club
changes each year. Those who fail to repay the loans 
which they incurred on farm inputs at the beginning of one 
farming season leave the clubs to join the 20,000, and new 
enterprising ones from the same 20,000 join the clubs at 
the beginning of another farming season and so on. The 
privileges go together with the obligations which they 
undertake to repay during the crop marketing seasons the 
loans on farm inputs.
The farmers clubs have nothing to do with the 
Achikumbe scheme. It is true that some Achikumbe are 
members of the farmers' clubs, but not all members of the 
farmers clubs are Achikumbe. The award of the Mchikumbe 
certificate has to do only with the excellence of one' 
performance regardless of how one went about it.
Thomas is right that only 260 small holders had by 
then obtained the Mchikumbe certificate. This number is, 
indeed, small not because of opposition from small holders
but because not everyone of them could qualify for the
/
certificate. Otherwise, it would cease to be a 
certificate of distinction. Moreover, this question of
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opposition is the way by which Thomas confuses the
Achikumbe scheme with the Ndunda scheme. As an award 
scheme, there is simply no basis on which the Achikumbe
scheme could have been opposed by the small holders.
Thomas is here referring to some opposition in connection
with the Ndunda scheme for the reasons that have already 
been explained; that is, for the reasons that the small 
holders in the Lilongwe Land Project merely wanted to 
ensure that land ownership was bestowed upon the rightful 
owners of the land.
In short, evidence in terms of references to certain 
agricultural development schemes is based on a confusion
i
of the Achikumbe. Ndunda. farmers club, and estate farming 
schemes as being one and the same schemes. Such confusion 
is then used as grounds for regarding, or presenting, 
these schemes as a revival of the past colonial schemes of 
"master farmer" and estate farming schemes. Each of these 
schemes is a separate scheme different from all the 
others. The only scheme which is similar to one of the 
other schemes is the estate agriculture. However, this 
scheme has not been an important proportion of the Malawi 
Government's efforts toward improving the country's 
agriculture. It is the small holder agriculture which has 
taken the lion's share of the Government's efforts towards 
improving agriculture.
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Malawi's Development Planning
Another piece of evidence which is also cited in. .support of 
the argument that the country's development strategy was 
decided upon by foreign experts is an absence of develop­
ment planning in the country. Mwakasungura, it will be 
recalled, blames the British expatriates for the lack of 
development planning in the country and specifically 
accuses them of abandoning a 1962-65 Development Plan
which he describes as a people's plan on the grounds that
49it puts emphasis on peasant agriculture. The basis on 
which he makes the accusation is that the British 
expatriates dominated the country's civil service.
On the contrary, Malawi does development planning. 
For example, the Government has a Department of Economic 
Planning and Development which is responsible for develop­
ment planning. So what critics like Mwakasungura are 
saying is that the type of development planning which 
Malawi follows is not development planning at all, because 
it is not the sort of planning which other developing 
countries follow. This will receive further attention at 
a later stage. The point for consideration at the moment 
is the argument that the British expatriates are the ones 
who decided that there should be no development planning 
in Malawi in the sense that critics like Mwakasungura 
understand.
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The British expatriates, indeed, dominated the 
country's civil service during the early years of 
independence. These expatriate officials also did not 
have a tradition of economic planning either during the 
country's colonial days (the 1962/65 Development Plan 
having been formulated under the guidance of African 
elected officials who had entered the government in 1961) 
or in their home country, Britain (except the brief period 
of the Labour Government economic plan of the mid-1960s). 
Nonetheless, critics like Mwakasungura distort what 
happened. It is true that a Development Plan was 
abandoned not because the expatriates decided that the 
plan be abandoned but because circumstances arose which 
made such an approach to development unattainable in 
Malawi.
Moreover, Mwakasungura is even inaccurate in his 
accusation of the British expatriates. The 1962/65 
Development Plan was not abandoned. It was seen through 
up to the end of its period. Indeed, the country adopted 
a new Development Plan covering the years 1965 to 1969, 
the preparation of which was done by the same British
expatriates. This was the Development Plan, not the
501962/65 one, which was abandoned midstream. There­
fore, the absence of development planning in the country
cannot be explained in terms of the British expatriates
y
wanting to abandon a ^people's Plan". It has to be
explained in terms of the reasons for which the 1965/69
Development Plan was abandoned.
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The official explanation for the abandonment of the 
1965/69 Development Plan was that it lacked the "essential 
prerequisites" which were listed as macro-economic 
statistics and the realization that development in Malawi
would involve fundamental structural changes in the
51 . .economy. Of the two "prerequisites", that of the macro-
economic statistics, though correct, was obviously less
important. For example, economic planning continued in
many other African countries were macro-economic statistics
were equally lacing since national censuses were, as in
Malawi, taken several years after the countries attained
independence. The second "prerequisite" was the more
important one and deserves more attention since it
summarizes the reasons for which the Development Plan was
abandoned.
The Development Plan was abandoned because of a new 
rationale for development planning. The wishes of the 
electorate had to be taken into consideration when planning 
for development. The attainment of independence created 
unprecedented consciousness for development among the 
electorate who now felt that they had a say in the 
development of the country. For example, demands arose for 
a school here and clinic there, a dipping tank here and a 
telephone there, a road here and bridge there and a post 
office here and telephone there. This meant that the 
Government had to set up projects all over the country,
many of which had indeed to be justified on the basis of
52the Government's own best judgment.
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One of the criticisms which are often made against 
the Malawi Government is that it sets up development 
projects, not on the basis of economic criteria, sometimes 
described as "objective criteria", but on the basis of 
political criteria. For example, Hodder Williams wrote:
"Furthermore, their objective attitudes towards
economic development often run counter to Dr. Banda's
. . 53appreciation of his own political need."
The "attitudes" referred to in the passage are those of 
the expatriates. These are said to be "objective" towards 
the country's economic development. The expression, "his 
own political need", refers to the President’s determi­
nation to take into consideration the demands of the 
ordinary people all over the country for development 
projects, a fact which is acknowledged by a very important 
expatriate. "The second principle has been that the 
Government respects the needs of the electorate more than 
the needs of anybody else," attested Bryan Roberts, former 
Secretary to the President and Cabinet. He went on:
"Everything has been subordinated to the necessity in 
the Government's mind to serve the needs of the 
people. External and minority interests have, 
sometimes, had to be subordinated to the essential 
principle of putting the interests of the electorate 
first, advancing their living standards, the raising
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of their educational standards, the provision of
54health services."
To the countrywide demand for development projects 
has to be added the vision which the President had about 
the future of the country before the attainment of 
independence. This is known as the Gwelo Plan which the 
President thought of while in detention in Gwelo (now 
Gweru), Zimbawe, in 1958 and early 1960. This consisted 
of a move of the country's capital from where it was to a 
more centrally-located place in the country and the 
construction of a new major road along the country's 
entire lakeshore. Both projects met harsh criticisms from 
abroad and muted criticisms among some of the expatriates.
The merits and demerits of the two projects are not 
the point of concern here. The point of interest is the 
implications of these projects for development planning. 
For example, the move of the capital created the prospect 
of establishing a major new economic growth point for the 
country while the new road created the prospect of opening 
up many areas which had hitherto remained almost 
inaccessible. Therefore, the two projects meant that some 
fundamental structural changes in the country's economy 
were in the offing. Under those circumstances, the 
Development Plan had to be abandoned because the economic 
implications of the two major projects could not be 
assessed accurately in advance for incorporation in the 
development plan.
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There were also other reasons which are implicit in 
the Government's second argument for abandoning the 
development plan. This becomes clear when one looks at 
the differences between Malawi's operational approach to 
development and the operational approach to development 
followed by many other African countries. Let the latter 
approach, for want of better term, be called conventional 
development planning. Its hallmark is a development plan 
which has a parliamentary approval and a time span, 
usually, five years. The plan also consists of a set of
overall objectives, a set of priorities which are
identified according to the objectives, and a set of 
targets in each priority area. The formulation of targets 
necessitates the use of macro-economic statistics and 
their realization serves as an indication of the successful 
implementation of the plan. The other equally important 
feature of the plan is consistence or coherence. Every 
part of the plan has to be made consistent with every 
other part of the plan. The plan is complete and ready 
for submission to parliament if it has a clearly defined 
set of objectives, priorities, and targets, and is
coherent.
Preparation of the plan is largely the task of the 
bureaucrats, or civil servants, to use the popular term in 
Malawi. In those countries where conventional development 
planning is followed, the Government starts the process by 
defining the objectives and issuing instructions for the 
preparation of the plan to start in accordant with the
200
objectives it has defined. However, it is the civil 
servants, or experts, who refine the objectives, identify 
areas of priority according to available data about the 
country, set the targets, and go through a process of 
adjustment to reach coherence in the plan. Then the plan 
is submitted to parliament for approval. This is the 
other stage during which the decision makers again get 
directly involved in the formulation of a country's 
development plan. However, after the Parliamentary 
approval, the implementation of the plan is left to the 
bureaucrats. This sort of planning is called central or 
rigid planning and is the type which critics like 
Mwakasungura have in mind when they say that Malawi has no 
development planning.
There is development planning in Malawi. This is 
confined to the public sector of the country's economy. 
It simply involves the setting up of development projects 
in accordance with Government-defined development 
objectives which include improving the living standard of 
the people of the country and correcting regionally 
unbalanced economic structures inherited from the colonial 
era. Each year, projects are submitted to Parliament for 
approval. The Civil Servants formulate the projects and 
implement them after Parliamentary approval has been 
obtained. Let this, for want of a better term, be called 
"Project Planning".
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Comparing the two types of development planning, the 
conventional planning would have presented several
difficulties. The first difficulty is that development 
work would have been left almost entirely to the bureau­
crats. The bureaucrats would have been the ones to define 
development priorities, and formulate and implement the 
development plans. This is the normal practice with the 
conventional development planning. However, in Malawi, 
the Government has gone further than mere
Parliamentary approval of the project. It has initiated
some of the projects which have been implemented in the 
country, has decided on where each project should be
located and on whether a modification in the project
should be effected. This has been possible because
projects have been presented one at a time for
consideration by the Government. This is not possible 
with the conventional development planning because the 
development plan is a package and has to be considered in 
total.
A British-funded leprosy project illustrates how 
directly the Malawi Government has been involved in the 
development work of the country. This is aimed at
eradicating leprosy, or at least controlling the disease, 
through the administration of a leprosy vaccine. The 
project began with some pilot (experimental) schemes which 
were based in Blantyre and covered some nearby rural areas 
in the south of the country. When Government approval was 
sought for the implementation of the project to start, in
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accordance ' with the laid procedure, the Government
directed that it be implemented in another district where
the project has indeed been implemented some 600 miles
55away from the areas of its pilot schemes.
This is the extent to which the Malawi Government has 
gone in exercising control over development. "The 
country's leader," commented a Times correspondent, "is 
the fountain head of all power and decision-making." 
"Virtually nothing takes place in Malawi without his 
direct knowledge and consent," he went on, "be it approval 
for a new agricultural project or the terms of a lease for 
a private house in a nation's new capital, Lilongwe.
This mode of operation would not have been possible with 
the conventional development planning.
The second difficulty is that projects would have 
been allocated on the basis of what are called economic, 
or objective, criteria. On paper, these can look sound 
or, indeed, objective, but in practice, they can turn out 
to be nothing more than subtle manoeuvres to foil the 
Government's stated development objectives. This is 
because the economic criteria assume some level of 
economic development to be already in place.
Morton mentions a project which illustrates this 
point very well. This was the Blantyre/Zomba road project 
covering a distance of about 37 miles. She says 
approvingly that this "project at least was considered to
203
be fully justified by all the parties concerned, including
57a USAID advisory mission." Because it was said to be 
"economically sound", that is, it met "objective criteria", 
the project was funded by the O.D.A. (O.D.M.). The Malawi 
Government had to seek World Bank funding for another road 
project, the Zomba/Lilongwe road project which started off 
just where the Blantyre/Zomba road ended and covered 
nearly 180 miles. Despite its obvious importance to the 
country's national development, it was not seen as being 
"economically sound", and was, therefore, not funded by 
the ODA or USAID.
The Blantyre/Zomba road project was appraised more or 
less in the same way that a road project in a developed 
country is appraised. The key concept in the appraisal 
was volume of traffic and an expected rate of increase in 
the volume of traffic. This appraisal method was suitable 
because there was, by Malawi standards, a lot of traffic 
between Zomba, which was then the country’s capital, and 
Blantyre, which is still the country's largest commercial 
city. The volume of traffic was also large because the 
two towns shared Government offices so that there were 
many Government vehicles moving to and from each of the 
two places.
The other road project could not be s-.miiarly 
appraised because the volume of traffic, even hy Malawi 
standards, was very low for three reasons. Par- i the 
road competed with another for traffic bound t. mtyre
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from Lilongwe. The second reason was that a good part of 
the road was in worse shape than that of the Blantyre/ 
Zomba road. It was a gravel road which was windy in many 
parts. The third reason was that Lilongwe was then a 
smaller centre than Zomba to say nothing of Blantyre. 
Therefore, the project could not meet the demanding 
"objective criteria." At the same time, the importance of 
the project was a matter of common sense.
This shows that the economic, or objective, criteria 
presupposes some sort of development already in place. No 
doubt, the O.D.A. and the USAID genuinely wanted to fund 
projects which were "economically sound", but by insisting 
that projects should meet what they believed were 
objective criteria, they were inadvertently asking an 
African Government not to tamper with regionally- 
imbalanced economic structures inherited from the colonial 
period. Seen in that way , the criteria were not, in 
fact, objective, but political.
Morton goes on to argue that many other road projects
58had similarly been fully justified. This is
simplistic and misleading. The technique which was used 
for appraising the Blantyre/Zomba road project was, in 
fact, abandoned. It soon became clear that many other 
roads could not be similarly justified. The appraisal 
activities resumed only after the O.D.A. fashioned out new 
techniques, one of which is called the cost/benefit 
analysis, for appraising projects in developing countries.
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In a sense, this was an admission that the Agency's 
earlier "objective criteria" argument was wrong. Very few 
roads in many of the developing countries could by then be 
justified in terms of the traffic flow concept because the 
roads had, in the first place, to be constructed in order 
to attract traffic.
With conventional planning, donor countries would 
have easily imposed these "objective" criteria on Malawi. 
This, in turn, would have meant a development which would 
put emphasis on building upon the economic structures 
which were inherited from the colonial past. The 
Government wanted to achieve a more balanced economic 
development of the country. The move of the capital and 
the lakeshore road projects were some of the projects with 
which the Government wanted to realize this objective. 
This would not have been possible with conventional 
planning. Development in Malawi would largely have been 
gradual improvement in the existing economic structures of 
a colonial era.
The third difficulty which would have arisen with 
conventional planning is its inflexibility. According to 
the experts, donor countries and organizations influence 
the development strategies of aid recipient countries by 
means of project-tying of their aid. For example, they 
can change the development strategy of a recipient country 
from industrialization to agricultural development simply 
by offering to fund only the agricultural development
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projects. The effectiveness of the technique is even 
enhanced by the recipient country's common sense to 
proceed on the basis of the known motto: better something 
than nothing. In the end, the recipient country is 
imperceptibly forced to abandon its cherished industrial 
development strategy.
The technique described in the foregoing paragraph is 
more disruptive to conventional development planning 
than to Malawi's project planning. This is because 
coherence is an important aspect of a conventional 
five-year development plan which if disrupted makes the 
plan fall apart. On the other hand, Malawi's project 
planning is flexible and can take almost any beating, 
as it were, without feeling a disruption. This explains 
why development has proceeded more or less as the 
Government envisaged. The construction of the new capital 
and the lakeshore road are a case in point. Conventional 
development planning would not have made this possible.
These days, the talk is not about project-tying, but 
about proliferation. This is in two senses: proliferation 
of the donors and proliferation of the projects. The 
former is supposed to lead to a disruption of a recipient
country's development strategy as a result of conflict
among the many donors while the latter is supposed to
cause severe strains in the aid-handling machinery of the 
recipient country. Elliot Morss thinks that Malawi is a 
good example of the victims of this new foreign aid
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phenomenon. "Indeed, it appears more likely that donor
and project proliferation," he wrote, "have diverted the
attention of the Malawi authorities from attempting to
determine their own policies to simply trying to please 
59their donors." This is based on a UNDP annual report 
which stated that "Malawi was benefiting from 188 projects 
supported by 50 different donors."60
The objectivity of Morss's article is a little bit 
suspect. It is improportionately longer on Malawi than on 
Lesotho and Zambia. Yet Lesotho was presented in the same 
UNDP report as benefiting from 324 projects supported by 
61 donors while Zambia was presented in the same UNDP 
report as benefiting from 614 projects supported by 69 
donors. Clearly, it is Zambia and Lesotho, each of which 
has a population smaller than that of Malawi, which ought 
to experience more the problem of donor and project 
proliferation. However, these two countries are treated 
almost in passing by Morss.
On the question of donor proliferation, Morss was 
simply uncritical of the UNDP report. This will be 
shown later in the thesis. For the moment, it is enough 
to just state, as Hewitt and Kydd do, that Malawi has had 
only a handful of donors.61 The problem of donor 
proliferation simply does not arise with regards to Malawi.
As for project proliferation, Morss's argument raises 
the question of the optimal number of projects which a
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recipient country has to implement in a year. Again, the
UNDP report has to be read with a pinch of salt. It lists
188 projects while Hewitt and Kydd have calculated that
Malawi, on the average, has been implementing something
62like 100 projects a year. If these projects
constituted proliferation, project failure rate would have 
been high. On the contrary, Malawi has a high reputation 
of project implementation. No project in Malawi has been 
abandoned after the start of its implementation.
However, what is important is not so much that
Malawi has a good record of project implementation but 
that Malawi’s type of development planning protects Malawi 
from the problem of project proliferation. This is 
because each project has to be approved by the Government 
before the start of its implementation. No bureaucrat 
would start implementing a sugar project anywhere in the 
country without the Government authorizing whether such a 
project should be executed and where it should be 
implemented. Moreover, no Malawi bureaucrat would wish to 
secure the Government's authority for the start of the 
implementation of a project without, in the first place, 
making sure that he is able to do so. Otherwise, he would 
risk a dismissal or demotion. In other words, Malawi 
takes in only what it can digest. This has a bearing on 
what is called aid "absorptive capacity" of the - untry, 
that is, the country’s ability to use all the aid ~K.;ch is 
offered to it. Morss's focus should have • *-**n on 
absorptive capacity rather than on project prolifer «• in.
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In short, conventional planning had to be abandoned 
because of the manner in which Malawi was to approach 
development. This was made clear by the move of the 
capital and the lakeshore road project. In time, it 
became also clear that the President was determined to 
exercise control over project choice and allocation. It
would have been impossible to accommodate his direct 
involvement in development by means of conventional 
five-year development plans. Therefore, Malawi had to 
adopt its own style of development planning. Conventional 
development planning was out of touch with new political 
reality in the country. Its absence is in itself evidence 
that the country's development strategy was not decided 
upon by the expatriates.
Development Planning Documents
Finally, still other evidence which is also cited 
in support of the argument that the country's development 
strategy was decided upon by foreign experts is a 
reference to some development planning documents. What is 
to be considered here is simply the opposite implication 
of what Kydd and Hewitt intended to do: to deny that the 
country's economic policies were made by the British 
expatriates. They argue for example:
"Although U.K. supplemented staff were involved in 
developing the statement of development policies, it 
was very much an autonomous document embodying the
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views of Malawi's political leadership and was
produced without close consultation with the donor 
,.63agencies.
The passage, as can be seen, raises more doubts than it 
clears. For example, what is this statement of 
development policies and how autonomous is the document? 
How can it be taken that the document was indeed produced 
"without close consultation with donor agencies'? In the 
end, the passage enforces the claim that Malawi's economic 
policy was the work of foreign experts. However, an 
account of the evolution of the project planning approach 
explains what the documents reallyare: on official record of 
the implementation of Malawi's economic policies.
While the documents are part of the "project 
planning" approach, the approach itself was not something 
which was consciously formulated. Rather, this is a term 
which is given to the way Malawi has been going about its 
development. It is largely the result of efforts by the 
civil servants to accommodate the Malawi Government's 
determination not to leave development in their hands.
The approach began to evolve following the
announcement of the move of the capital and the lakeshore
64 . . .road project. The first development m  its evolution
was the production of a document called Estimates of
Expenditure on Development Account. This was produced to
meet the need for keeping track of all the projects
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implemented in the country. It itemizes all the projects 
being implemented and the expenditure to date on each 
project and is approved each year by Parliament as part of 
the country's national budget. The second development was 
the production of a document called, Three-year Rolling 
Development Programme, which was produced to meet the need 
for longer term preparation and implementation of 
projects. The third was the production of a document 
called, Statement of Development Policies (DEVEPOL), the 
first of which covered the years 1971 to 1980. This was 
produced to meet the need for clear guidelines to all the 
development activities. It had a set of national 
development objectives and some indicative planning 
figures.
DEVEPOL was the most controversial among the three 
documents because it looks like a development plan. For 
this reason, the Government went out of its way to explain 
that it was not a development plan. It was simply what 
its title said: a statement of development policies.
Humphrey quotes the Government's explanation, saying:
"The Statement of Development Policies 1971-1980 is 
essentially an indicative planning document that sets 
out in some detail sectoral projection and the 
policies it is thought necessary to meet the stated 
aims."^
A point which the country's Chief Economist elaborated as:
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"It will be clear from the foregoing that DEVOPOL is 
not a conventional development plan. In fact, it is 
not a plan at all but, as its title clearly 
indicates, a statement of the Government's policies 
for economic development. To illustrate the effects 
of these policies, quantitative projections of their 
expected results have been made for the principal 
sectors of the economy, but these are not to be 
confused with the usual plan targets."66
Indeed, DEVEPOL was not a development plan. For 
example, the document covered too long a period, ten 
years, for it to be a plan. A development plan normally 
covers half the period, five years. A paragraph on the 
last page of the document is in itself proof that the 
document was not a development plan. It reads:
"It must be emphasized that all these projections are
illustrative only even though every effort has been
made to make them internally consistent and
empirically realistic. They do not constitute a
development plan in the conventional sense, nor a
6 7specific commitment by the Government."
The strangeness of the last part of the last sentence of 
the passage is the proof that DEVEPOL was not a develop- 
ment plan because a development plan, after parliamentary 
approval, is a law, or at least a commitment of the 
government concerned. If DEVEPOL was not a "specific
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commitment by the Government", then it was clearly not a 
development plan. DEVEPOL was not also a plan because in 
practice, it did not serve as a guideline during the 
period which it covered. Far more than anything it 
envisaged was done in the development field by 1980. For 
this reason, its second production was temporarily 
abandoned between 1980 and 1985 by the now highly 
localized bureaucracy without incurring the slightest 
Government displeasure.
Therefore, the argument by Hewitt and Kydd needs 
correction. DEVEPOL was, indeed, the work of the British 
expatriates. While containing some minimal contribution 
from local personnel in the Ministry of Labour, Trade and 
Industry, Natural Resources, and Transport and Communi­
cations, which were localized by then, the document was 
largely the work of British expatriates. Hewitt and
Kydd are right when they say that DEVEPOL contained the 
Government's views. It could not have been otherwise as 
far as the operation of the Malawi Government is concerned. 
However, this is not an important point. What is important 
is that DEVEPOL did not embody the country's economic 
policy and its contents, for example, were largely an 
interpretation of the implication of a number of projects 
which the Government had embarked upon long before the 
document was produced. Rather, the document was * record 
and an interpretation of the policy as it was i . ready 
being implemented.
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Expatriates* Economic Policies
That the expatriates did not decide on Malawi's 
development strategy can, perhaps, be illustrated by 
contrasting the Malawi Government's economic policy and the 
sort of economic policy which the expatriates, at least 
some of them, appear to favour. This is not to indulge in 
comparing what has happened with what might have happened. 
Information on the sort of economic policy which the 
expatriates favoured is available. One has only to go by 
the sort of development projects which they favoured, or 
the sort of development projects which they opposed, to see 
what they intended to do or believed should have been done. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to present an overall 
impression of what might have been their development policy 
for the country.
The objectives of the Malawi Government economic 
policies, as earlier stated, are raising the living 
standards of the ordinary people of the country as much 
as possible, and rectifying regionally unbalanced
economic structures which were inherited from the colonial
68
era. To this end, Government's efforts have also
centred on major infrastructural development, particularly 
the construction of national roads to bitumenized 
standards so as to make every part of the country 
accessible to modern economic activity. In addition, 
Governments's efforts have also concentrated on the 
implementation of large integrated rural development
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projects designed to attack mass poverty. In short, the 
government economic policies have involved a large- scale 
approach to infrastructural and agricultural development.
The term, "large-scale approach to agricultural
development", should not be confused with "large-scale
agricultural development." The latter means estate
agriculture or the promotion of estate agriculture. The
Malawi Government are said, by Kydd, Christiansen, and
others, to have pursued large scale agricultural
development which is said to have had adverse effects on
6 9the small holder agriculture. By that is meant that 
the Malawi Government has concentrated on the development 
of estate agriculture at the expense of small holder 
agriculture. That is not what is meant here by large 
scale approach to agricultural development and there is no 
intention to look into the "neglect arguments" by Kydd and 
others because facts simply fly into the face of their 
arguments. The large scale approach to agricultural 
development is intended to reflect the large integrated 
rural developments projects which have characterized the 
Malawi Government's development policies. These are the 
very same projects the planning and execution of which are 
based on promoting small holder agriculture as opposed to 
estate agriculture. In terms of the heavy capital outlay 
involved in the implementation of these projects, nothing, 
perhaps, has received as much attention as the small 
holder agriculture in the country.
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In short, the Malawi Government's economic policies 
have been characterized by large scale approach to 
infrastructural and agricultural development. In concrete 
and specific terms, this has meant construction of new 
railway lines, new national roads, bridges, schools and 
colleges, the move of the capital to a new site and the 
implementation of large integrated rural development 
projects.
What might have been the expatriate's economic
policies can easily be construed from the content of the
Hill Commission Report which was, no doubt, based on
70information gathered from the expatriates. As already 
stated, it opposed the Government's decision to move the 
country's capital to a new site and to construct the 
lakeshore road. Instead, the report recommended the 
construction and maintenance of feeder roads for the 
extraction of small holder crops. In fact, this was the 
country’s infrastructural development policy in the 
closing days of colonialism.
The expatriates similarly favoured small agricultural 
schemes. Some of these have been implemented with funding 
from the O.D.A. which has tended to favour such schemes 
ostensibly for their "economic soundness" but covertly 
for their low capital outlay because funding the 
integrated rural development projects would have led to 
doubling of O.D.A. allocation of aid to Malawi. In a 
sense, this is a paradox. Both the expatriates and the
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O.D.A. are directly connected with the advent of the 
integrated rural development project which in Malawi was 
borne out of the results of some agricultural pilot 
schemes all of which were funded by the O.D.A. and 
implemented by the expatriates. Instead# the O.D.A. has 
mainly funded the small agricultural schemes. Only 
belatedly did it decide to fund one integrated rural 
development project# the Phalombe rural Development 
Project.
The small agricultural schemes illustrate two 
philosophies which have been followed in Malawi. The 
first is the philosophy that "big is beautiful". This has 
characterized the large integrated rural development 
projects which make it possible to spread development to 
every part of a country and are among the first compre­
hensive and organized efforts against poverty in a newly 
independent state. Its emphasis is on coverage of 
thousands of families and acres. However# it has two 
disadvantages. The first is the implied heavy capital 
outlay which has indeed run into tens of millions of 
Kwacha or dollars. The second is that the economic impact 
of projects based on such a philosophy is
problematic. It is not easy to tell if the results of 
projects based on such a philosophy can last forever.
On the other hand# the expatriates# or at least some 
expatriates# favoured the "small is beautiful" 
philosophy. The country's oldest small agricultural
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development scheme is the one called Kasungu Flue-cured 
Tobacco Authority. This started during the colonial days 
and was almost wound up because of financial difficulties 
during the closing days of colonialism. The scheme has
survived because the President initiated some changes in
its mode of operation. The first small agricultural 
development scheme after the country attained independence 
owes its origin to the personal initiative of the 
President. This is called the Small Holder Tea Authority 
Scheme, which began on the directive of the President who 
had seen a similar scheme during his visit to Kenya. 
Other small holder agricultural schemes include the Small 
Holders Coffee Authority in the North of the country and
Dwangwa Small Holders Sugar Scheme, funded by O.D.A. and the
Commonwealth Development Corporation, and Chinese Rice 
Development Schemes in several parts of the country.
The purpose of these schemes, like the large 
integrated rural development schemes, has been to promote 
the production of tea, coffee, flue-cured tobacco, and 
sugar by the small holders. They are the most capitalistic 
of the country's development schemes because emphasis in 
them is on imparting skills to the individual in the 
growing of say, flue-cured tobacco, tea, or coffee. For 
example, Kasungu Flue-cured Tobacco Authority involves the 
training of each tenant on the scheme in the g r e w . - q  and 
handling of flue-cured tobacco. Their advantage . that 
they involve small capital outlay for fund.-: The
amounts involved range from a mere £100,000 to 00 a
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year. Their other advantage is that their economic impact 
is not problematic and can be ascertained in terms of the 
individual's ability to grow coffee, tea, or flue-cured
tobacco on his own.
"Small is beautiful", too, has its own shortcomings. 
Part of Malawi's experience is evidence that "small" is not 
"beautiful". It is true that the production of flue-cured 
tobacco has experienced a phenomenal increase since the
country attained independence. However, the increase is, 
not because of the small holder production of the crop, 
but because of the production of the crop on new estate 
agriculture development scheme. The experience of the 
Small Holder Coffee Authority Scheme is perhaps more
concrete evidence that "small' is not "beautiful". The 
scheme did, indeed, lead to a revival of coffee production 
which was abandoned by the country during the 1920's
following Brazil's growth into prominence in the coffee 
business. However, its coffee output between 1980 and 
1982 was so small that it had to be sold as part of the 
Tanzanian coffee. Yet the country has the potential to be 
among the major coffee exporters in Africa. Indeed, it 
began to change when the crop began to be grown on the 
estates. The O.D.A. probably learned from this experience and 
decided^ though belatedly, to fund at least one integrated 
rural development project, the Phalombe Rural Development 
Project, in which the idea of promoting Women's Role in 
Development has received some emphasis. "Small" is simply 
not "beautiful". It makes one remain small.
In short, the economic policy which the expatriates 
favoured for the country was that of construction and 
maintenance of feeder roads for the extraction of small 
holder crops and of the implementation of small holder 
agricultural schemes. Its purpose, according to the terms 
of reference of the Hill Commission, was to promote 
economic development so as to enable the country to do away 
with its reliance on the budgetary subsidy from Britain. 
To this end, emphasis would have been on implementing 
"economically sound" development projects. There is no 
intention here to go into the question of whether such a 
policy would have, indeed, best promoted the countryfs 
economic development. Suffice it to say that the 
development which was envisaged in terms of this policy 
would have been largely that of a mere graduate improvement 
in the economical structures inherited from the colonial 
period.
A number of small holder agricultural schemes have 
been implemented as already stated. The feeder roads for 
the extraction of small holder crops are now receiving 
attention in the form of a programme called DRIMP, 
Development of Rural Roads Improvement and Maintenance 
Programme. These have been accommodated because of the 
flexible nature of the Malawi Government's operational 
approach to development; that is, it has also been possible 
to implement some of the schemes which the expatriates 
favoured without distracting the Government's attention to 
its priorities. This is why the country's development
has proceeded in accordance with the Government's economic
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policies outlined earlier. Institutional building, major 
new roads construction programme, a new capital, and large 
integrated rural development projects are evident to any 
casual observer in the country. Therefore, it is not true 
that the countryfs development strategy was decided upon by 
the expatriates.
Conclusion
The evidence which is often cited in support of the 
argument that the country's economic policies were adopted 
in order to make Malawi attractive to donor countries and 
organizations are quotations made from some of the 
President's speeches. These are partial and in fact 
distort the President's thoughts as expressed in the 
speeches quoted. The President expressed a preference for 
a mixed economy which is, indeed, what has emerged in 
Malawi for the past twenty years or so. If attracting 
foreign aid were indeed the main objective of the country's 
economic policies, then the President would have been 
hesitant to set up public enterprises which led to the 
emergence of a mixed economy in the country. A more 
market-oriented economy would have been the choice 
consistent with such an objective.
Finally, the evidence in support of the argument 
that the development strategy was decided upon 
by foreign experts cites references to certain 
development schemes, certain development documents, and to
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an absence of conventional planning in Malawi. The 
reference to certain development schemes is based on a 
sheer misunderstanding of the Achikumbe. Ndunda. and 
farmers' clubs schemes, none of which is a revival of the 
colonial "master farmer" and estate farming schemes. 
Similarly, the reference to certain development planning 
documents is based on a misunderstanding which assumes that 
they embody a policy which was formulated by the 
expatriates. Actually, the documents have largely been a 
record and a guide for policy implementation. Finally, 
Malawi's development strategy evolved out of efforts to 
accommodate the President's direct involvement in matters 
of development.
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Chapter Four 
Alleged Impact of Malawi's Policies 
Introduction
The last chapter examined the evidence which is often 
cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid 
and Malawi's economic policies. This chapter looks at the 
impact which Malawi’s policies apparently have had on the 
donor countries and organizations. To that end, it 
examines some misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient 
of foreign aid. These are examined in the context of 
Malawi's aid relations with its donors.
The discussion is divided into four parts. The first 
part is a consideration of Malawi's aid relations with the 
donors in general. The second part is a consideration of 
Malawi's relations with South Africa, a topic which has 
attracted considerable attention among scholars of foreign 
policy. The third part is a consideration of Malawi's aid 
relations with Britain while the fourth part is a 
consideration of British budgetary assistance to Malawi.
Aid Relations With Donors
Apparently, Malawi's policies have, over the years, 
led to a realization of their alleged main objective; that 
is endearing Malawi to donor countries and organizations.
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Accordingly, they are often described as "pro-western", 
"capitalist", and "anti-communist". Malawi's "pragmatic, 
pro-Western foreign policy", claimed the Guardian , has 
been rewarded with generous amounts of aid."^ The word, 
"rewarded", is clearly a reminder that donors give aid to 
Malawi, not on account of its needs, but on account of its 
allegedly "pro-western" and "capitalist" policies. 
MacManus elaborated the point. He wrote:
"The steady production and export of tea, tobacco,
and cotton fuels the economy. This coupled with the
President's insistence on timely repayment of loans
and incorrupt implementation of aid programmes has
made his nation a favourite son of Africa for donor
2countries and banking community.
Out of this apparent success of the allegedly foreign 
aid-oriented policies have arisen several misconceptions 
about Malawi in relation to its donors. The first one 
is that donors have been generous towards Malawi and that 
Malawi receives foreign aid from many donors. Indeed 
Elliot Morss cited Malawi as the typical victim of "donor 
proliferation", meaning that Malawi receives aid from too 
many donors.'*
The second misconception is that the mere fact that 
Malawi receives Western aid means that Malawi is aligned 
with the Western countries. The "pro-western" and 
"anti-communist" labels are a case in point. "The Malawi
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Government", claimed Richardson, "aligns itself squarely
with capitalism, United States, Western Europe, and
increasingly the foreign policy of South Africa."4 Malawi,
also argued Short, never "seriously attempted to play off
East and West in the scramble for aid, an argument which
depicts developing countries as being in a fierce compet- 
. . . . 5ition with each other for aid." Apparently the point is 
that to appear genuinely nonaligned, an aid recipient 
country must accept aid from both the East and West.
The third misconception has it that Malawi is the 
largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa. "Perhaps 
not surprisingly", claimed Dorrell, "this Wester-oriented 
open economy is clearly favoured by the international
financial institution; indeed it is said to be the largest
. . 6
per capita recipient of aid in Africa."
The notion of "per capita aid" is, in the view of the 
writer, inappropriate. This is because the concept is 
supposed to indicate the amount of aid which each person in 
a recipient country would get in a given year if the aid 
received were to be shared equally among people of the 
recipient country. It gained currency during the foreign 
aid boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which created 
a need for equitable distribution of aid particularly the 
U.N.D.P. resources, among the recipient countries. It 
implies a directly proportional relationship between the 
need for aid and the size of a recipient country's 
population.
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The per capita aid though useful as an approximation, 
omits the factors of geography and size and can, therefore, 
be misleading. It can be misleading because it presupposes 
that all foreign aid is for sharing purposes among the 
people of a recipient country. Such presupposition is 
correct only if one considers relief and emergency aid. 
This is the type of foreign aid which is indeed for 
distribution to the needy, say those facing starvation. 
However, the concept is not a sound one with regard to some 
other categories of foreign aid.
A greater proportion of foreign aid is not for 
distribution to the needy. It is for the creation of 
production units and social services like the establishment 
of a fertilizer plant and the construction of new roads and 
hospitals. Such activities have much to do with a 
recipient country's level of economic development rather 
than with the size of a recipient country's population. 
For example, to construct a road along its entire length, 
Malawi would need as much aid for this sort of project as, 
say the cSte d'Ivoire although its population is less than 
that of the latter. However, the concept has gained wide 
acceptance because it is seen as appropriate for comparison 
purposes. So Malawi is said to be the largest per capita 
recipient of aid in Africa meaning that in relative terms, 
it gets more aid than any other African country.
Finally, another misconception is that Malawi 
does not have difficulties in obtaining foreign aid. "So 
efficient and diligent", reported Ashford, "has Malawi 
proved itself to be developing its own resources that aid
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bodies such as the World Bank, Commonwealth Development
Corporation and European Development Fund almost fall
over each other in the rush to give Malawi loans and
grants", a point which he repeated on another 
7
occasion. He reported:
"At present Malawi is seeking £50 million in foreign
aid to pay for national rural development schemes.
On its record it is unlikely to have difficulty in
o
raising the money".
In short, the popular claims are that Malawi receives 
generous amounts of aid, that Malawi receives aid from too 
many donors, that in relative terms, Malawi receives more 
aid than any other country in Africa, and that Malawi has 
no difficulties in getting aid. All these are actually 
misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient of foreign aid 
and hardly stand closer examination.
To begin with, the claim that Malawi is given 
generous amounts of aid is ambiguous. It implies several 
things about Malawi vis-a-vis the west. One possible 
meaning is that the western donors have provided 
substantial aid to Malawi. Table II on the next page 
shows the aid which Malawi has received from 19 64 to 
1985. The figures are certainly proof of Western 
generosity to Malawi. Another possible meaning is that it 
has been the West and not the East, which has been willing
TABLE II
i . i t t  o p  m n 1;  f r n n i o v  a t 3) l r w i r , ; ________ r :  t  m  m o p s
1964 1965 1966 1967 196« 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 10Pl 10.9? 1983 198/1 l°Pr' •
Canada 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0.4 0.40 0 .1 0 .1 0.4 0.4 0.9 1 .8 13.3 10.4 14.8 47.0 13.3 9.0 lo.o 6 .6 7.8 3.3 4.3
lenmark 0 .0 2 0 .2 1 0.9 1 .2 1 .2 0 .8 1.4 2 .6 4.5 5.0 4.4 1“.Q 6 .0 1 .6 3.? 0.9 3.0 5.1
France 0.4 3.9 ° . 6 3.3 3.0 3.2
Japan 0 .0 1 0 .6 0.7 1 .1 2.7 6.9 1 1 .6 9.9 5.7 5.1 6.5 4.9 ■
Tetherlends 0 .1 0 .2 0.4 0.9 1 .2 1 .2 3.3 2 .8 2 .2 4.5 7.0 2.5 2.5 2.3 1.3 7.1
United Klngdoi 3 0 .2 30.4 24.7 23.1 17.2 18.5 24.5 20.5 16.9 1 8 .9 2 3 .8 24.7 2 2 .2 2 2.5 37.4 29.3 30.3 23.6 1 8 .1 17.0 16.5
TJnlted States 2 .0 3.37 3.0 3.0 2 .0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 ?# *3 6 .0 7.0
Uest Germany 0 .1 0 0.47 2.3 1.7 2.3 3.2 4.8 2 .6 3.0 2.4 2.3 1.7 8 .8 12.3 57.2 13.2 29.9 21.7 14.5 14.7 11.9
A.D.B. 1.5 0.9 0 .8 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 .6 1.4 2 .0 10.9 6.3 5.9 5.7 3-3 2 .1 .
I.D. A. 0 .1 0 0.24 4.8 9.6 7.3 7.8 4.7 7.5 11.4 U.9 10.9 1 8.? 14.5 15.1 20.7 26.9 30.4 76.9 34.0
O.H. 0 .2 2 0.9 0.64 0.64 1 .1 1.4 1.4 1 .8 2.9 3.7 5.2 4.7 4.4 5.2 7.4 13.5 15.4 13.1 2 0 .2 14.9 1 2 .6 .
E.E.C- 1 .0 5.2 8.9 12.7 2 0 .6 14.0 1 0 .8 5.8 14.5 1 0 .9
I.B.R.D 0 .1 2.3 2.5 7.4 4.2 0 .6
I .V .C 5.8 r.o 5-0 O .l
Source; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (0ECD) Annual Reports of Financial
Flows to Developing countries. The reports are those of each year from 1965-1986 inclusive.
Gap; Figures for 1968 not available in the ©ECD Reports. 29/....
’Abbreviations; ADB: African Development Bank; IDA: International Development Association; UN; United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF); etc.; EEC;
European Economic Communities; IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and 
IMF; International Monetary Fund.
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to give aid to Malawi. Table II also confirms this.
Malawi has not received any aid from the East.
However, one other possible meaning is that the 
generous amounts have been something special to Malawi? 
that is the western countries have been willing to give aid 
more to Malawi than to any other developing country in 
Africa. Probably this is the intended meaning of the 
claim. In this third sense, the claim is a misconception 
about Malawi's relations with the donors. As can be 
calculated from Table II, Malawi received nearly $1,785.74 
million of foreign aid from 1964 to 1985. On its own, the 
amount is substantial. However, the figure is just a little 
more than what Sudan got in 1985 alone. Therefore, in 
relative terms, the west has not been so exceptionally 
generous towards Malawi.
Table II also shows that Canada, the Netherlands,
Japan, and France had for many years been giving Malawi 
almost no aid at all until the late 1970s. This was true 
too, to some extent, of the United States, the West's 
largest donor, as the small amounts of its aid to Malawi 
show. Absent from the table are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Italy, Israel, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, a list which includes some 
of the most generous donors. Malawi's donors are the World 
Bank, West Germany, Britain, U.N.D.P., Denmark, A.D.B., and 
the United States of America. Now the list includes Japan,
Canada, the Netherlands, and the European Communities (E.E.C). In
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short, contrary to Morss's claim, the country has only a
9
handful of donors.
Further, the claim that Malawi is aligned with the 
West just because it receives aid only from the West 
implies a direct relationship between acceptance of aid 
and alignment. The mere acceptance of aid is seen as 
itself proof of a recipient's alignment with the donor of 
the aid. Such an assumption overlooks the asymmetrical 
situation which the developing countries face with regard 
to sources of foreign aid. As is well known, the Eastern 
bloc countries have not been a major source of foreign 
aid. Moreover, a good deal of their aid has been military 
which is quite unsuitable for Malawi with its very small 
army. Therefore, Malawi has not received any aid from the 
Eastern bloc countries, not because it cannot accept aid 
from those countries, but because the Eastern bloc
countries do not have the aid which Malawi needs.
The United States has now got a handy official 
definition of alignment. This is based on the voting 
practices in the United Nations General Assembly. 
"Because a general Assembly acts on so many diverse
issues, the voting record of a U.N. members during a
General Assembly", reads an introductory statement to the 
United States Official Report, "tell us a good deal about 
a country's orientation in World arenas: where it stands, 
with whom it stands and for what purpose". ^  No doubt 
this is debatable. However, this is one of the ways by
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which the United States has chosen to define another 
country's alignment with it. Since the United States is 
the leading member of the Western bloc countries, the 
definition constitutes a reasonable basis for testing the 
validity of the claim that the mere acceptance of aid from 
a donor means a recipient country's alignment with the aid 
donor.
Table III on the next page shows Malawi's voting 
practice in the United Nations General Assembly and the 
United States aid to Malawi. It has some shortcomings. 
For example, it may be disputed on the ground that it 
covers too short a period, 1984 to 1987. While this is, 
indeed, a very short period, the Table, nonetheless, 
provides some useful insights. Among other things, it 
shows Malawi's alignment with the United States. Its 
voting percentage in line with that of the United States 
is among the highest in the African group of countries in 
the United Nations. However, the alignment seems to have 
nothing to do with aid. The relationship between it and 
Malawi's receipts of American aid is a poor one. For 
example, the 1984 lowest voting percentage figure was 
rewarded with a relatively larger amount of aid than the 
1983 higher voting percentage figure. Their relationship 
is even worse if Malawi's receipts of American aid are 
compared with those of some other African countries.11
Moreover, the alignment as depicted by the Table is 
highly relative. These voting percentages are indeed high
TA
BL
E 
II
I
TABLE. Ill 
VJTOG FETCENmSES IN THE U.N.
1983 1984
Malawi Voting % Coinciding w/ U.S. Position: 24.7 14.3
Position Among African Countries: 7th 14th
American Aid Commitments to Malawi in
Million of Dollars 4.0 6.0
Sources: 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 Reports to Congress on Voting Practices in the
United Nations. The aid figures for 1983, 1984, and 1985, are from O.E.C.D. 
Reports. The 1986 and 1987 figures were obtained from a Malawi Government 
official records.
Key: The percentage figure is the number of Malawian votes which coincided with
the United States "yes” or "no" votes in a hundred. The United Kingdom has 
throughout the period scored over 90 per cent according to the U.S. official 
reports. The figures are calculated on the basis of a selected number of
issues.
1985
26.9
2nd
7.0
1986
36.8
1st
3.4
1987
17.9
9th
7.3
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in comparison with those of other African countries. For 
example, the 1986 high percentage of 36.8 is even less 
than half of the United Kingdom rating of over 90 per cent. If 
anything, the Table shows that Malawi's voting percentage 
figures are very much within the overall pattern of the 
voting practices of African states. In other words, 
acceptance of aid from a donor is probably an unreliable 
guide to an aid recipient country's alignment.
Furthermore, the claim that Malawi is the largest per 
capita recipient of aid in Africa is simply not true. 
Table IV on the next page lists per capita aid figures for 
a number of African countries chosen at random. As can be 
seen from it, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the 
largest per capita recipients of foreign aid . Per capita 
aid figures for Senegal, which has almost the same 
population as Malawi, are also far higher than those of 
Malawi. Even the per capita aid figures for countries 
like Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania, each with a population 
larger than that of Malawi, are, on average, higher than 
those for Malawi. Therefore, quite the contrary of what 
people like Dorrell say, Malawi is simply not the largest 
per capita recipient of aid in Africa.
In absolute terms, Malawi's position is even lower.
For example Table V on page 244 lists a number of African 
aid recipient countries chosen at random. As can be seen 
from it, Zaire, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and 
Kenya are the countries which almost constantly received
PER CAPITA KmEIGff All) OF SCO AFRICAN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES III &
1971 1972 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 I960 1981 1982
Botswana 24.81 31.71 44.49 52.7 60.58 67.25 69.86 75.35 124.0 130.7 114.3 112.5
Cote d'Ivoire 11.23 11.43 11.92 13.55 16.98 19.73 21.16 15.92 29.0 30.4 38.2 36.5
Ethiopia 1.91 1.78 2.06 2.79 3.5 4.87 4.66 4.42 5.4 6.4 6.0 7.6
Kenya 6.45 5.60 6.48 7.58 8.70 10.10 10.96 13.20 25.1 27.1 30.7 25.9
Lesotho 13.75 14.76 14.62 16.13 19.57 26.35 30.94 31.26 52.1 63.4 65.0 70.2
Madagascar 7.22 7.49 7.08 7.79 8.65 8.75 8.59 8.83 15.4 18.3 26.0 19 .8
Malawi 7.24 7.64 6.88 7.42 9.07 11.25 13.07 14.58 24.7 27.3 22.3 18.0
Mali 5.05. 5.92 8.68 13.06 16.81 18.56 17.36 18.34 30.0 30.7 23.4 24.1
Senegal 13.29 12.07 14.47 17.78 24.41 28.45 24.85 28.43 50.0 56.8 46.5 48.3
Somalia 10.99 9.50 10.15 9.98 14.80 19.20 23.87 23.54 47.6 572 59.0 58.5
Sudan 0.73 0 .8 2 1.88 2.68 4.49 7.47 8.08 10.00 19.3 23.3 28.7 29.22
Swaziland 15.80 13.33 15.91 24.15 31.79 37.10 40.40 16.14 113.2 116.5 72.4 78.9
Tanzania ... 4.23 4.17 5.11 7.12 12.18 15.?4 19.19 21.20 32.8 36.3 34.3 29.6
Uganda 3.13 3.15 2.37 1.68 1.27 1.61 1.57 1.45 4.6 7.6 9.8 9.7
Zaire 4.90 4.81 5.37 6.24 7.11 7.82 8.40 9.64 _ 14.5__ 15.6 11.2 10.1
Zambia 5.02 . 4-.32 6.68 8.79 12_.I1. 14.21 16.30 ?_2.5 ...50*5..... .49-8 . 43.1 . . y.6_„
Source: Statistical Yearbook Cf The United Nations, 1972 to 1983 inclusive.
The figures start with the year 1971. This is because the concept of per capta foreign 
aid had not come into currency prior to 1970.
TABLE V
sor?; a h it  cap n K c ir if r .T  c p io t : r : s  
r o r m .r  rro i: r ;  n o o : r o n r a i  a ti, n i  t a n . i o i :  o f  i it it f .l st a t e s  i o i m i i s »
Potawana 6°6
J'/'V
87 3
1 VO O l'f'U
1 4 .0
i'll"
14.3
|V / I
1 7 .8
l'fid
7 0 .8
J211.
134.5
..
36 .9
J
Pi. 8 57.8
ini
30.8
1 ' i<
21.4 1 4 0 .4 53.4 1 1 0 .7 11P. 6 1 29 .6 100 .4 I0 0 .7
Cote Uvolre 6480 8859 39.85 3 8 .8 2 4 3 .4 6 34.64 6 7 .9 115.5 1 0 3 .6 84.9 158.2 1 6 4 .0 193.8 383.4 5>"8.0 6 1 7 .2 551.8 918.4 2 6 0 .6 P4 8 .2 448.5 1 35.6 136.2
Ethiopia 28076 34140 1 7 .0 0 26.73 4 0 .6 9 29.41 4 8 .1 49.8 69.3 49.0 59.0 107 .8 115.8 135.3 107 .1 1 30 .8 2 2 0 .9 2 1 5 .6 2 5 6 .0 221.1 2°4.4 372.7 719.0
Kenya 12558 17390 55.18 71.24 65.77 56.55 67.9 94.6 1 0 8 .5 116.9 199 .8 1 7 7 .2 190.7 354.4 550.0 4 6 2 .2 654.5 557.3 577.4 575.3 478.6 420.6 462.7
Lesotho 1169 1407 13.2 9.9 16.7 14.1 1 4 .2 2 0 .9 27.5 30.1 39.1 51.9 6 2 .1 0 0 .7 1 0 3 .2 93.6 103.3 101 .1 95.6
Madagascar 7426 9142 47.59 5 0 .8 2 42.35 43.34 4 6 .1 47.5 5 6 .8 6 0 .1 54.9 65.4 91.7 61.7 54.0 115.2 229.3 394 .2 4 0 0 ,0 369.9 236.6 160.8 2 0 0 .5
1'alawi 5009 6355 32.56 34.53 31.41 29.82 31.4 42.9 35.2 54.2 33.8 /I8 .0 84.9 77.7 114.3 1 1 2 .2 210.4 189.3 193.2 135-4 105.4 165.1 1 2 2 .P
Kali 6151 7260 17.17 .61 2 0 .8 6 17.76 20.9 2 0 .8 36 .6 40.6 69.7 106.5 114.9 °5.1 113.6 176.7 2 1 0 .1 254.0 236.4 2 0 S .2 214.P 323.5 390.1
Senegal 48 6I 50l/3 57.31 47.52 44.10 48.70 49.4 41.2 6 2 .2 57.3 99.8 1 29 .6 136.7 161.9 169.8 294.7 350.3 448.1 483.1 4P6 .2 455.P 3P0.2 303.3
Somalia 3052 3963 2 1 .6 8 28.67 17.94 15.04 34.5 30 .0 34.4 31.3 31.7 20.7 8 4 .6 72.1 396.3 225.3 229.7 553.0 369.1 6IF.0 411.8 368.1 368 .3
Sudan 1540 19450 24.90 30.16 17.10 1 8 .8 9 2 0 .2 16.7 18.7 46.2 9 0 .8 104.3 382.7 2^.3 388.3 478.1 64 3.2 705.8 7 2 1 .1 P o o .8 1019.4 6 3 0 .2 1 1 3 6 .0
Swaziland 470 580 1 1 .2 1 1 .0 1 .8 12.4 1 0 .6 15.0 17.4 18.7 37.6 54.4 7 8 .8 79.1 56.9 48.1 53.0 3 1 .8 27.9
Tanzania 15464 19831 4 6 .8 1 38.34 38.52 36.45 61.0 59.0 79.5 102.5 127.9 1 6 2 .2 317.2 317.9 420.4 576.3 744.4 857.5 8 5 0 .4 759.6 6 1 0 .0 565.7 494.7
0 pan da 11060 13675 22.87 21.63 2 5 .0 6 2 0 .7 8 44.0 40.3 38.3 32.4 8 .6 1.9 7.5 45-5 3 0 .0 129.2 4 2 .8 137.2 153.9 170.2 190.8 169.3 I8P.5
Zalro 24021 29960 1 21 .00 149.31 8 9 .6 6 94.1 3 154.7 132.9 285.9 2 1 8 .6 ■>518.5 467.1 610.7 494.1 512.3 707.1 732.5 756. 3 6 3 0 .2 433.? 111.1 347.7 331.0
Z anM a 4 66P. 6008 20.67 1 3 .6 33.72 68.30 4 6 .6 27.0 36 .6 6 8 .4 158.5 183.5 311.1 133.1 205.7 315.6 449.7 353.1 419.8 346.7 218 .1 240.9 331.7
Source: O.E.C.D. Annual Report On Financial Flows To Developing Countries.
Base Year: 1964 is chosen as the base year for the figures because it is Malawi's independence year. 
1968 figures are not included because they were not recorded in the O.E.C.D. Report.
The 1964 to 1967 figures for Botswana# Lesotho# and Swaziland are not included because 
these countries got independence between 1966 and 1968.
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the largest amounts of foreign aid each year for the past
twenty or so years. Sudan, Somalia, and Zambia joined, as
it were, the list of the aid high fliers later. Malawi
has been roughly in the third category, competing mainly
with Madagascar and Mali both of which gained the upper
hand of the competition as the 1970s drew to a close.
Malawi has not been the largest recipient of foreign aid
in Africa. Indeed Hewitt and Kydd have calculated that
the country "ranks 52 among all third world countries with
12a 0.5% share of total aid".
Finally the impression that Malawi does not have
difficulties in getting aid is simply misleading. Not all
Malawi's development schemes have met full cooperation
from the aid donors. For example, the country's rural
development schemes which Ashford mentioned were initially
shunned by some of the Western aid donor governments
including the British Government, despite their popularity
in international development circles as the sort of
schemes which enable aid to reach the rural poor in the
13recipient countries. Perhaps the best known project
which initially met almost total opposition from the
Western aid donors is the country's new capital. Progress
on its construction was made in the teeth of donor
opposition and the project was described harshly by
Richard Gott as "Brazilian delusion of grandeur" and by a
Representative of France as "dubious public 
14investment".
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No doubt, other developing countries have had similar 
frustrations with the aid donors. It matters less if 
Malawi had less of such frustrations than the other 
developing countries. The frustrations which Malawi has 
also experienced on some of its development schemes show, 
at least, that all has not been bread and butter for 
Malawi on the question of foreign aid.
Recipient Of South African Aid
Malawi's acceptance of some foreign aid from South 
Africa has been a subject of wild speculations or 
exaggerations. Almost anything which Malawi has done 
successfully is attributed to South African help. After 
describing Malawi as one of Africa's remarkable economic 
success stories, Girardet, claimed:
"Over two decades later, Western development 
officials argued that Malawi's conservative... and 
controversial Life President...has achieved more for 
his country than many other African leaders have for 
theirs. Many feel that his success... as well as his 
controversiality. . . stem from the fact that he 
established diplomatic and trade links with South 
Africa in 1967";15
a point which also appeared in an article in the 
Economist in which it was claimed that "the relative 
efficiency of Malawi's industry is to some extent a
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consequence of access to the spare parts and service 
skills in Johannesburg area".^
It is by no means clear how the trade links with 
South Africa# especially the "access to spare parts and 
service skills in Johannesburg area", have helped Malawi 
to succeed to the exclusion of South Africa's other neigh­
bours. For example# Joseph Hanlon says that in 1982 
Zambia imported from South Africa goods including vital 
mining spare parts worth 92 million Zambian Kwacha#* and
Zimbabwe imported from South Africa goods worth 239
17Zimbabwean dollars. How these trade links have not 
helped these other countries is hard to say. Though 
debatable# the argument has created the impression that 
Malawi is a preserve of South African consumer goods. "We 
were surprised"# reported Brigadier Lewis, "to find# 
contrary to our expectation with which we left London# a 
limited range of South African consumer goods in 
Malawi."
It is not the intention here to explore all the 
economic questions concerning Malawi and South Africa in 
this thesis. The subject of concern is aid. Therefore# 
attention is centred only on the aid relationship between 
Malawi and South Africa. With it# too, an impression is 
often created that South Africa is a donor of aid to 
Malawi or that Malawi gets aid from South Africa. The 
Life President of Malawi# claimed an article in the Times, 
"maintains trade# aid# labour and diplomatic ties with
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19South Africa". "In 1980 South African loans accounted
for 27 per cent of all bilateral loans made to Malawi,
second behind the U.K.", claims Sparks who goes on to say;
"it must be remembered that South African aid, as limited
as it has been, has a very high present value component of
about $700 million, the highest of any particular linkage
20Malawi has with the Republic". Why the South African 
aid alone should have a "very high present value 
component" is by no means made clear.
Table VI on the next page gives figures of South 
African loans to Malawi over the years 1964 to 1984. As 
can be seen, Malawi received loans from South Africa only 
in 1968, 1972, 1979 and 1983 worth K50.2 million. Sparks 
gets the $700 million figure by recalculating the K50.2 
million into what it would amount to in the present 
value. This is simply misleading. The 1979 figure in the 
Table includes a loan of K1.87 million (roughly £935,00) 
with a 3 per cent interest and K642,000 (roughly £321,000) 
with 2 per cent interest. These two loans are what can 
properly be called aid. The others are regarded as aid by 
the Malawi Government only in the sense that they were 
badly needed funds which only South Africa willingly 
offered. Otherwise, they were the most expensive loans 
which Malawi obtained then. The interest on some of them 
was as high as 8 per cent which was one of the highest 
even on a commercial loan by the standards of 1968. 
Sparks ignores all this whereas he ought actually to 
recalculate what the high interest rates of the loans
TA
BL
E 
VI
TABLE VI
South African Loons to Malawi In Million Of Kwachat
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
-  23.5  -  - - 8. 4 - - - - -  -  13.3  -  -  5.0
Sourcei Republic of Malawi 1 The Appropriation Acoounts Revenue Statements and other
Public Accounts for the Year ended 31at March, 1983. Government Printer, Zomba, 
Malawi, I984, Page 148.
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would mean today in keeping with the prevailing conviction
that high interest and short repayment period reduces the
. . 21value of aid to a recipient country.
As stated earlier, Table VI shows mostly what is
called loans to Malawi; that is South African loans to
Malawi. These add up to a quite a substantial figure
which needs to be interpreted with care if one is to avoid
creating a misleading impression. For example, Sparks
claims that in 1980, these loans accounted for "27 per
22cent of all the bilateral loans made to Malawi." This 
is misleading in that it overlooks cancelled debts to 
Malawi by Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and to some extent Britain. Otherwise, these 
constitute a very small percentage of all the bilateral 
aid, let alone all the foreign aid to Malawi.
In short, South Africa has not been an important 
source of aid for Malawi. This is simply because, as 
everyone knows, South Africa is not, strictly speaking, an 
aid donor.
Perhaps the most misinterpreted South African loans 
to Malawi are the 1968 (K11.44 million) and 1972 (K8.36
million) loans. By the 1968 standards, each of these 
carried a high interest rate of 4 per cent. On the basis 
of these two loans, South Africa is often said to have 
financed the construction of the country's new capital in 
the central part of the country. "Lilongwe, the new
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Capital City", claimed an article in a magazine on Africa,
"was built with South African money, and development aid
23
has continued to flow into Malawi", a view more or less 
held by Meredith who says:
"The South Africans were duly grateful, providing him 
(the Malawi leader) with finance for the construction
of a new capital city at Lilongwe and an additional
24rail link to the coast in Mozambique."
Gwendolen Carter also made the same point, saying:
"While other sources of international financing 
provided unwilling to underwrite the costs of building 
Lilongwe, a new capital, in the centre of Malawi...he 
(the Malawi leader) willingly accepted South African 
financing (though on strictly business basis) and 
construction. Economic ties then forged have been 
continued."
Such views exaggerate the importance of the two loans.
It is, indeed, the two loans which made it possible for 
Malawi to move its capital from Zomba, the capital inher­
ited from the colonial past, to a new site near Lilongwe.
The loans were used on the production of a structure plan 
for the new capital, construction of some roads at the new 
site for the capital, and the building of some office 
blocks, stages which are indeed appreciated and often 
acknowledged by the Malawi Government as having been crucial to
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making the move of the capital possible. However this is 
not the same as saying that South Africa financed the 
construction of the new capital. The project involved a 
host of other projects which were not financed with 
South African loans. Perhaps Kydd's letter to the 
Economist explained the funding of the project better. 
It read:
"Sir, Your correspondent writes (April 13th) that 
South Africa underwrote the costs of Malawi's new 
capital, Lilongwe. This is a myth which anti-South 
African commentators repeat as often as supporters of 
the South African regime, much to the satisfaction of 
the latter.
"South African aid over 1969-72 financed the 
construction of a second rail link to the coast, the 
structure plan for the capital city and some of 
Lilongwe's initial roads and public buildings. Most 
of the construction took place over 1971-1981, and 
almost none of it during this time was South African 
financed.
'The expensive water and electricity infrastructure 
was financed by multilateral development agencies, 
and bilateral agencies were also involved. The 
creation of the commercial infrastructure was mainly 
implemented by local companies in which the Government 
was usually a shareholder, but which were required to
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raise the bulk of their finance in private markets.
Some of this was from Euro-currency market but a
surprisingly high proportion was domestically
financed. In the 1970S/ Malawi displayed a very high
savings rate for such a poor country, peaking at 21%
of G.D.P. in 1978. During 1973-78 between 59% and
2 670% of investment was domestically financed".
Recipient Of British Aid
As a recipient of British foreign aid, Malawi has 
similarly been a subject of some misconceptions. One of 
them has it that Britain accords "exceptional treatment" 
to Malawi. What this means is by no means made clear. 
Perhaps it means that Malawi is the largest recipient of 
British foreign aid or that Britain is the largest donor 
of foreign aid to Malawi. For example, Morton argues:
"But so far as the role of aid in development is
concerned, one of the major factors making Malawi a
special case was the exceptional, if not unique,
treatment it received from Britain. At the same
time, it has received substantial inflows of foreign
aid, most notably from Britain. Indeed aid receipts
from Britain have exceeded Malawi's aid from all
other sources, and in the initial years financed
27roughly half all government spending";
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a point which was also made by Bryan Roberts who said:
"We will have received by the end of this year
something like £50 million in aid over the last five
years from overseas governments. By the end of 1970,
the total will be £60 million. Of that, no less than
£50 million will have been provided by one country
2 8alone - Great Britain4'.
Taken at face value, this is indeed the impression 
which figures for British aid to Malawi give. The figures 
for British foreign aid to Malawi in Table III indeed show 
Britain as the largest aid donor to Malawi.
However, the United Kingdom figures include a large
element of technical aid which consists of funds kept and
spent in Britain as training fellowships for Malawians and
as supplementary salaries for British Nationals recruited
29to work for the Malawi Government. This is quite
substantial. For example Hewitt and Kydd wrote:
"Some 55% of the total U.K. aid programme worth £13 
million annually is now supplied in the form of 
manpower support and the U.K. has consistently 
devoted at least half of its aid to technical 
assistance since independence although the programme 
has become increasingly focused and less random gap 
filling nature".^
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The United Kingdom figures also include commercial 
loans which amounted to £12.3 million in 1972. The 
figures for the other donors such as West Germany, Canada, 
and Denmark do not include commercial loans and contain a 
very minimal element of technical aid. Therefore the 
real British concessionary transfers to Malawi are thus 
lower than what Table III shows.
Moreover, a comparison with other recipients of
British foreign aid in Africa tells a different story.
Nothing comes up which might even be construed as an
exceptional or "unique" treatment of Malawi by Britain.
For example Table VII on the next page lists a number of
recipients of British foreign aid. With the exception of
Pakistan, the recipients are the Commonwealth countries in
Africa and Asia. As can be seen from it, India and Kenya
are really the major recipients of British foreign aid.
The figures for Malawi are even below those of Pakistan.
Malawi's position is low even in per capita terms. For
example, Jones shows that it is Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho,
and Swaziland which are, in fact, the countries which are
the largest per capita recipients of British foreign 
31aid. Malawi has indeed received considerable amounts 
of aid from Britain. However, the country has not been an 
"exceptionally treated recipient of British aid."
Perhaps the most misinterpreted British aid to Malawi 
was the British budgetary aid which Malawi used to receive 
during the years 1964 to 1973. This is part of the United
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TABLE VII
scwe i i E c i m r r s  ok  n r m s i t  ro itL icr a id ;  r :  t  m , l i o n s
1964 1965 1966 1967 196? 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1075 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1084 19«5
Botswana 11.9 6.7 10.7 8.4 7.0 8.4 9.3 8.5 8 .0 10.4 16.9 2 0 .6 16.6 13.2 15.1 1 2 .6 7.9
Cembia 2.45 3.90 2.34 2.44 2 .2 2 1 .0 1.4 3.1 2.3 277 3-4 3.1 5.8 7.0 5.1 5.3 5.0 6 .0 3.6 4.9 4.0
India 94.60 75.83 09.44 74.20 81.5 107.5 157.0 139.6 1 2 1 .0 176.5 157.2 197.5 139.4 2 2 8 .2 325.3 2 0 0 .2 341.8 °4.9 193.6 lnr: .8 1 3 8 .0
Kenya 47.96 53.26 31.14 20.61 25.8 2 6 .6 23.9 61.1 2 8 .2 32.5 2 1 .0 38.1 2 2 .6 48.5 56.3 49.3 74.6 56.3 4 6 .0 47.2 40.5
Lesotho 8.9 1 .6 7.4 7.3 4.6 5.9 8.7 3.8 3.8 1 0 .0 14.1 16.0 2 5 .0 25.0 7.1 7.0 3.0
UaJawi 30.22 30.43 24.66 23.07 17.2 18.5 24.5 20.5 16.9 1 8 .9 23.8 24.0 21.5 22.5 37.4 29.3 30.3 26.3 1 8 .1 17.0 16.5
Taldotlan 2 0 .0 1 20.26 24.04 27.22 2 6 .8 25.5 20.1 30.7 1 0 .8 20.3 14.6 3 8 .8 45.1 34.° 5 8 .8 51.8 49.9 32.8 25.2 M.l 21.5
Sierra Le6ne 5-52 2 .6 8 3.30 2.Or .3 2.2 ' . 0 1 .0 1 .2 1 .6 3-1 2 .6 (..A °.o 2 .0 8 .0 i'.O 3.7 4.7
S-l Lanka 1.38 0.49 6.58 1 1 .0 2 1 0 .9 10.9 14.5 9.2 5.1 3.6 6 .0 9.9 7.0 16.0 3 0 .0 76.4 53.3 58.0 44.7 30.5 14.3
Sudan 3.30 4.56 4 .2 6 1.76 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.7 3.5 6 .8 13.9 8 .8 1 3 .6 29-5 5 0 .8 6 6 .4 6 8 .7 4 8 .8 36.4 M.8
Swaziland 10.5 5.4 3.6 10.9 8.4 8.3 7.6 3.7 15.7 13.1 13.8 lO.o °.4 6.4 4.5 3.7 2.7
Tanzania 24.6?. 17.77 11.75 2.75 4.2 4.9 5.2 4. 3 3.7 3.5 9-0 10.4 11.7 19.8 46.5 74.5 56.0 41.2 4 3.Q 29.7 23.0
Uganda 16.81 13-22 12.14 13.24 9.7 11.9 o.8 25.0 4.4 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.8 2.2 4.7 6.7 30.7 18.6 9.3 9.5 1 0 .4
Zambia 20.56 12.07 26.75 40.13 13.6 6.2 13.2 10.5 21.6 19.6 22.0 16.9 19.4 25.6 6 0 .8 44.2 38.7 22.5 21.1 20.1 23.9
nom-roi O.E.C.K nrrnrt on niunt.-i] ritipnrlal linn* to t»ir dav»jnn|iir> counlrlen.
These figures were compiled from O.E.C.D. Annual Reports 1965-1986 inclusive.
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Kingdom figures in Table II and IV and amounted to £7.2
million in 1964. Less and less of it was drawn by Malawi
until 1973 during which Malawi stopped to draw it all
together. The aid is said to have played a developmental
role and its acceptance by Malawi is said to be evidence
for Malawi's alleged neo-colonialist status. Both those
interpretations of the aid were made by Kathryn Morton who
32examined British aid to Malawi in terms of dependence.
They are really a misinterpretation of the aid.
Morton made the developmental role interpretation
after comparing what has happened in Malawi with the aid, with
what might have happened in Malawi without the aid. She
justified the consideration of the latter possibility on
the ground that Malawi's lack of strategic importance to
the great powers and attraction to foreign investment
would have made it very difficult, if not well nigh
impossible, for the aid to come from sources other than
the country's former colonial power. At the end of the
exercise, she argued that the maintenance of a modern
administrative machinery for which the aid was used was
crucial to the economic development which had taken place
in Malawi. Thus, she placed the budgetary aid into the
33same category with developmental aid.
Morton made her allegation that Malawi has 
neo-colonial status on two grounds. The first was that 
Malawi was in 1964 the first newly independent former 
British colony to receive budgetary aid which in the past
258
used to be given only to territories, or people, still 
under British colonial control. The second was that 
Britain, to be specific, the O.D.M., scrutinized Malawi’s 
annual national budgets prior to granting the required 
amounts of the aid. The argument was that the right of 
scrutiny exercised by O.D.M. constituted an inroad into 
Malawi's sovereignty.
These arguments are probably among the most precise 
and persuasive arguments for the dependency theory. They 
are, in fact, an attempt to provide irrefutable evidence 
for the contention that foreign aid establishes a 
dependence relationship. On their basis, Morton could 
list as neo-colonialist states a host of other countries
including Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland which also
. . . 34received British budgetary aid for a number of years.
These days the list would include Ghana, Liberia, and
Uganda which are said lately to be receiving British 
35budgetary aid.
The argument need not be accepted, however. To begin 
with, the developmental role interpretation is based on a 
fallacy. The argument that the existence of a modern 
administrative machinery is a pre-condition for economic 
development is fallacious. It is like saying that the 
possession of guns by private individuals is a 
pre-condition for the crime of murder in a society. That 
is not necessarily the case in real life. The national 
bureaucracy, or civil service, like the gun, is a neutral
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instrument which is maintained for a variety of purposes. 
Economic development is, indeed, one such purpose. The 
budgetary aid was used to maintain the national adminis­
trative machinery. That in itself was an important 
function. However, for the national administrative 
machinery to undertake development activities it must be 
directed to do so. Otherwise, there can be no economic 
development regardless of its existence.
Economic development is a product of a consciously 
formulated and implemented policy. For it to take place, 
a government must be conscious of the need for develop­
ment. For example, the budgetary aid was used on the 
support for an administrative machinery which was more or 
less inherited from the colonial past during which a 
greater part of the country was hardly developed. That 
the bureaucracy has played a developmental role during the 
independence period of the country is due not to the mere 
fact of its existence but to the fact that is has been 
directed to undertake development activities. Therefore, 
it is incorrect to attribute a developmental role to the 
budgetary aid.
Further, the neo-colonialist status interpretation is 
implausible if the aid is placed into its historical 
context. Malawi began to receive the budgetary aid at the 
time that its Civil Service was dominated by British 
expatriate officers whose salaries were supplemented by 
the O.D.A. These were the ones who drafted the country's
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annual national budgets. It made no difference that the 
budgets were each year scrutinized by the officials at the 
O.D.A. in London. Therefore, the argument about the 
erosion of Malawi's sovereignty did not arise at that time.
Furthermore, these interpretations are at odds with 
the attitude which the British and the Malawi Governments 
had towards the aid. Both Governments were anxious to 
have the aid phased out. Such an attitude raises several 
questions if Morton's interpretations are accepted. Why, 
one might ask, were both Governments anxious to phase out 
the aid if it also played a developmental role and why was 
the British Government anxious to phase it out if it were 
a leverage over Malawi? Morton's explanation of this 
attitude of both Governments was in terms of Malawi's 
dislike for the humiliating neo-colonialist status and 
Britain’s dislike for its interference in Malawian 
affairs. This not only inadequately explained the 
attitude but also begged further questions. For example, 
why did Britain not simply give up its right to scrutinize 
the Malawi national budget in say 1967, 1968 or 1969 if
it, indeed, felt that it did not like its interference in 
the Malawian affairs?
Finally, the O.D.A. scrutiny of the budget was part 
and parcel of the arrangement for the budgetary aid to 
Malawi. So long as Malawi had prior consent to it, the
O.D.A. scrutiny exercise did not constitute an inroad into 
Malawi's sovereignty. In other words, this question is
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similar to the one in international politics about how 
states can be sovereign at the same time that they are 
subject to international law. Similarly Morton's argument 
is about how Malawi could be sovereign at the same time 
that its national budget was subject to O.D.A. scrutiny. 
The answer is that so long as Malawi freely consented in
the first place to the O.D.A. scrutiny of its national 
budget, Malawi's sovereignty was not eroded or impaired.
The Root of the Deficit Problem
The budgetary aid was actually part of the arrange­
ment for ending colonial rule in Malawi. This was because 
Malawi's recurrent account deficit problem had its root
deep in the country's colonial history. Therefore, a 
brief account of the country's colonial history is
necessary for a correct understanding of the budgetary aid.
The reasons for British colonization of the country
which was called Nyasaland in the colonial era are still
shrouded in controversies. The popular point, popular in
the sense that it is expounded by many writers, is that
Britain never wanted to colonize the country. Britain
instead, is said to have colonized the country by
accident. "British colonization of Nyasaland", Griff-
Jones wrote, "was done at the time that the desire to rule
3 6more foreign lands was not fashionable in Britain".
This point was first made by Duff, almost a mere decade 
after the British colonization of Nyasaland. He wrote:
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"In assuming direct control over Nyasaland, the
Imperial Government was primarily influenced not by
considerations of mere territorial aggrandizement or
political expediency but by a simple determination to
protect, at all reasonable cost, the right of the
handful of British subjects who had been the first to
37attempt its development".
It is true that the passage does not exclude colonial 
motives; that is " territorial aggrandizement, or 
political expediency". However, it is clear that emphasis 
in it is on humanitarian considerations; that is the 
protection of the work in the country of a "handful of 
British subjects" who included missionaries and traders.
As the country's independence approached, the
emphasis on humanitarian motives, shifted to mere accident
of history. "The birth of Nyasaland", Jones also argued,
"depended not on these human endeavours but on the flukes
3 8and uncomfortable quirk of history", a point which has
been emulated by Short saying:
"By a quirk of colonial history, Nyasaland had been
carved out of Africa by the Great Powers in such a
fashion that its southern half protruded deep into
39Portugal's East African Province of Mozambique".
Robinson and Gallagher elaborate the point, saying
that the British colonization of Nyasaland was the result
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of local circumstances such as tribal wars and the Arab 
40slave trade.
So the British colonization of Nyasaland is said to 
have been an accident which arose out of local circums­
tances. This view is supported with evidence from 
Whitehall official records. In addition, both Duff and 
Jones served in the country’s colonial Civil Service. 
Therefore, they had an inside knowledge of the country's 
colonial history. This also adds force to their argument.
Though forceful, the argument raises two problems. 
The first is how to explain the opposition from a number 
of local Chiefs to British colonial rule when it was 
established in the country. For example, Johnston, who 
actually accomplished the colonization of the country, had 
to carry out what he called pacification campaigns in 
several parts of the country. Therefore, if Robinson and 
Gallagher ar© correct in saying that colonial rule came 
to the country because of Arab slave trade and tribal 
wars, why did a number of local chiefs some of whom were 
victims of slave trade or tribal wars, oppose the colonial 
rule? Why did they not simply welcome it?
The other problem is how to define the entity called, 
"Britain". What is Britain? Is it the British Government 
or the British public? If it is the former, Jones and 
Robinson are probably correct. The Whitehall official 
sources, at least as cited by Jones, point to British
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Government reluctance to colonize the country. If it is 
the latter or both, Jones, Robinson, and others are simply 
wrong. In his book, Maaomero. Landeg White makes it clear 
that the major nationalities in Britain, the English and
the Scots, were both involved in the colonization of
41
Nyasaland. This is a major departure from past practice 
whereby the advent of British rule to the country was 
attributed only to Scotland in recognition of the efforts 
of a handful of Scottish missionaries who saved the country 
from being swallowed up by the Portuguese and the Germans 
in East Africa.
Whatever Jones, Duff, and others say, the man who 
started the scheme, Dr. David Livingstone, clearly had 
colonial motives in mind. His description of the country 
meant, to all intents and purposes, British colonization. 
For example, a young English visitor to Malawi had this to 
say:
"I was rather disappointed. It seems there wasn't
just the missionary in him. He discovered the country
and the way he described it was not how beautiful it
was but how good it would be for growing cotton,
42
tobacco, and keeping sheep.”
Livingstone's description of the country clearly 
meant European settlement, since the local people 
knew very little of such activities then. In any case. 
Livingstone's motives about the country are now known.
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"....but what I can tell to none but such as you, in 
whom I have confidence, is this, I hope it may result 
in an English colony in the healthy high lands of 
Central Africa".4'*
The letter was written at the outset of his Zambezi 
expedition in 1841 which was financed by the Foreign 
Office. The expression in the passage, "it may result 
in", refers to the expedition. Therefore, Livingstone was 
going to look for a suitable country for English 
colonization in South Central Africa.
The sequence of the events was as follows: 
Livingstone reached on 17th September, 1859, the part of 
Africa between latitude 9 45' and 17 16' south of the
Equator. Part of this is what is today Malawi. In 
response to his appeal about this country which appears 
now to have been the part of Africa which impressed him 
most, a number of Universities in England and Ireland set 
up a body called, the Universities Mission to Central 
Africa (U.M.C.A. )j ostensibly to evangelize the people of 
Central Africa. Financed by the Foreign Office and guided 
by Livingstone himself, the Mission led by Bishop Charles 
Fredrick Mackenzie from York, settled at a place in what 
is today Malawi, known as Maaomero. in 1861.
The Maaomero settlement was abandoned a year later 
for a number of reasons which need not be mentioned here. 
The point is that for years, this settlement was referred
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to in passing in many scholarly works on Malawi simply as 
the abortive U.M.C.A. settlement at "Magomero". White's 
book, Maaomero. corrects this impression and explains the 
connections which were there between it and the subsequent 
successful Scottish missionary and traders' settlements in 
the country.
The first Scottish Missionary body from the Free
Church of Scotland arrived in the country in 1875. This 
was followed a year later by that of the Established 
Church of Scotland which called its settlement, Blantyre 
in memory of Livingstone's birth place in Glasgow. The 
latter was later joined by two Scottish traders, John and 
Fredrick Moir. These Christian and Trade Missions were 
undertaken in memory of Livingstone who died while 
exploring the area in 1875. The people involved in these 
Missionary and Trading bodies were those who influenced
the British government, through the public in Scotland, to 
take a direct interest in the country which was then
facing threats from the Portuguese and the Germans in East 
Africa. Without their efforts, Malawi would have been 
colonized by the Germans and the Portuguese.
The efforts of these missionaries and traders 
culminated in the declaration in 1891 of a British
Protectorate called British Central Africa, which was 
renamed Nyasaland Protectorate in 1903. The funds for 
this scheme came from Cecil Rhodes who also funded the 
country's colonial administration for a number of years.
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The author of Maaomero summarizes the history of the
period as: "conceived by Missionaries and delivered by
. . . 44Cecil Rhodes was British Central Africa born". It is
true that this was colonization of the country by a 
handful of British missionaries and traders. However/ it 
was British colonization of the country all the same.
What has the foregoing to do with the recurrent 
account deficit problem? The answer is: it is the root of 
the problem. Jones and the others quoted earlier, though 
wrong about the reasons for the British colonization of 
the country, point to the root of the problem. This was 
the difference in opinion about the country between the 
British Government and a portion of British public. The 
former was not keen to fund the administration of the 
country and had to be persuaded by the British Central 
Africa Administration in 1898 to take over from Cecil
Rhodes the financial responsibility for the administration 
of the Protectorate. Therefore, the root of the problem 
was the British Government's reluctant involvement which 
coupled with the lack of valuable minerals in the country 
for exploitation meant that the country could not count on 
investment from abroad and that its economic development 
would have to depend on agriculture. The result was,
indeed, a very slow economic progress and a seemingly
interminable dependence on Imperial subsidy.
The problem would not have been all that bad had 
thought been given to the potential of African agriculture
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right from the start. This is because Malawi actually has 
a good climate, annual rainfall, and fertile soil and is 
capable of supporting a reasonably large national 
bureaucracy. However, the logic of colonialism obviously
prevented that. For example, the growing of tobacco by
45
Africans began by accident in the early 1920s. Yet the 
development of African agriculture was the only way by 
which the need for Imperial subsidy could have swiftly been 
brought to an end.
Development of African agriculture began to receive 
some government's attention only after the end of the first 
world war during which there was, in Britain, a more 
liberal attitude towards the colonies. For example, cotton 
began to be grown by the Africans in the early 192 0s under 
Government supervision. This was followed by the African 
grown tobacco which began to receive Government's attention 
in the late 1920s. Progress was a first steady and picked 
up again after the interruption of the second world war. 
This development was a promising solution to the deficit 
problem since acquisition of some purchasing power by more 
and more Africans created a potentially large tax base.
However, the British Government, which was itself 
grappling with its own postwar economic problems, 
insisted on financial self-sufficiency for each colony. In 
accordance with this new policy, it decided to solve the 
Nyasaland recurrent account deficit problem by forcing the
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European settlers in its two other nearby colonial
territories, generously endowed with valuable minerals, to
accept the country's inclusion into their federal scheme
for South-Central Africa in 1949. The paradox of it all
was that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as the
scheme eventually came to be called, was imposed on the
Africans of the country at the time that the few European
settlers in the country felt confident that the country
was, on its own, making quite encouraging economic
46progress.
Opinion still differs on whether the now defunct 
Federation promoted economic development in Malawi. The 
country's Africans believe that the scheme retarded the 
country's economic progress, a position which is amply 
supported by the Federal economic statistics. On the 
other hand, some country's expatriate community believes 
the opposite. For example, David T.Williams argues that 
there would have been economic growth during the period 
were it not for the advent of what he calls "politically 
inspired downswing" a notion which by implication
attributes the lack of economic development to the African
. . . 47opposition to the Federation. This is based on a
paper written by David Humphrey which, among other things, 
computed figures indicating what economic growth might 
have occurred in the country during the Federation. 
Apparently, the point is that economic growth would have 
occurred if the Africans accepted the Federal scheme. The 
White settlers manipulation of the scheme for their
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benefit in Southern Rhodesia is hardly given any attention. 
Whatever might have occurred, the Federation indisputably 
aggravated the country's recurrent account deficit problem 
because it destroyed most of the country's indirect tax 
base through the removal of import duties on the Southern 
Rhodesian goods.
The deficit problem assumed political importance when
the Africans stepped up their demands for independence. In
response to African demands for independence, white
settlers in Central and Southern Africa began to present
the deficit problem as evidence that the country was
inherently poor or seriously deficient in natural
endowment. The problem, however, had actually to do with
the nature of British colonization of the country. "No
doubt", Mayson wrote, for example, "the newspapers tend to
regard Malawi as unimportant country congenitally poor and
48
unlikely ever to become self-supporting."
The issue later came to be the grounds on which the 
white settlers in Central and Southern Africa fiercely 
opposed the country's independence. The argument was that 
the country was too poor to be on its own. Malawi's 
President recalled their arguments in 1966:
"When we became independent on July 6, 1964, noone, 
friend or foe, expected us to survive politically and 
economically. Our enemies wrote us off completely; 
and there were those of our enemies who sniggered at
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the very idea of a country, then Nyasaland, as an
49independent sovereign state.”
The provision of the British budgetary aid to the country 
was how the problem was solved.
In short, the budgetary aid was to the British
Government something which they had to honour. The aid 
was to the Malawi Government a reminder of the struggle
for independence. Its phasing out in 1973 was, to the
Malawi Government, a vindication of the African demand for 
the country's independence. This is why both Governments 
were anxious to phase it out. In other words, Morton 
misinterprets what was in itself a part of the very 
mechanism for ending colonial rule to be evidence of
neo-colonialism.
Conclusion
Malawi's foreign and domestic policies are said to 
have had the effect of making Malawi attractive to donor 
countries and organizations. For example, Malawi is often 
presented as the "favourite son" of donor countries and 
organizations, as the largest per capita recipient of aid 
in Africa, as a regular recipient of aid from South 
Africa, and as a "uniquely treated" recipient of British 
aid. In other words, the country's allegedly foreign aid 
oriented foreign and domestic policies are said to have 
achieved their objective •
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However, such views are sheer misconceptions about 
Malawi. It is true that Malawi has over the years 
received substantial amounts of aid particularly from the 
World Bank, West Germany, and several other Western 
donors. However, no ground exists on which Malawi can 
objectively be said to be the largest per capita recipient 
of aid in Africa or the "favourite son" of donor countries 
and organizations.
As has been pointed out in this discussion, Malawi 
received nearly $1,785.74 of aid from 1964 to 1985. For a 
country which used to have a national budget of less than a 
million dollars during its colonial days, this is quite 
substantial indeed. However, the figure is less than what 
Sudan received in 1985 alone or less than what Zaire 
received in three years (1978, 1979, and 1980). Moreover, 
this figure is the sum of amounts of aid which the country 
received from only a handful of donors. Those who regard 
Malawi as a "neo-colonialist state" on the grounds that it 
is the largest per capita recipient of aid or the 
favourite recipient of aid from many donors are simply 
mistaken.
It is probable that Malawi's foreign and domestic 
policies have been received very well by donor countries 
and organizations. However, this is not proof that the 
policies were adopted for foreign aid reasons. Such an 
impact, if any, has been incidental to the objectives of 
these policies.
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Chapter Five 
The Alleged Role of Foreign Experts 
Introduction
The last chapter examined the effects which Malawi's 
foreign and domestic policies apparently have had on donor 
countries and organizations. This chapter looks at the 
effects which foreign aid# particularly technical aid, is 
said to have had on Malawi. To this end, attention is 
centred on the argument that foreign experts, particularly 
the British expatriate officers, have been de facto 
decision-makers of the country.^
Often no clear evidence is offered for the foregoing 
argument. For example, some of the evidence for it 
appears to be the mere presence of foreign experts in the 
country's civil service and the positions which they hold 
in it. Apparently the point is that because these foreign 
experts hold, or have held, senior positions in the 
country's civil service they must have decided on policy 
for the country. Therefore, the discussion in this 
chapter is concerned mainly with the implicit evidence for 
the argument that foreign experts have been de facto 
decision makers in Malawi.
The discussion is in three parts. The first part is 
the consideration of the presence and the positions of
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foreign experts, including those from South Africa, in 
Malawi's civil service. The second part is the con­
sideration of the bureaucracy in relation to decision 
making. This assumption is crucial to the argument under 
consideration because the expatriates, not being the 
elected officials of the country, can be thought to have 
influenced decisions in Malawi only as bureaucrats or 
civil servants. Finally, the third part is the 
consideration of some suggestions of how the bureaucrats 
are said to exercise influence on decision making.
The Presence of Expatriates
Part of the evidence for the argument that the
expatriates were, or have been de facto decision-makers in
Malawi is apparently the mere presence of foreign experts
in the country's civil service. This is construed as
itself proof that the localization of the country's civil
service is incomplete. Apparently localization should
mean complete replacement of foreign experts in the
country's civil service. Almost any statistics showing
the contrary is seen as evidence of uncompleted
localization of the country's civil service. "Even after
more than two decades of independence and availability of
educated Malawians", Keith Sommerville reported, "many
important civil service positions, particularly in the
Ministries such as those of Justice and Finance are still
2held by the British expatriates". "Some 550 expatriates
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most of them British"/ Edward Girardet also wrote, "still
3hold positions in the government".
This is the belief among many writers. Miller, an
American expert who worked in Malawi claimed that "many of
the British expatriates would remain in Malawi as long as
the President pursued his present policy of staffing 
4
 ." * Gordenker similarly wrote that "a contingent of
British colonial servants expected to stay in Malawi for
5considerable time". Morton also argued that Malawi's 
localization policy had made the Malawi Government 
"somewhat slow in formulating detailed manpower plans
 ".** In other words, the Malawi civil service would
remain unlocalized.
The foregoing means that the other former British 
colonial territories in Africa performed differently. 
Apparently, they quickly dispensed with the British 
expatriates as soon as they became independent. "In other 
countries, most of the expatriates serving in the civil 
service did so as advisers on fixed-term contract 
service", wrote Gordenker who want on to say:
"Moreover expatriate officials came from countries
7
other than the former colonial country".
The other countries which Gordenker referred to are 
Tanzania and Zambia. Apparently these two were among 
those former British colonial territories which swiftly
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dispensed with the British expatriates as soon as they 
attained independence.
The foreign experts who are in Malawi/ apparently 
include those from South Africa. These are also talked 
about as if they are still working in the Malawi civil 
service. "Official South African Personnel"/ says Sparks, 
"have been seconded or otherwise loaned to various Malawi 
Government and parastatal organizations including the 
Department of Information, the Post Office, Malawi 
Broadcasting Company, Department of Planning, the office 
of Tourism, the Capital City, the Development Corporation,
118the Medical Office, and the Dog Trainers.
The expressions, "have been seconded" and "otherwise 
loaned to", create the impression that the South African 
experts are still working in the Malawi Government today. 
This may be disputed as a misinterpretation of Spark's 
literary style. However, Mwakasungura made the same point 
and explicitly stated:
"The South Africans have remained in Malawi ever
9
since and have dug in rather deeply".
In short, part of the evidence for the argument under 
consideration is that Malawi, unlike other former British 
colonial territories has up to now not only retained most 
of the former British colonial civil servants but also 
employed and retained, in its civil service, experts from
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South Africa. Their mere presence in the civil service is 
apparently proof that they decide for the country.
The question about foreign experts in Malawi is 
largely the question about the British expatriates. 
Therefore more attention will have to centre on them in 
this chapter. For the moment, the less important or 
significant question about the presence of South African 
experts in the Malawi civil service will be briefly dealt 
with first.
The claim that some experts from South Africa are 
still working in the Malawi civil service is simply not 
true. The Police dog trainers whom Sparks refers to were 
in Malawi only for a short while. This was because the 
Police dog training programme was not an ongoing one. It 
was a short duration training programme and the experts 
returned to South Africa soon after the programme. In 
addition, terms like, "Office of Tourism", "Medical 
Office", and "Malawi Broadcasting Company" are even 
inaccurate. There are no such offices nor such a company in 
Malawi. The correct terms are, the Department of Tourism, 
Ministry of Health, and Malawi Broadcasting Corporation 
(M.B.C.) in none of which, incidentally, has a South 
African official ever served.
This may appear as an obsession with the accuracy of 
details, but the distortions which these details create is 
amazing. They create a misleading picture of South
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African experts as still running important offices in 
Malawi. For example, the term, "Department of Planning" 
gives the impression that some South African experts still 
serve in one of the highest policy making institutions in 
Malawi. Yet there is no South African expert who is 
serving in such an institution in Malawi. For example, 
planning in Malawi is decentralized so that the country 
has a town and country planning, agricultural planning, 
health planning, manpower planning, and educational 
planning units, to mention a few. To avoid a misleading 
impression, one has to specify the unit in which a foreign 
expert works.
The largest planning unit of the country is the 
Department of Economic Planning and Development. This was 
created in 1986 out of two separate development planning 
units, the Economic Planning Division (E.P.D.) and the 
Development Division in none of which had a South African 
expert ever served. The only Department which was headed 
by a South African expert was the Department of 
Information, now Department of Media and Public Affairs. 
This was from 1970 to the end of 1972. Since then the 
Department has been headed by a local officer.
The South African experts were in Malawi's civil 
service only for a brief period. They numbered 22 in all 
during the heyday of their presence in Malawi and came to 
Malawi largely in connection with two projects: Nacala
Railway Project and Capital City Projects. The former
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project was financed with a loan from South Africa while 
the start of the latter project was made possible by some 
loans which were also from South Africa. Most of them 
left Malawi soon after the completion of the Nacala 
Project and of the first phase of the Capital City Project 
during the early 1970s.
With regard to the British expatriates, one has to 
make an important distinction between them and foreign 
experts. The mere presence of foreign experts is 
construed as evidence that the localization of the
country's civil service is still incomplete because of 
failure to make this important distinction. It is true 
that in common usage in Malawi, the term "expatriate", is 
used in reference to almost every foreign expert. 
However, for serious purposes, the distinction is
important. The term "expatriate", reflects something 
which has to do with the country's history.
The term "expatriates", refers to British nationals, 
especially those of European origin. These number about 
8,000 according to the country's 1977 census. Other 
British nationals in Malawi include those of Asian 
origin. These number about 11,000, according to the
country's 1977 national census, and dominate the country's
commerce. However, the term, "expatriate", is used mostly 
in reference to the other group of British nationals. 
These others are simply referred to as Asians.
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The British expatriates as defined here fall into two 
groups. The first group is made up of businessmen, estate 
owners, company managers, and Christian missionaries. 
Many of them came to Malawi during the colonial days with 
the intention of settling in the country.1® Others
included those who came after the country became 
independent to establish, or run, commercial companies. 
The other group is made up of administrators, professio­
nals, and technicians many of whom were recruited as young 
graduates to work in the territory's colonial Government 
on a permanent basis. Some of them decided to leave the 
country prior to the country's independence while others 
decided to stay on after the country attained
independence. Still others in this group included those 
who were recruited after the country became independent to 
work for the Malawi civil service and statutory bodies. 
The term "expatriate", refers, strictly speaking, only to 
those British nationals in both groups who worked in the
country before independence and decided to stay on after
independence.
On the other hand, foreign experts are those people 
from various countries who are seconded to the Malawi 
Government by donor countries and organizations. These 
have no connection with the country's past history and are 
recruited for their special skills to work for the Malawi 
Government for a specified period, usually, 36 months. 
Common practice has it that these are also expatriates.
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As already stated, this is all right so long as it is a 
matter of common practice.
Of relevance to the discussion here are those British 
nationals who worked in the Nyasaland Government and 
decided to stay on to work for the Malawi Government. 
These were the expatriate civil servants in the early days 
of the country's independence. They were not recruited by 
the Malawi Government for their special skills although 
many of them had such skills to warrant calling them 
experts. Many of them held important and responsible 
positions in the country's civil service for the simple 
reason that independence found them in such positions. In 
other words, the expatriates were retained to provide a 
smooth transition from the colonial bureaucracy, called 
the Secretariat, to the Malawi civil service.
i
Most of these expatriate civil servants are no longer 
in Malawi now because they retired from the country's 
civil service by the beginning of 1970s. The expatriates 
who are referred to by Keith Sommerville and the others 
are, strictly speaking, British experts or foreign 
experts. These have nothing to do with the problem of 
Africanization of the country's civil service.
Further, the problem of Africanization had nothing to 
do with the mere presence of foreign experts in the 
country. Africanization, or localization, had to do with 
the important positions which the expatriates as defined
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here occupied in the country's civil service especially 
soon after the country's attainment of independence.
The term "Africanization", reflects the fact that 
colonialism in most parts of Africa was Western European. 
One of its concrete manifestations was the European 
domination of the colonial bureaucracies. This was the 
case, at least in East, Central, and Southern Africa. It 
was definitely the case in Malawi where attempts were made 
at direct rule, no doubt, in keeping with Livingstone's 
dream of establishing an English colony in that part of 
Africa.11 Although lack of European settlers was 
responsible for the failure of the direct rule scheme, all 
the same, Europeans dominated the territory's bureaucracy, 
particularly its upper echelons. The Africans were 
allowed to serve only in the lower echelons of the 
bureaucracy.
The country's colonial bureaucracy was divided into A 
and B sections. Section A consisted of all the important 
posts. These included executive and technical posts, and 
officers who held them were known variously as customs 
officer or laboratory technician. This was at the lowest 
strata of the section. The senior posts in the section 
began with those of administrative and professional posts 
and officers who held them were known as assistant 
secretary or medical officer. The most famous of them was 
the District Commissioner (D.C.) in charge of a district 
in the country. The top posts of the section were those
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of director such as the Director of Agriculture or the 
Director of "Native" Education. The topmost post in the 
section was that of Chief Secretary. A handful of African 
graduates were given some posts in this section, 
particularly the post of Assistant District Commissioner 
(A.D.C.), but the Africans were by and large confined to 
section B of the bureaucracy.
Section B consisted of mainly minor posts such as 
clerical officer, assistant motor mechanic, assistant 
laboratory technician, or agricultural instructor. The 
well known posts were messengers, drivers, cooks, and copy 
typists. Senior posts included Senior Clerk or Chief 
Clerical Officer, or Senior Laboratory Technician. These 
had to be earned after years of service. The section had 
no head and existed largely to provide supportive services 
to section A.
The foregoing is a rough description of the Nyasaland 
colonial bureaucracy. Some of the details mentioned may 
be inaccurate, but the overall picture is correct. It 
illustrates, at least, how the Africans were simply 
excluded from the country's colonial bureaucracy. There­
fore, the Africanization problem which arose when the 
country attained independence was that of how the Africans 
could best take up the senior posts in the country's 
national bureaucracy. This was the Africanization 
problem. It was not about the mere presence of foreign 
experts in the country's civil service, but about the
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domination of the senior posts of the service by the 
expatriates.
Furthermore, the figures about the expatriates are 
quoted in a misleading manner. The 550, or 620, figure is 
indeed quite significant if seen on its own. However, the 
figure pales into insignificance if it is placed in its 
proper context. The Malawi civil service, excluding the
Police and the Army, stood at 30,787 strong in 1979.
Clearly the 620 figure is nothing in relation to the 
overall size of the civil service. It is more so since 
not all the foreign experts work in the civil service. 
Some work in the statutory bodies such as the University 
of Malawi, M.D.C., and ADMARC. The total number of those 
working in the civil service proper is pretty much smaller 
than the 620 figure. Therefore, their mere presence is 
not evidence that Africanization of the country's civil 
service is still incomplete.
Finally, the impression, or claim, that it was only 
Malawi which continued to employ former British colonial 
civil servants after the country became independent is
simply false. Indeed, the puzzle is the basis on which 
some observers such as Gordenker came to have such
impression about Malawi. For any civil servant is by 
definition an adviser to the government. Table VIII on
the next page shows some statistics for British 
expatriates in East, Central, and Southern, Africa. As can 
be seen from it, Zambia had the largest number of
an
gUTISH EXTATRIATES IN EASTERN AND SOITTHKRN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
BOTSWANA 237 •255 200 ]i01 294 327 287 396 446 379 470 479 504 356
KENYA 1563 1716 1468 1441 1563 1376 1167 1400. ' 1215 IO83 940 897 767 639 712 668 549 435
LESOTHO 90 83 63 74 94 84 68 57 67 63 98 93 82 70
MALAWI 916 668 693 937 916 890 890 836 776 710 663 696 578 493 636 579 542 434
UGANIA 1214 1253 1275 1211 1214 1236 1244 IO64 551 253 93 - - - - - - -
SWAZILAND 154 174 174 192 198 167 163 175 176 157 204 191 190 155
TANZANIA 543 774 922 749 543 250 105 27 8 50 81 50 47 40 77 101 82 . 66
ZAMBIA 3268 1972 2683 3182 _3288 2948 3049 2831 1941 1814 1530 1251 1176 1008 1108 1014 985 793
SOURCE: British Aid Statistics, Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) I 964 to 1983.
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expatriates followed by Kenya and Uganda. Malawi was 
fourth. For example, Gordenker covered Malawi, Zambia, 
and Tanzania in his study. How he came to the conclusion 
that even Zambia did not employ British expatriates after 
it attained independence is by no means clear. With 
Tanzania, it is understandable because, as it can be seen 
from the Table, that country did not have many British 
expatriates.
As can also be seen from the Table, Zambia throughout 
the 1960's had on average no less than 2,000 British 
expatriates. Can it seriously be taken that all of them 
were employed exclusively as advisers in Gordenker's 
sense? This number is too large for Gordenker's claim to 
be correct. He is probably wrong on this point as well. 
This is most probable because quite contrary to 
Gordenker's arguments, these expatriates were retained on 
the same three-year contract terms in all these countries 
and their salaries and pensions were supplemented in one 
form and another by the British Government. There is no 
record that the British Government supplemented the salary 
or salaries of those expatriates who were retained 
exclusively as advisers to the Government of these 
countries.
On the more general question of Africanization, the 
Table shows that Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi were 
the countries which really faced the problem of 
Africanization in acute form. Barring the distinction
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between foreign expert and expatriate, the figures show 
that Africanization was slow in all the four countries in 
the 1960's but rapid in the 1970's. The 1970's was the 
decade of Africanization in all the four countries. The 
number of expatriates began to decline in most of these 
countries and Uganda is obviously the country which 
achieved the most spectacular, indeed drastic, 
Africanization, if it can be properly called so.
This demonstrates the importance of making the 
distinction between British expatriates and British 
experts. The figures for Zambia, for example, show a drop 
from 3,268 in 1964 to 1,972 in 1965 and a rise almost by 
the same number to 3,182 in 1967. They remained steady 
until 1971 when they started to decline again. The most 
spectacular figures, in this case, are those for 
Botswana. Botswana started independence with only 237 
British expatriates working in its civil service. Then 
on, the numbers kept increasing until 1980 when they 
reached a record high of 504. This does not mean that the 
civil service in Zambia and Botswana became less and less 
Africanized over the years. The increase in numbers has 
to do with development activities which necessitated the 
recruitment of British experts.
The figures for Malawi similarly show a strange 
pattern. The figures dropped by about 200 in 1965 and 
were up again in 1967 almost by the same number after 
which they remained steady until 1972 after which they
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began to decline steadily. The drop reflects the pace of 
Africanization which continued until the beginning of the 
1970s when the number of expatriates became insignificant. 
However, the decline of the expatriates was more than 
compensated for by the arrival of the newly recruited 
British nationals to work mainly in the development 
projects.
That the increase in numbers in the Table after 1966
was due to development activities is borne out by the fact
that 1967 and 1968 were the years when Malawi began the
implementation of some of its large development projects.
^hese included the start of the construction of the
lakeshore road project, the start of the move of the
capital, the Lilongwe Land Development Project, the Lower
Shire Valley Development Project, and Salima Lakeshore
Development Project. The last three projects were the
first large integrated rural development projects
12elsewhere in the developing world. The World Bank
funded the first two projects while the Federal Republic 
of Germany funded the third one. Each of these projects 
involved, among other things, heavy intake of foreign
technical personnel. These coupled with the expansion of 
secondary and tertiary education which also took place
more or less at the same time accounted for the increase 
in the figures for 1967 and 1968 and for the fact that 
these figures remained steady after 1968 up to 1972. So 
while more expatriates were leaving the civil service, 
more British nationals were at the same time arriving to
296
join the country's civil service. The figures for 
Botswana which has experienced the fastest economic growth 
in the region can similarly be accounted for.
In short, the mere presence of foreign experts is 
construed as evidence that foreign experts still dominate 
the country's civil service. This, in turn, is used as 
evidence for the claim that foreign experts have been de 
facto decision-makers in Malawi. Such a claim is false. 
Foreign experts ceased to dominate the country's civil 
service over a decade ago. Those who are still in the 
service occupy technical posts. Most of the senior posts 
in the service have been in the hands of local officers
for well over a decade. The exception has been the
Ministry of Works which indeed still has an expatriate as 
its principal secretary.
The Posts Held Bv Expatriates
The evidence for the argument under consideration is 
that the expatriates have been holding senior positions in 
the country's civil service. Apparently, the point is 
that because they have been holding such positions, the 
expatriates must have been de facto decision-makers of the 
country. This touches on the much bigger question
concerning the role of bureaucracy in decision-making
which will be considered later.
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For the moment, the point of concern is the claim
that the expatriates still hold senior positions in the
country's civil service. "In fact, in 1983", Hewitt and
Kydd wrote, "there are a total of 600 expatriates in
middle and high-level positions of whom half were British
13supplemented personnel". "In 1984", Tony Tembo echoed
them, "there were 620 expatriates in the middle and
. . 14high-level positions of whom half were British". "One of 
the three, Malawi, the smallest in area and the most
densely populated continued to employ British civil
servants in the most senior line positions and
. . . 15professional posts of its civil service", said
Gordenker who years later is echoed by Elliot Morss. 
"Recognising that it cannot effectively manage such a 
number of projects", says Morss, "Malawi allows
expatriates to take line positions in government at all 
levels".1  ^ The expression, "line positions", means 
management or policy positions. So the point in all these 
statements is that the expatriates still occupy policy
making positions in Malawi's civil service.
Apparently the foreign experts who held the most
important positions in Malawi's civil service were those
from South Africa. "Further, the few positions that the
South Africans hold", says Sparks, "are key, and are
.....  from which the course of Malawi's future policies
17are shaped". This statement is almost a word for word
18quotation from McMaster's book. The expressions, "are 
key" and "from which the course of Malawi's future
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policies are shaped" are self-explanatory. Indeed 
Mwakasungura goes so far as to claim that the Malawi
President "recruited a racist propagandist from South
. . . h19Africa as his Minister of Information.
So the popular claim is that the expatriates hold 
senior posts in the country's civil service "from which 
the course of Malawi's future policies are shaped". 
Apparently the point is that because they hold such 
positions, they must be deciding on policy for the country.
To begin with, the claim that the positions which the 
South African experts hold are senior positions in Malawi 
is simply a myth. The most important positions in the 
Malawi civil service are those of Principal Secretaries, 
or Permanent Secretaries as they were originally titled. 
These are the equivalent of Permanent Under-Secretaries in 
White Hall. All except one were localized over a decade 
ago. Before that, these posts were held by the British 
expatriates. The highest ranking South African expert in 
the Malawi civil service was Dan Van der Spuy who was the 
Director of the Department of Information for three 
years. He was in this case two ranks below that of 
Principal Secretary because in between the Director of 
Department and the Principal Secretary of a Ministry, 
there is the Deputy Secretary.
It is true that the general-managerships of M.D.C. 
and Air Malawi which two South African experts held are
299
important posts. It is also true that the M.D.C. is an 
important statutory body in the area of industrial 
development. However, as a statutory body the M.D.C. does 
not formulate the country's industrial development 
policy. The latter is the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry. In short, the claim that the posts 
which the South African experts held in Malawi "are key" 
and from which the course of Malawi's future policies
are shaped is a myth which was started by McMaster and is 
now perpetuated by Sparks.
Further, some of the foreign experts do not hold 
"middle and high level positions". Many have been 
technical officers which occupy quite junior ranks. In fact, 
the 620 figure mentioned by Tony Tembo includes British, 
American, Canadian, and Japanese volunteers workers such 
as members of the British Volunteers Service Overseas 
(V.S.O), Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(J.I.C.A), American Peace Corps, and the Canadian 
University Service Overseas (C.U.S.O.). Most of these 
take up teaching posts in teacher training colleges and 
secondary schools. The number of foreign experts in 
middle positions to say nothing of high level ones is 
actually smaller than the 620 figure.
In 1980/81, the Malawi civil service had a total of 
1053 super scale posts or "middle and high-level posts". 
If Tony Tembo were correct in saying that all the 620 
foreign experts were in the middle and high-level posts,
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local officers would then hold only 433 or less than half 
of the middle and high-level posts. This is obviously 
incorrect because it would mean that the foreign experts 
would be seen running more than half of the Government 
Ministries and Departments, if that were indeed the case. 
That is simply not the case at Malawi's Capital Hill 
(Centre of Government Offices).
Finally, that the domination of the Malawi civil 
service by the expatriates came to an end years ago is, 
perhaps, better explained by Colin Baker's article written 
as far back as 1972. Baker, himself an expatriate in 
charge of the localization (Africanization) training 
programme of the country's civil service wrote:
"At the beginning of 1972, out of a total of 158,
20only 25 officers or 15 per cent were expatriates".
Baker is here referring to senior officers in the 
country's civil service. He went on:
"The Administrative Service of Malawi is now 85 per
cent Africanized; and this figure is likely to
increase significantly. The number of departures of
expatriates was greater during 1971 than during any
other year since independence and there are signs
21that this will be maintained during 1972".
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How is the disparity between Baker's figures and argument 
on the one hand, and the figures and arguments quoted 
earlier by Girardet, Hewitt and Kydd, and Tony Tembo on 
the other, to be explained? The answer is simple. In the 
first place, Baker is concerned with expatriates and
not with foreign experts. The latter did not matter as 
far as the problem of Africanization was concerned. No 
doubt Malawi will continue almost indefinitely to recruit 
foreign experts to work in its civil service. However, 
that will not mean re-emergence of the Africanization 
problem because such experts will not dominate the 
country's civil service in the same way that the 
expatriates did.
In the second place, Baker is concerned with senior 
posts in the country's civil service. These include 
administrative officer, under-secretary, deputy secretary, 
principal secretary or permanent secretary as it was 
called originally. He is also concerned with senior 
professional posts such as chief medical officer, chief 
education officer, chief information officer, and chief 
geologist to mention a few because the occupants of such 
posts, though basically professionals, are involved in 
policy implementation. He is concerned with these senior 
posts because almost all of them were indeed occupied by 
the British expatriates during the early days of the 
country's independence.
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On the other hand, Baker is not concerned with the 
basic professional and technical posts such as technical 
officer, medical officer, project manager, surveyor, 
geologist, architect and economist, some of which posts 
are occupied by foreign experts. It is true that these 
are middle level sort of posts, but their occupants are 
not involved in policy matters. In fact, the gist of 
Baker's article is a denial of the arguments, some of 
which were quoted earlier, that Africanization was, or has 
been, slow in Malawi. Contrary to Morton's argument, the 
article makes it clear that the localization training 
programme began prior to Malawi's independence and went on 
uninterrupted.
The current situation with regard to the civil 
service is as follows. All except two principal 
secretaryship posts were Africanized or localized by the 
turn of the 1970's. The exceptions were the Chief Justice 
post which was localized in 1985 and the Principal 
Secretary post in the Ministry of Works and Supplies. The 
latter has three senior professional officers, the Chief 
Mechanical Engineer, the Chief Building Designer, and the 
Chief Civil Engineer, all of which were localized in 
1987. In between the Principal Secretary and these senior 
professional officers are Deputy Secretary and 
Under-Secretary both of which were localized over a decade 
ago.
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As Africanization was about replacing expatriates in 
such posts by local officers, the Ministry of Works and 
Supplies was the only section of the country's bureaucracy 
which has indeed taken very long to be localized. 
Sommerville must have had the Chief Justice in mind when 
he made the claim that expatriates still hold senior posts 
in the Ministry of Justice. In that case, he was 
referring to the Judicial Department which is separate 
from the Ministry of Justice. The latter is headed by the 
Attorney-General and Secretary for Justice who since the 
1970 s has been a local lawyer. However, even with regard 
to the Judiciary Department, Sommerville's claim is 
misleading. It is true that the Chief Justice was an 
expatriate at the time that he made the claim. However, 
all the judges in the magistrate courts and the senior 
judges in the High Court of Malawi were local lawyers by 
then. Moreover, the Chief Justice himself retired in 1985 
and has been replaced by a local lawyer since then. In 
short, localization of the country's civil service ceased 
to be an issue over a decade ago.
Bureaucracy In Policy Making
While no longer in senior positions now, the 
expatriates did, indeed, dominate the country's civil 
service during the early years of the country's 
independence. They occupied almost all the senior 
positions in the civil service soon after the country 
attained independence. The question then arises: did
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they not decide on policy for the country at least during 
the early days of the countryfs independence?
The strength of the argument of those who say that
they did lies in the assumption that bureaucrats, and not
the elected officials, are the ones who really make
decisions for a country. So if bureaucrats decide on
policy in every country, did the expatriates do the same in
Malawi? Is there no evidence that they did this in Malawi?
Some writers think that they did. "Bryan Roberts, for
example, until his retirement in 1972," Hodder Williams
wrote, "was, as Secretary to the President, a closer
adviser to Dr. Banda and exercised a wide range of
22
arbitrary powers delegated to him."
The claim raises three questions as far as the 
thinking in foreign policy analysis is concerned. The 
first is the question of whether the bureaucrats are indeed 
important in decision-making. The second question is 
whether Malawi has a bureaucracy and the third is whether 
the bureaucrats of a country like Malawi are indeed 
important in decision-making. To scholars of the history 
of African nationalism, the second is simply nonsense, but 
to scholars of foreign policy analysis, it is an important 
question. Each of the three questions is controversial in 
foreign policy analysis.
With regard to the first question, opinion still 
differs among the experts in foreign policy analysis.
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Graham Allison is one of those scholars who believe in the 
importance of bureaucracy in decision-making. One of his 
conceptual models for analyzing foreign policy issues
called the governmental policies model, drew attention to
. 23
the importance of bureaucracy m  decision-making. Since 
then, the question of whether the bureaucrats are the ones 
who really make policy for a country is still important in 
foreign policy analysis. The argument that the expatriates 
have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi is a case in 
point.
Allison's governmental politics model attracted many
critics. Krasner thought that Allison attached undue
importance to bureaucracy in decision-making while Lawrence
Freedman thought that Allison took a narrow view of 
24
politics. "The point," Brian White concluded after
analyzing the views of yet another critic of Allison's 
model, "is that Allison's models disaggregate governments
in ways that seem, on reflection, both arbitrary and
25
culture-bound." These are some of the criticisms
against Allison's conceptual models. Essentially they say
that bureaucracy is not important in decision-making.
Despite the criticisms, Allison's conceptual models,
especially in a combined sense of two of his models
called, governmental politics model and organizational
process model, remain influential in foreign policy 
26
analysis. The argument is not so much that decisions
are the outcome of a "pulling and hauling game," but 
that the bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in
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governments. "Recipient government/" Gordenker attested/
"retains all powers of final decisions, but in practice
they take in advice profered by the international 
27personnel."
The latest study which reflects this view about the
importance of bureaucracy in decision-making is a book
2 8edited by Scilla Maclean. This contains articles on 
nuclear weapons states which include the United States, 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. Almost each 
article is evidence that nuclear weapons decisions in each 
of these big states are made by the bureaucrats. For 
example, a paragraph in the postscript section of the book 
reads:
"The sixth theme which recurs in these chapters is 
the power of the permanent bureaucracies. The 
development lifespan of a nuclear delivery system and 
its warheads is now fifteen or twenty years: because
of the extreme sophistication of its components, 
dogged coordination is necessary through the 
feasibility studies, evaluation, prototype building, 
testing and production stages. These stages are in 
the hands of permanent bureaucracies, while 
government ministers in Western nations, are usually 
in office for a period of no more than two or three 
years; the pressures on them to maintain consistency 
with their predecessors4 decisions are very great. 
Since technology is so complex, the formal decision
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taken in cabinet or politburo depends, to a large
extent, on the options presented by their permanent
secretariats. The parameters of these options do not
normally include consideration of alternative defence
policies. Fundamental question of the assumptions do
29not normally form part of the debate."
To critics, this book no doubt raises the question 
of demarcation between policy and implementation. For 
example, one might ask if policy is also about whether 
China should be armed with a particular system of nuclear 
weapons. If a decision is taken that a country should be 
armed with nuclear weapons, does the question about 
different weapons systems not fall within policy 
implementation? In other words, critics might say that 
the book deals with issues, not of policy making, but of 
policy implementation. Nonetheless, the book clearly 
demonstrates a continued interest among scholars in the 
role of bureaucracy in decision-making.
Thus, there is a difference of opinion among scholars 
on whether bureaucracy is important in decision making. 
Critics such as Krasner, White and Freedman, to mention a 
few, do not believe that bureaucracy is important in 
decision making while Allison and the contributors to 
Maclean's book believe that bureaucracy is important in 
decision making. This means that the argument that the 
expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers 
in Malawi rests on an assumption which is itself
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controversial. No one as yet knows for certain that 
bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in governments.
With regard to the second question, opinion also
differs among the experts in the foreign policy analysis.
The existence of bureaucracy in countries like Malawi is
doubted, if not disputed, by some foreign policy
analysts. "A low degree of institutionalization,
characteristic of many third world states," Joel Migdal
wrote, for example, "is often associated with political 
30instability." This portrays bureaucracy in new states 
as being almost nonexistent. It is a bureaucracy which is 
nascent, or in its infancy, or at a rudimentary stage. 
Accordingly Migdal suggested:
"Because the bureaucracy of the third world states is
not as complex, autonomous, and coherent as in the
world's powers and superpowers, researchers of
foreign policy making in these states would do best
31to focus directly on the top leadership."
This means that the argument that the expatriates were, or 
have been, de facto decision-makers of Malawi is simply 
wrong or at least implausible. As a nascent bureaucracy 
which is not "coherent and autonomous," the expatriates 
could not have played such a role.
However, one can legitimately raise the question: 
has Malawi no bureaucracy or is the Malawi bureaucracy
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indeed nascent and incoherent? A response from Africa
rejects this view held by Migdal and others concerning
bureaucracy in African states. "I disagree with such
arguments," Olajide Aluko wrote, "given the contemporary
situation in Africa in general and in Nigeria in
particular," inadvertently implying that bureaucracies
32have just sprung up in Africa. However, Aluko is by
and large expressing a view which is held by many scholars
of the history of African nationalism. "All the powers,"
Thomas Hodgkin wrote, "have carried a good deal further
the process of equipping their territories with the
panopoly of modern states - infrastructure as the French
term it: internal and international airlines, road
networks; telephone systems; urban electricity schemes;
and the like," an argument which implies at least the
existence of bureaucracies in all the former European
33colonies in Africa. This reads like evidence of the 
existence of bureaucracy in African countries. For there 
must be a body of local as well as foreign experts looking 
after such an infrastructure.
The quotation in the foregoing paragraph covers 
things which are available in Malawi. There are indeed 
roads, telephones, telexes, hospitals, schools and 
colleges, and research centres all of which need the 
services of the bureaucrats. Robert Rotberg described the 
country's bureaucracy as it was almost a hundred years ago 
as follows:
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"In Nyasaland, the growth of a central government was 
rapid. An accountant joined Johnston in 1892; by 1986 
a small secretariat has been established in Zomba, the 
Protectorate's Capital that Johnston had artificially 
created. An embryo judicial department was begun in 
the same year. A principal medical officer was 
appointed: a superintendent of public works, a
superintendent of road making and a first surveyor all
34
had their departments."
Obviously Migdal would regard this as evidence of a nascent 
and incoherent bureaucracy in Malawi. However, one has to 
bear in mind that this was the beginning of the bureaucracy 
some ninety years ago. Now it is much bigger and more 
complex. For example, excluding the police and the army, 
it stood at 44,622 in 1981. This was almost three times as 
large as the United Nations bureaucracy at its headquarters 
in New York. This seems by any standard to be a bureau­
cracy. Views implying the non-existence of bureaucracy in 
new states like those of Midgal raise quite puzzling 
issues. Probably they are a sad regression on a subject 
long trodden by scholars of African nationalism like 
Hodgkin and Rotberg.
However puzzling they may be, the views are 
evidence of doubts among the foreign policy analysis 
experts about the existence of a bureaucracy in a 
country like Malawi. This means that the argument 
that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto 
decision-makers in Malawi is based on an assumption which
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is also controversial. For example, it is not easy to 
tell whether the Malawi civil service, though larger and 
more complex than the United Nations bureaucracy in New 
York, is a bureaucracy in the sense understood by experts 
like Migdal.
Finally, with regard to the third question, opinion 
also differs among the experts in the field of foreign 
policy analysis. Aluko believes not only in the
existence of abureaucracy in African states but also in the 
importance of bureaucracy in the policy making of African 
states. He wrote:
"So it is the main thesis of this chapter to assert
that in foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria the
bureaucrats have played a more critical role than any
other individual or organization in the country since 
35independence."
The chapter referred to in the quotation is the article
which he contributed to the book which he helped to edit.
Some scholars in foreign policy analysis like Aluko 
do not doubt the existence of bureaucracy in African 
states. However, unlike the African foreign policy
analyst, such scholars do not believe that the bureaucracy 
is important in decision-making in African states. 
Perhaps this is not surprising since Allison himself 
warned that he did not expect his model to be applicable to the
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less industrialized states. "If we begin with those 
factors likely to be less prominent in the policies of new 
states than in the countries like Britain, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union," Christopher Hill wrote, "it
takes little sophistication to see that bureaucracy will be
3 6among the first of them." "As in most African states," 
James Mayall also wrote, "the political system is highly 
personalized, foreign policy in particular being regarded 
as a special preserve of the head of state."37 The
existence of bureaucracy in new states like Malawi, is here 
accepted. What is doubted in the role of the bureaucracy 
in decision-making.
In short, although the existence of the Malawi 
bureaucracy is accepted, some scholars do not believe that 
it has been important in the decision-making of the 
country. So the argument that the expatriates have been de 
facto decision-makers in Malawi also rests on another 
assumption which is itself controversial. Bureaucracy in 
African states is believed to be simply unimportant in 
decision-making.
In conclusion, the assumption which underlies the 
argument that because the expatriates occupied senior 
positions in the country's civil service they are important 
in the decision-making process, raises three questions, 
each of which is controversial, at least in foreign 
policy analysis. This means that the validity of the 
argument under consideration is questionable. If the 
Malawi bureaucracy is nascent, incoherent, and less
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important in the country's policy making, then it is 
incorrect to claim that the expatriates decided on policy 
just because they occupied senior positions in the 
country's civil service. In other words, the claim 
touches on a bigger issue which is controversial at the 
moment.
Instruments Of Decision-Making
To say that the expatriates were, or have been, de
facto decision— makers in Malawi because they occupied
important positions in the country's civil service is one
thing. It is another thing all together to tell exactly
how the expatriates really played the alleged de facto
decision-making role in Malawi. Many of those who make
this argument often offer no convincing explanation. They
just make the claim. To the extent that the President
"has relied upon the loyalty and support of his expatriate
civil servants both for his efficient administration of
government departments and to enforce the comprehensive
security measures with which he buttressed his position,"
McMaster suggested, for example, "their views must be
considered a relevant factor in the President's
3 8calculations." How exactly one might do so is often 
left unsaid.
However, Gordenker suggested how one might go about
assessing how foreign experts play their alleged de facto 
decision making role in the aid recipient countries. "To
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make recommendations about the organization of an education
system, to arm a minister of transport with arguments for
extending a road network that competes for capital funds
with a weapons seeking defense ministry, to urge population
control on people who for the first time in the memory of
the oldest man enjoy a reasonably good health," he wrote,
. . 39"is to become involved in politics." It is true that
this is part of Gordenker's argument that the work of
international organizations touches on "delicate national
40issues in less developed countries." However, the
argument is a good hint on how one might go about 
assessing how the expatriates played their alleged de 
facto decision making role in Malawi.
According to the foregoing suggestion foreign experts 
exercise influence on the decision-making of a less 
developed country like Malawi in three ways. These are, 
"to make recommendations," "to arm a minister with 
arguments" and "to urge population control."* Gordenker 
calls the first, a "specialized report." The second 
suggestion refers obviously to policy speeches or 
statements while the third refers to policy making and 
implementation. The latter is often contained in a 
memorandum.
Both the specialized report and the memorandum 
contain recommendations, but the memorandum differs from 
the specialized report in that it is briefer and usually 
contains fewer recommendations, three at the maximum while
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the specialized report is tens of pages thick and contains 
not only a host of recommendations but also a host of 
implementation measures. These three are what may be 
called instruments of decision-making, if one is neutral 
about them, or instruments with which bureaucrats, as 
Gordenker at least implies, influence decision-making in 
developing countries. These are the three ways, as 
suggested by Gordenker, by which one can assess the 
influence which the expatriates are said to have exercised 
in Malawi.
To the three, one would add verbal advice as a fourth 
instrument. In fact, Gordenker also mentions this. The 
point is that some decision makers do have advisers with 
whom they discuss matters in confidence. However, this 
will not receive further attention here for two reasons. 
The first is that there had been only one person who 
briefly served exclusively as an economic adviser in 
Malawi. Since his departure, his post was retitled, Chief 
Economist, who, to all intents and purposes, serves under 
Malawi's head of the Civil Service. In other words, 
Malawi hardly has had a Presidential adviser. The second 
reason is that because advisers are said to proffer advice 
verbally, a great deal can be claimed in the name of advisers, 
which cannot easily be ascertained. It is a device the 
use of which implies an absence of records. Therefore, 
the instruments which will receive further attention here 
are the specialized report, the policy speech, and the 
memorandum.
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The specialized report is produced by a variety of 
bodies. These sometimes include a single consultant or a 
group of consultants, sometimes a committee of officials 
or parliamentarians, and sometimes a review commission or 
commission of inquiry. The latter body sometimes presents 
its findings in the form of a declaration. By and large, 
consultants are hired to look into the feasibility of 
something like a manufacturing plant while the many other 
bodies referred to here are often set up to review, or to 
investigate a specific, usually, political situation.
For example, one of the famous works by commission or 
committees of inquiry is the Balfour Declaration which 
recommended the partition of the then British mandated 
territory of Palestine and is still one of the most 
important documents in the Middle East Conflict. However, 
Commissions and Committees of Enquiry have been rare since 
Malawi became independent. They are also often made up of 
non-bureaucrats. Therefore, attention will centre on the 
specialized report which has, indeed, been produced quite 
frequently for the consideration by the Malawi Government.
Speeches or statements are written for a variety of 
purposes. They are sometimes written for ceremonial 
occasions, or written as congratulatory or condolence 
messages. They are also sometimes written to express 
gratitude or thanks, to praise or appeal for help. Such 
speeches or statements do not enable the writer to 
exercise influence on policy because they really contain 
no policy issues. The speeches or statements which place
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the writer in a position to exercise influence are those 
that announce intention or commitment, restate intention 
and commitment, or defend intention and commitment. 
Writers of such speeches do, indeed, influence decisions 
because they contain the language with which policy is 
conveyed to the public. The moment a policy speech is 
endorsed by the decision-makers, the writer's ideas become 
policy. Therefore, policy speech writing is a potent 
instrument with which bureaucrats can influence policy 
making.
Policy formulation and implementation are conveyed to 
decision-makers in a variety of ways. They include a 
memorandum, a cabinet paper, a position paper, a back­
ground brief, or an official report. The memorandum is 
the most frequent of them all and can appropriately be 
used as a representative of them all. Like the speech, it 
is written for a variety of purposes. These include 
conveying information to decision —  makers, seeking 
clearance of something from decision makers, and 
recommending a particular course of action on something. 
Each of these purposes can lead to influence being 
exercised on policy by the bureaucrats. Moreover the type 
of information which is drawn to the attention of decision 
makers is largely a matter of choice by the bureaucrats. 
Therefore, the potency of the memorandum as an instrument 
with which bureaucrats can influence policy making is, in 
theory, very considerable.
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The use of each instrument is sometimes in isolation 
of the others. In some cases all the three are used at 
the same time. For example, the specialized report is 
almost always submitted with an accompanying memorandum
which may recommend against, or in favour of, the 
specialized report or a particular recommendation in the 
specialized report. The policy speech, too, is sometimes 
submitted with an explanatory memorandum. In other words, 
the memorandum is the basic instrument and, perhaps, the 
most potent of them all.
Gordenker observed the use of the three instruments 
in connection with three projects. These were Luangwa 
Project in Zambia, Wami-Pangani Valley Project in 
Tanzania, and Lower Shire Valley Project in Malawi. 
According to Gordenker, each of these projects involved 
initiating a request for consideration by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), compiling into a report 
results of an F.A.O.-sponsored survey of the area to be
covered by each project, and drafting a plan of operation 
for funding by the World Bank. International
personnel were involved in all the three stages so that 
what was implemented in the end was partly the product of 
the thinking of the international personnel and partly the 
thinking of the recipient government. Indeed Gordenker 
says that the UNDP Office in Lusaka was the one which
drafted the plan of operation for the Luangwa Project for 
funding by the Zambian Government and the U.N.D.P.
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The use of the three instruments may not be apparent 
from the foregoing account. However, a good deal of it 
must have taken place. For example, initiating a request 
must have involved the use of the memorandum to facilitate 
an exchange of views between the recipient government's 
civil servants and the international field personnel 
particularly members of the UNDP Resident Representative 
Office. When the request was drafted, the civil servants 
must have submitted it with a memorandum to the decision­
makers for consideration and approval. The approved 
version of the request was then submitted to the F.A.O. 
for consideration. This stage in the formulation of the 
project necessitated the recipient government to dispatch 
its minister of agriculture, who had to be "armed with 
argument", to Rome, the F.A.O. headquarters, to present 
and defend the request (actually application for financial 
assistance). The same process occurred in connection with 
the preparation of the plan of operation. So to determine 
the influence of the international personnel one simply 
has to find out if they were the ones who drafted the 
request or the plan of operation.
On paper this looks to be the most reliable and 
easiest way of assessing the influence of foreign experts 
on a recipient country. However, a closer examination 
shows that use of these instruments is fraught with 
shortcomings. One of them is the well known problem of 
the interaction of cause and effect. The others have to 
do with how and whether each instrument applied to
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Malawi. The former has to do with the assumption which
underlies Gordenker's suggestion; that is the assumption
that an endorsed recommendation, policy speech, or
specialized report is evidence that influence has been
exercised by a bureaucrat. "Evidence of such influence",
Gordenker wrote, "may be found in the manner in which
governments and their personnel react to recommendations
and policies emanating from international institutions and
to possibilities of achieving direct benefit in
42programmatic form". Similarly, to see whether the
expatriates made Malawi's domestic and foreign policies, 
one has simply to check how the Malawi decision-makers 
reacted to the recommendation, or draft speeches, made by 
the expatriates. If in so doing, one discovers that the 
Malawi decision—  makers simply endorsed recommendation 
after recommendation, or draft policy speech after draft 
policy speech submitted by the expatriates, one would 
then conclude that the expatriates made the country's 
domestic and foreign policies.
It follows from the foregoing that if one discovers 
that the expatriates wrote no policy speeches, one would 
conclude that the expatriates did not make the policies. 
This must be tempting to scholars of international 
politics in that it says, in effect, that the relative 
importance of an external factor to decision-making can be 
determined even in a post hoc situation. It is a view 
which rests on the seemingly solid, or sound, ground that 
a recommendation is by definition an input of a decision
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because it is made with the expectation that it would at 
least be considered by the decision makers.
However, the assumption raises two problems. The 
first is the stage at which decision making starts. For 
example, one can enquire whether decision is made only at 
the stage at which recommendation is considered by the 
decision-makers or at the stage at which a recommendation 
is first thought about? If it is at the latter stage, 
then the recommendation ceases to be an input. If it is 
at the former stage, then the recommendation is turned 
into an input of decision and anendorsed recommendation is 
almost by definition evidence that influence has been 
exercised by a bureaucrat, an interpretation which would 
probably be endorsed by Gordenker. However, this ties up 
with the second flaw in the assumption. By taking an 
endorsed recommendation as being evidence that a bureau­
crat has exercised influence, the contribution which the 
decision-makers may have made indirectly to the making of 
the recommendation itself is, thus, ultimately excluded 
from consideration.
The context of a recommendation is important. An 
endorsed recommendation would, indeed, be evidence that 
influence has been exercised by a bureaucrat only if each 
bureaucrat is independent of any rules and of the decision­
makers. However, bureaucrats operate within certain 
stipulated rules and regulations some of which give powers 
to the decision-makers. For example the power to appoint
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someone to a certain important post is a powerful weapon 
with which decision makers can control the bureaucrats. 
The implication of this is that the bureaucrats can not only 
be controlled but also conditioned to act according to 
the wishes of the decision makers. Bernard Brodie dealt 
with this point in detail. He wrote:
"Thus one outstanding characteristic of the bureau­
cratic mind is that it can take on, usually with no 
difficulty visible to the outsider, the entire set of 
attitudes favoured by the organization with which it 
identifies itself, including the biases and 
predispositions known to be held at the top. The 
good bureaucrat is rarely in conflict with his 
superiors on basic policies or related principles,
not simply because he is timid but because it comes 
naturally to him to absorb those policies and make 
them his own. Otherwise he would not choose that
kind of life, or having done so would look
desperately for alternatives. He wants to be 
known as, a good officer - foreign service, military 
or other - and this means "fitting in" with a set of 
concepts about which his training has left him in no 
doubt. As an individual, he may have considerable 
ability, and therefore be qualified to prepare for
his superiors position papers that often include 
shrewd operational advice. That advice, however, 
will nearly always be confined to the best tactics
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for carrying forward the policy that he knows to be 
the accepted one."
If we add to this mental quality the element of 
rewards and punishments, which vary from subtle to 
quite overt, another important dimension becomes 
operative. If, for example, the top command in the 
military wants high enemy body counts, then high body 
counts is what it will get, for commendations, 
decorations and promotions will come of fulfilling 
that desire and not otherwise. The same is likely to 
be true of all kinds of information. If the top 
command wants favourable and optimistic information, 
that is mostly what it will get.
"The degree to which it will be taken for granted
in such organizations may reach incredible lengths -
incredible, that is for those who retained some
detachment in their thinking. Thus when Hoopes and
others talk about the monitoring that Walter Rostow
was practising at the very top concerning items
reaching the desk of the President, they are talking
only about the last link in a long chain in which the
same process has operated over and over again. It
was upon such thoroughly doctored information,
generally optimistic and often quickly proved such by
events, that our entire Vietnam policy was based for
43at least the decade following 1961."
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This passage is only a part of Brodie's elaborate 
criticism against the view that bureaucrats are important 
in decision-making. Though not often recognized, it is, 
perhaps, the most incisive and devastating criticism 
against the bureaucratic politics model. Here it is
quoted because it also explains very well the extent to
which bureaucrats can indeed be conditioned or manipulated 
by the decision makers. For example, the selective
recommendations which President Johnston endorsed could on 
paper look indisputable evidence that Rostow exercised 
decisive influence on President Johnston while in actual 
fact they were evidence of President Johnston's influence 
on Rostow who, in the first place, made the recommendations 
with the President very much in his mind.
This point is inadvertently given supporting evidence
by Gordenker himself. For example, he wrote that the
Malawi Prime Minister did, in the end, sign a plan of
operation drafted by the F.A.O. personnel for the Lower
Shire Valley Project which was referred to earlier.
However, he also makes it clear that the F.A.O. drafted
the plan largely to meet the Prime Minister's wishes.
"The thin theoretical content of the approach used by the
Malawi Government", he wrote, for example, "formally had
little in common with the policies of the F.A.O. or the 
44I.B.R.D.". Thus, by overlooking the context in which a 
decision is made an endorsed recommendation can be 
mistaken as evidence that a bureaucrat has exercised
influence on decision-making.
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The second shortcoming has to do with application of 
each instrument to decision-making in Malawi. The
potency of the policy speech as an instrument for 
influencing decisions, to begin with, has limitations. 
One of them is that a policy speech is drafted only as and 
when it is required. This means that the initiative lies 
with the decision-maker. The other is that some guide­
lines are normally issued along which a policy speech has 
to be drafted. This limits the scope of the writer's 
initiative.
Civil servants in Malawi have, indeed, been drafting 
some policy speeches for delivery by the country's 
ministers. However, it is an established procedure in the 
country's civil service that any policy speech written has 
to be cleared with the President before delivery. This 
procedure has ensured that speeches are drafted in line 
with Government policy.
By and large, the President makes most of the policy 
speeches. Although he does so, the President has made 
most of the policy speeches without reading from written 
texts. For example the President addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly in October, 1964 without reading 
from a text. It is true that he has sometimes read a 
policy speech from a written text, but the text had been 
written by himself. In other words, the President has had 
no policy speech writer. He has been his own policy 
speech writer. Therefore, the drafting of the policy
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speech as an instrument with which to influence decision­
making was not available to the expatriates in Malawi.
With regard to the specialized report, certain limits 
of its potency as an instrument with which the expatriates 
might have influenced decision making in Malawi have also 
to be kept in mind. One of them is that the specialized 
report is normally on an issue on which the government, 
which invites those who produce it, (the consultants), has a 
special interest. The Government normally has an idea of 
what it wants to do on an issue on which it commissions a 
specialized study. The other limitation is that the 
consultants have to carry out a study within certain terms 
of reference defined by the host government or at least 
approved by the host government. The situation is worse 
if the host government also finances the study. The 
consultants, in that case, become temporary employees of 
the host government. It is true that this is not much of 
a problem since most of the specialized studies in 
developing countries are funded from external sources 
particularly the World Bank and the U.N.D.P. This indeed 
increases the independence of the consultants. However, 
the prospect of conducting another study in future 
dampens this spirit of independence.
As a general rule, any specialized report which 
recommends in favour of what the host government wishes to 
do stands a very good chance of being accepted and 
implemented while any specialized report which recommends
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against the wishes of the host government stands the risk 
of being ignored. The consultants influence on a decision 
is clearer if their negative recommendations, negative in 
the sense of being against the wishes of the host govern­
ment, are accepted and acted upon by the host government. 
Such situations are rare in that governments invite 
consultants on an issue on which they have set ideas. In 
fact, the consultants are often invited to tell, not 
whether something should be done, but how something is done 
or can best be done. In other words, the specialized 
report is largely an instrument of policy implementation.
Hypothetically it may be said that the specialized 
report instrument was available to the expatriates in a 
negative sense; that is, in the sense of using it as a 
cover for their unwillingness to implement Government 
decisions. For example, the expatriates were, indeed, the 
ones who drafted the terms of reference for a specialized 
study and possibly took advantage of this. They might have 
often recommended the conduct of a specialized study 
ostensibly for establishing the feasibility of what they 
were directed to do while in actual fact it was intended 
covertly to foil, or delay, the implementation of what the 
Government wanted to be done. It is possible they might 
have done that on several occasions. However, this is not 
entertained here because it is an allegation for which this 
thesis has no supporting evidence. On the contrary, the 
British expatriates left the country with a very good 
record of project implementation.
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In practice, the specialized report instrument was 
not available to the expatriates because as civil servants 
they were not appointed to constitute a consultants team. 
This is because the idea of inviting consultants from 
outside presupposes a lack of expertise on an issue in a 
country or government. This is not to say that Malawi has 
not hired any consultant from Britain. On the contrary, 
many of the consultants came from Britain. The point is 
that there was an important difference in terms of the 
availability of this instrument between the expatriates on 
one hand and the foreign experts on the other. The former 
were full time civil servants and could not be appointed 
or hired as consultants while the latter included the 
consultants. Therefore the specialized report as an 
instrument for influencing decision—  making was not 
available to the expatriates except possibly in the 
hypothetically negative sense described earlier.
With regard to foreign experts, the instrument was
available. Specialized reports which have been drawn to
the attention of the Malawi Government have been
numerous. One of them was a report produced by a United
Nations consultants' team which was invited to look into
45the industrial situation in the country. Among other 
things, this recommended the setting up of a development 
agency to act as an engine of industrial growth, a 
recommendation which was not only accepted but also 
implemented. This is how the M.D.C., which was referred 
to in third chapter, came into being.
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However, one should not say much about the potency of 
this instrument. If anything, the Malawian experience 
amply demonstrates the serious limits to its potency. By 
and large, the use of this instrument has been confined to 
the area of infrastructural development, particularlythe 
national roads construction programme. The provision of 
the new project appraisal techniques mentioned in the 
third chapter made it possible to have a feasibility study 
almost on every road construction project in the country. 
However, there is no evidence that it has been important 
in other areas.
In addition to being confined to the area of 
infrastructural development, the special study does not 
deal with policy questions. It does not ask whether
something should be done. That is a policy question. It 
asks that question only in an indirect way by recommending 
that something should not be done or demonstrating that 
something is not feasible. The question which the 
specialized study asks is how something which is wanted,
can be done or best be done. No doubt the many 
feasibility studies which the Malawi authorities have 
accepted and implemented have affected road design and 
construction in the country. However, they have not
affected the Malawi Government's commitment to 
infrastructural development. Almost all the planned new 
major roads in the country have now been constructed. In 
this regard the studies have contributed in no small
measure towards a successful implementation of the road
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development programme. In other words# specialized 
reports often do not influence policy but enhance policy 
implementation.
That the foreign experts did not usurp the decision­
making role in Malawi by means of specialized reporting is, 
perhaps, best demonstrated by the fate of some specialized 
reports which attempted to influence policy by recom­
mending against some of the Malawi Government's important 
decisions. The President has on several occasions told
the public that he was advised on economic grounds that
46certain projects should not be implemented. These
projects included the establishment of the University of
Malawi, the High Court of Malawi, and the Reserve Bank of
Malawi. These were said to be economically unviable.
However, all three have been successfully implemented and
are among the country's important institutions. To these
three have to be added the new capital city project and
the lakeshore road project. Opposition from foreign
experts to those two projects is public knowledge. For
example, the Hill Commission, which was sent by the O.D.A.
to Malawi, recommended, among other things, against the
47two projects. As a result progress on the
implementation of the two projects has been made in the 
teeth of donor opposition. Therefore, the President has 
not been a passive recipient of the specialized report.
Finally, the memorandum was indeed available to the 
expatriates because it is the most frequently used
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instrument of decision making. Almost nothing goes to the 
decision makers without an accompanying memorandum. 
However, its availability is not in itself enough. It all 
depends on whether the expatriates intended to use it for 
influencing decisions and succeeded in doing so.
The potency of this instrument is also limited. In 
the first place, the memorandum is a record of government 
business. It ensures that nothing takes place, or is done 
by the bureaucrats, without first of all being placed on 
record. This makes it possible for the decision-makers to 
check what the bureaucrats are doing. This in itself is a 
limitation on the ability of the civil servants to 
influence decisions. For example, decision-makers can 
call for an old memorandum to check the activities of a 
bureaucrat if they feel that a bureaucrat is doing 
something improper or funny. The possibility that one
might be checked in that way reduces the potency of the 
memorandum as an instrument for influencing decision­
makers .
Perhaps the second most important limitation is that 
the content of the memorandum is in itself a reflection 
upon the writer himself. One's written work, as is well 
known, is a reflection upon one's personality. This is 
particularly the case with memorandum writing because a 
recommendation is itself a revelation of one's feelings or 
attitude. As a result, decision-makers do easily know the 
feelings of their closest bureaucrats. It is true that
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bureaucrats can make one or two recommendations against 
government policy, and get away with them. However, the 
practice carries with it the risk of provoking a reaction 
from decision makers. If caught red-handed like that, 
the punishment could be loss of the decision-makers' 
confidence in the bureaucrat, closure to the bureaucrat of 
access to the decision-makers, a humiliating transfer of 
the bureaucrat from his favourite post to another post, 
demotion, premature retirement, or, in the extreme, 
dismissal. These are consequences all of which no 
bureaucrat would want to contemplate.
The technique of denying decision-makers alternative 
policy options in a memorandum probably works when the 
decision-makers have no interest in a subject and have, 
therefore, to rely on the initiative of the bureaucrat, or 
when the one-sided recommendations are always in line with 
government policy. All this means that the memorandum 
is a double-edged sword. It is also the very instrument 
with which decision makers do effectively control the 
bureaucracy.
That the expatriates did not usurp the decision­
making role in Malawi is perhaps demonstrated by the 
acknowledgement among some foreign policy analysts that the 
President has been the country's important decision­
maker. "In looking at the foreign policy making process 
in Malawi", Christopher Clapham argues, for example, "one 
is effectively looking at President Banda". This is a
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“personalized foreign policy" view which is popular among
48some foreign policy analysts. Although its validity 
is debatable in that it is arbitrarily used only in 
reference to foreign policies of African states, leaving 
out some of the French, American, and Soviet Union foreign 
policies which have been, or were, equally "personalized" 
such as at the time of Charles de Gaulle's Presidency in 
the case of France and Kissinger's Detente in the case of 
the United States, the view is in part a recognition that 
at least the President has been the country's decision 
maker. "All major decisions", argues McMaster "are either
initiated or approved by him, and fear of his legendary
. . . 49temper permeates the civil service".
That the expatriates did not succeed in reducing the 
Malawi authorities to mere passive recipients of official 
recommendations is also shown by the admiration and muted 
protest which the President's control of the civil service 
earned among some of the expatriates. "Dr. Banda", wrote 
Richardson, who served as Permanent Secretary for the 
country's Ministry of External Affairs, "possesses a sharp 
intelligence, an extra-ordinary memory, vast reserves of
energy for a man in his sixties, and capacity to make
. . 50decisions and enforce them". This is an admiration as
well as a recognition of the President's ability to make 
and enforce decisions by an expatriate who worked closely 
with the President. There are also statements of 
protests, displeasure or disapproval. "At the same time", 
Gordenker also wrote, "an observer could not overlook the
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paramount position of the President in all the matters of 
government expenditure and his willingness to put aside
reasoned bureaucratic papers in order to conduct personal
. . 51policies".
Gordenker's is a statement of disapproval by someone 
who was not among the expatriates. However, his views 
about the President's role in decision making are shared 
by some of the former expatriates or by some of the newly 
recruited British nationals who worked among the 
expatriates in the Malawi Government. Simon Thomas, who 
has been frequently referred to in the thesis and who 
worked in the country's civil service as a Government 
Economist, says, for example:
"While much detailed policy making has been left to 
the civil service, Banda has insisted upon laying 
down the overall framework and of making the final 
decisions even on the most trivial matters. Once 
made, decisions cannot be altered except by Banda 
himself, though attempts are sometimes made to 
reinterpret his decisions. When expert advice has 
clashed with Banda's own opinions, the advice is 
rejected and the expert vilified, and if from within 
the civil service often dismissed. To considerable 
extent Malawi's economic policies are those of Banda 
himself".52
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This passage is not a contradiction of the view that 
Thomas is one of those who attribute a de facto decision­
making role to the expatriates. Thomas inadvertently 
attributes a de facto decision - making role to the 
expatriates because of his mistaken belief that the 
Achikumbe scheme is the same as the former colonial 
"master farmer" scheme whereas he is in this passage 
consciously acknowledging that the President, and not the 
expatriates, has been the decision-maker of the country.
With such complaints by even some of the expatriates 
themselves, it is puzzling that the expatriates are at the 
same time portrayed as having been de facto decision­
makers of the country. If the President made decisions, 
or had been making decisions even on "the most trivial 
matters", it is hard to see how the expatriates at the 
same time could be de facto decision-makers of the 
country. This is why these complaints or statements of 
displeasure or disapproval are themselves taken here as 
evidence that the expatriates did not decide on policy in 
Malawi.
Conclusion
The argument that foreign experts, particularly the 
British expatriates, were, or have been, de facto decision 
makers in Malawi is based on three grounds. The first one 
is the presence of foreign experts in the country's civil 
service. This is construed as evidence that foreign
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experts still dominate Malawi's civil service. The second 
one are the posts which the foreign experts occupy in the 
country's civil service. These are said to be senior, or 
"line", positions. The point is that because they 
occupied such positions they must have decided on policy 
for the country. The third ground is the assumption that 
bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in every country.
However, it is simply a mistake to interpret the mere 
presence of foreign experts as evidence that they dominate 
the Malawi civil service. It was the British expatriates 
who indeed dominated the country's civil service during 
the early years of the country’s independence. Their 
domination of the service arose because independence found 
them already in such position and ended during the early 
1970 s. Therefore foreign experts no longer dominate the 
country's civil service.
Further, many foreign experts have not been holding 
senior positions. Only some of the British expatriates 
did indeed hold senior positions during the early years of 
the country's independence. They did so simply because 
independence found them already in those positions. The 
question of whether they decided on policy simply because 
they occupied such positions is a matter which raises the 
much bigger question of whether bureaucrats are the ones 
who really make decisions in any country.
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The views of the experts in the field of foreign 
policy analysis on this question are conflicting. Some of 
them say that bureaucrats are indeed important in decision 
making while others say the opposite. Still others do 
even doubt the existence of a bureaucracy in countries
like Malawi. By and large the experts in the field of 
foreign policy analysis do not think that bureaucracy is 
important in policy making in new states. For this
reason, some of them think that it has been the President 
who has dominated policy making in Malawi, a point which 
is indeed, supported by some expatriates who worked in 
Malawi's civil service.
This means that the mere fact that the expatriates 
occupied senior positions in the country's civil service 
is not evidence that the expatriates were, or have been, 
de facto decision-makers in Malawi. No .one knows for sure 
that bureaucrats are the ones who really decide on policy 
in any country.
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Chapter Six 
Development And Aid Influence 
Introduction
The last chapter looked at the effect which foreign 
aid is said to have had on Malawi. This was the' argument 
that foreign experts have been de facto decision-makers in 
Malawi. Underlying this argument are several assumptions 
which were not examined in the last chapter. These 
assumptions are that development is the "stuff of 
politics" in developing countries, and that foreign aid as 
an instrument of foreign policy is effective. That is 
apparently illustrated by the operations of certain multi­
lateral organizations which are seen to constitute 
inroadsinto the sovereignty of the aid recipient countries.
This chapter looks at these assumptions. The 
discussion is divided into four parts. The first part is 
the consideration of the assumption that development is 
the kernel of crucial decisions in developing countries. 
The second part is the consideration of the operations of 
certain multilateral aid organizations while the third 
part is the consideration of the political effectiveness 
of foreign aid. Finally, the fourth part is the 
consideration of some instances of foreign aid influence 
in Malawi.
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Place of Development Among Governments Activities
The reason why foreign aid is believed to have the 
power to reduce a recipient country to a dependency, or 
neo-colonialist state, as it is said to have done to
Malawi, is that development is believed to be the most 
important, indeed overriding, activity of a developing 
country's government. Gordenker calls development the 
"stuff of politics", or the "kernel of crucial decisions", 
in developing countries.* No doubt this is made on the 
ground that there is abject poverty in the developing 
countries. For example, Williams book, Malawi: The
Politics of Despair, has the theme that "Malawi is still
desperately poor," a theme which reflects the belief that
. . . . 2development is the "stuff of politics" in Malawi.
Obviously Malawians find such a theme strange because, 
though aware of the wealth in other countries, they are 
not desperate about their country.
Since a greater proportion of foreign aid is used on 
financing development, it follows that decisions on 
foreign aid are crucial to developing countries or are the 
"stuff of politics" in developing countries. However, 
this belief is an error. It is a misunderstanding about 
the relative place of development among government 
activities or responsibilities.
Malawi's attainment of independence in 1964 indeed 
exposed the country's underdevelopment. Malawi is a small
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narrow country enclosing within its borders meagre natural 
resources. Its economy is basically agricultural and 
exports the less lucrative agricultural commodities. It 
has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world and 
has no coastal area of its own, which means that it is 
land-locked. Apparently this is what has given the 
impression that development must be an overriding priority 
of the Malawi Government.
However, the Malawi Government has many responsibi­
lities, some of which override development in importance. 
Political stability is one such responsibility and the 
defence of the country is another. Even the administra­
tion of justice overrides development in importance. 
Moreover, development has many aspects; economic, social, 
political, and technological to mention a few. The 
development which is popular and which requires foreign 
aid funding is economic development. This is largely
a programme of activities which are undertaken with the 
intention of bringing about economic growth.
For countries like Malawi, there is also political 
development. This refers to activities which are geared 
towards promoting national unity. Such activities could 
simply be the abolition of a multi-party political system 
or the adoption of one local language as the national 
language for the whole country. Such activities do not 
require foreign aid funding and in fact constitute the top
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priority of a new state. Indeed the President of Malawi 
explained the point:
"While development in Malawi means agricultural 
progress above all things, this country is doing just 
that; but the term "National Development" is all 
embracing. It must be thought of in terms of 
political, economic, and social advancement. * Politi­
cally, national development must mean development of 
national conscience among the people of the country. 
There is no national progress where there is a sense
of division based on tribal, district, or regional 
3
differences."
This makes it clear that the overriding priority of the 
Malawi Government is not economic development but unity 
and political stability of the country.
The national accounting procedures of some developing 
countries, certainly those of Malawi, do not place 
economic development as apriority. Instead, they place on 
priority the traditional functions of governments such as 
security, law and order, justice, and education to mention 
a few.
For example, the Malawi national budget is divided 
into two parts. The first part is called recurrent 
account which consists of revenues and expenditure. This 
is the more important part of the national budget of any
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developing country. In simpler terms, it means money for, 
and expenditure on, the maintenance of the army for the 
defence of the country, of the police to keep law . and 
order, of the civil servants to provide medical services, 
to keep government records, and to implement government 
policies, and of judges to administer justice or interpret 
law. It is the maintenance of such social services which 
is indispensable to the existence of a modern state.
The second part of the country's national budget is 
called development account. This consists mainly of loans 
and grants (or foreign aid) on one hand and expenditure on 
the other. The expression, "mainly of", is intended to 
indicate that the revenue side of the development account 
is not entirely made up of foreign aid. It also consists 
of what is called counterpart local resources. This will 
receive further attention later. In simpler terms, the 
development account means the money for and expenditure on 
activities such as the construction of a major new 
hospital or the execution of an agricultural development 
project, or, in short, money for and expenditure on 
development.
It is true that this division of the country's 
national budget into recurrent and development accounts is 
a matter of accounting convenience. Many items from the 
recurrent account such as the salaries of certain civil 
servants can easily be transferred to the development 
account and vice versa. For example, an expenditure on
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the construction of an office building can be treated as 
an item on the recurrent account or development account 
depending on the preference of the accounting officer. 
However, the division is by and large maintained. The 
implication of this with regard to the place of develop­
ment among the g9vernment activities should be obvious. 
Development is indeed an important option but not an 
overriding priority.
According to this accounting procedure, it is normal 
for a developing country to have a deficit on its national 
development account; that is to say, expenditure on deve­
lopment activities such as the construction of bridges,
new roads, and clinics always outstrips the revenue which
4a developing country can provide on its own. This is 
the resource gap which is bridged by means of foreign 
aid. For example, Malawi's own development revenues form 
a small proportion of the development account budget and 
has to get foreign aid to wipe out the resource gap.
However, Malawi could also wipe out the gap simply by 
drastically scaling down development activities.
However, Malawi was one of those worst cases in that 
it also had a deficit on its national recurrent account. 
In simpler terms, this meant that the country could not, 
on its own, pay the salaries of its public employees and 
the running costs of its public vehicles, schools, roads,
and hospitals. In the jargon of the economists, the
country faced a serious problem of economic inviability.
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Any foreign aid which is used to bridge this sort of 
resource gap is called budgetary aid or subsidy. This was 
what the British budgetary aid to Malawi, which was
considered in the fourth chapter was all about.
The deficit on the recurrent account is a serious
matter compared to the one on the development account. It 
means that a country is indeed unable to pay its own
way and lack of support from donors could indeed mean 
political instability if not the collapse of the state
itself. On the other hand, the deficit on the development 
account is not a matter of life and death for any 
developing country. It is an option. Were the donors to 
withold aid, Malawi would not necessarily experience 
political instability. It would continue to exist and
even to undertake some development activity. The 
difference would be that development would drastically 
slow down to about say three rural clinics a year. Table 
VI shows that Uganda experienced more or less such a 
situation. Foreign aid to that country declined 
dramatically from $30 million to just under $8 million a 
year for nearly three years. Yet Uganda as a state at 
least continued to exist.
In other words, the Malawi national accounting 
practice makes it clear that the activities which are a 
priority of the Malawi Government are those of the defence 
of the country, law and order in the country, administra­
tion of justice, maintenance of transport infrastructure,
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health services, education, and immigration to mention a 
few. These are the priority activities of any modern 
government. Development is not among them. This is why 
it is treated in a separate section of the national budget.
In short, the assumption that development is "the 
very stuff of politics - the kernel of crucial decisions - 
in many developing countries" is simply an error. 
Development is an option. It is carried out only when 
there is adequate provision of the more important services 
such as the security of the state and the administration 
of justice.
Operations of Certain Multilateral Aid Organizations
The power of foreign aid to reduce a recipient to a
dependent state is apparently evident in the operations 
of certain multilateral organizations. Foremost among 
them are the operations of the European Economic 
Communities (E.E.C.) Aid Fund and the International 
Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). The operations of both
organizations vis-a-vis the developing countries are seen 
to constitute an inroad into the sovereignty of the aid
recipient states.
The neo-colonialist implications of the E.E.C.
5
operations are advanced on three grounds. The first is 
that eligibility for the E.E.C. aid is conditional upon 
the acceptance of the Berlin Special Clause. This
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involves taking sides on the question of the status of 
West Berlin. Many developing countries in Africa 
including Malawi, in the Caribbean, and in the Pacific, 
the A.C.P. countries as they are called, are eligible for 
the E.E.C. aid partly because they have accepted the 
Berlin Special Clause. Mozambique was for a while denied 
of the E.E.C. aid because of its refusal to sign the 
Clause. Things changed only after Mozambique changed its 
mind and signed the Berlin Special Clause.
The neo-colonialist implications of the E.E.C. 
operations are also advanced on the ground that the Lome 
Convention, which governs the relations between the A.C.P. 
countries and the E.E.C. countries brings the A.C.P. 
countries back into a legally binding relationship of 
these countries with their former imperial powers: 
Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands. What, indeed, prompted many of these 
countries into seeking the Lome Convention was the British 
entry into the E.E.C. which meant that many of them, 
including Malawi, would lose the preferential treatment 
which they had hitherto enjoyed on their exports to 
Britain.
Finally the neo-colonialist implications of the 
E.E.C. operations are also advanced on the ground that the 
relationship between the A.C.P. countries and the E.E.C. 
countries is based not on the principle of reciprocity but 
on the principle of mutual advantage. The former prin­
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ciple was abandoned in the course of the negotiations of 
the first Lome* Convention in favour of the latter 
principle which really masks an unequal relationship 
between the A.C.P. countries and the EEC countries. For 
example, each A.C.P. country is permitted under the Lome' 
Convention to impose protective tariffs against the 
imports which would constitute a threat to its fledgling 
industries. Such tariffs can be imposed without expecting 
retaliation from the E.E.C. country concerned. In legal 
terms, this is how unequal the relationship between the 
A.C.P. countries on one hand and the E.E.C. countries on 
the other is.
The relationship is also unequal in practice. The 
day to day interpretation, or implementation, of the Lome 
Convention is a one-sided affair since many of the A.C.P. 
countries do not have the requisite expertise for handling 
the operations of a complex multilateral trade agreement 
like the Lome Convention. For example, the interpretation 
of the operations of the STABEX scheme of the Convention 
is largely a matter for the E.E.C. bureaucrats in 
Brussels. Therefore, the EEC aid is seen to have 
neo-colonialist implications. It is aid which comes from 
an unequal relationship, from a relationship which legally 
binds, though indirectly, the recipients to the former 
colonial powers, and from a relationship which forces the 
recipients to align with the West on the question of the 
status of West Berlin.
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However, the neo-colonialist implication of the 
E.E.C. aid to the A.C.P. countries in general and to 
Malawi in particular can be overstated. In the first 
place, Malawi did not seek the agreement with the E.E.C. 
in order to gain access to the E.E.C. aid. Malawi sought 
the agreement for reasons of trade or for reasons of its 
exports to Europe. The E.E.C. aid to Malawi, though quite 
substantial now, has been an incidental development to the 
Lome'" Convention. Further, the Lome Convention is not a 
comprehensive trade agreement between A.C.P. and the
E.E.C. countries. It is actually a mere regularization of 
trade in certain commodities which had long been in place 
the A.C.P. countries' exports of certain tropical 
products to Europe. For example, the convention excludes, 
from its STABEX scheme, tobacco which is Malawi's largest 
and most important export.
Moreover, the Convention is a matter of free choice. 
Malawi can, at least in principle, choose to withdraw from 
it, an option which was not available to a colonial territory. 
Colonialism was something which was imposed regardless of 
the wishes of local people. The Lome Convention,
despite its faults, is an agreement which is freely 
entered into between the ACP countries and the E.E.C. countries.
Finally, the implications of the I.M.F. operations 
are similarly seen as inroads into the sovereignty of the 
I.M.F. member states. These are said to arise first and 
foremost from the conditionality of the Fund's loans. The
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conditionality is the demand that the use of the Fund's 
loan be accompanied with the implementation of some 
prescribed structural adjustment measures in the reci­
pient's economy. Often these include large currency 
devaluations or price decontrols/ or both at the same time 
plus other measures such as removal of subsidies on food, 
reduction in the number of civil servants, and privati­
zation of statutory bodies. Accordingly, the Fund's loan 
is called a structural adjustment loan (SAL) and its 
conditionality is prescribed because the Fund is supposed 
to help a member state which finds itself in structural 
balance of payment difficulties.
Malawi did not for a long time seek I.M.F.
assistance and has so far implemented only two SALS, the 
first one of which was obtained in 1982. Hewitt and Kydd 
have examined in detail the implications of the two SALS, 
including those arising from price decontrols, and the 
devaluation of the country's currency, the Kwacha(IQ .6
The Fund does not give foreign aid as such. It gives 
permission for a member state to use its allocated quota 
of the Fund's currency called special drawing rights 
(SDRs). The question of foreign aid in the Fund's 
operations comes in for two reasons. The first is that 
the Fund's loan is partly paid in the debtor country's own 
currency. This makes the Fund's loans almost as soft as 
foreign aid. They are easy to repay. The second reason 
is that SALS to developing countries are supplemented, in
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fact augmented, with multilateral (World Bank) and 
bilateral foreign aid. This is because developing 
countries are allocated SDR quotas which are small in 
relation to their developmental needs, a matter which is 
itself an unresolved issue in the United Nations economic 
sectoral fora.
The neo-colonialist implications of the- Fund's 
operations are further seen to arise from the Fund's 
technical assistance to developing countries. For 
example, Malawi has some of the Fund's experts currently
working in its Treasury and Reserve Bank. The secondment 
of such experts to developing countries is interpreted as 
neo-colonialism. Referring to a similar World Bank 
technical aid programme, Anatoly Keletsky wrote, for 
example:
"This 'something ' according to the new orthodox among 
the donors require cherished institutions and class
privileges built in since independence to be swept
away. In a sense, we're talking about a kind of
recolonization - about sending smart white boys to 
tell them how to run their countries," admits one 
official (of the World Bank)."7
Finally, the neo-colonialist implications of the 
Fund’s operations arise from the Fund’s "policy dialogue." 
This refers to a donor's conference which the World Bank 
sponsors for each SAL recipient. This involves laying
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down on the table the SAL recipient country's economic 
policies for scrutiny by the donor countries and 
organizations. Every detail of the proceedings of the 
"policy dialogue" is recorded on tapes by the World Bank 
which has sponsored two such meetings on Malawi held in 
Paris.
The expression, "policy dialogue", is, according to 
the critics of the World Bank, a euphemism. It is "most 
frequently used in the Bank," Theresa Hayter and her 
colleague argue, "to describe its attempts to change the 
government's economic policies especially their macro-
Q
economic policies." In other words, SAL is seen as a 
neo-colonialist instrument. The practice by some donor 
countries of using SAL as a precondition for providing 
their aid to recipients has added fuel to the 
neo-colonialist charges against the Fund's operations.
Like those of the E.E.C., the neo-colonialist 
implications of the Fund's operations can be overstated. 
Some of the extreme views on this matter are really 
nothing but a yearning for "the good old days of 
colonialism." It seems that some people would like 
colonialism to come back in one form or another in some 
parts of the world. The use of the term "recolonization," 
in reference to the Fund's operations which are hardly 
like colonialism is a case in point. May be the World 
Bank official who was Keletsky's informant needs to be 
reminded that the predecessors of his "smart white boys,"
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the Harry Johnstons, the Cecil John Rhodes, the Brazzas, 
the Lord Lugards and Delameres did not go to Africa to 
tell the Africans how best to run their affairs. They 
went there to conquer, ^to rule, and to exploit.
Further, the Fund's conditionality really falls into 
the same category as the decisions of the United Nations 
Security Council and the International Court of Justice 
because it applies, at least in theory, to every member of 
the Fund, developed or developing, which finds itself in 
structural balance of payment difficulties. It is possible 
that the Fund has been more strict with developing 
countries than with developed countries in the application 
of its rules. However, that is a matter of judgment. The 
fact is that the conditionality is applicable to any 
country seeking the Fund's assistance.
Finally, though it is indeed an inroad into state 
sovereignty, the "policy dialogue" operates in an area 
where international cooperation is possible. The Fund's 
attempts to change the economic policies of its recipient 
countries need not be regarded asa serious inroad into 
sovereignty unless one shares Gordenker's contention that 
development is the "kernel of crucial decisions" in the 
developing countries. As already stated, development is 
an option and states are free to seek the Fund's 
assistance. So long as there is this free choice, the 
neo-colonialist interpretations of the Fund's operations 
need not be entertained.
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Some Difficulties In Assessing Aid Political Effectiveness
Finally, the discussion has so far assumed that 
foreign aid is politically effective. However, it is high 
time to look into this question a little closer. Is 
foreign aid politically effective? To many, the answer to 
this question is: Yes! The belief is reflected in the
adage that "he who pays the piper calls the tune." 
However, the answer to the question is not an easy one.
The assessment of foreign aid is actually fraught
with several difficulties. One of them is the lack of
information on the political objectives for which foreign
g
aid is said to be provided. This is due to the fact that sane
of the aid is disbursed as a matter of routine or habit, 
and that political objectives are kept secret as a
matter of prudence.
Another difficulty in assessing foreign aid 
effectiveness is also lack of information on the initial 
situation which foreign aid is meant to change. This 
arises because the initiative to seek aid is, in most 
cases, with the recipient. Without such information it is 
not easy to tell whether, after providing aid, a given 
situation is indeed the one which foreign aid was meant to 
bring about. The information on initial situation which 
is intended to be changed is called, "baseline study."
Such studies are in many cases not available to facilitate 
the assessment of foreign aid effectiveness.
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Finally, the other difficulty in assessing foreign 
aid political effectiveness is the question of time span. 
In development economics, this is easy to establish. For 
example, economic effectiveness of a given amount of aid 
can be assessed at the end of the second, third, or fourth 
year of a project such as a new hospital. In foreign 
policy analysis, this is not easy to establish. For 
example, if a donor's political objective for giving aid 
to a recipient is to prevent the recipient from falling to 
communism, for how long is foreign aid expected to do so 
and at what point in time can its effectiveness be 
assessed? Such questions arise because many of the 
political objectives for which aid is said to be provided 
do not have a time span.
These are some of the difficulties which render 
foreign aid effectiveness not easy to assess. They may 
not be insurmountable, but they are all the same 
difficulties which call into question the over-optimistic 
assumptions about foreign aid political effectiveness. 
They certainly account for the current practice whereby 
the assessment of foreign aid political effectiveness is 
largely a matter of one's best judgment or impression.
In assessing aid political effectiveness, attention 
is usually centred on aid strings: project-tying and
procurement-tying. Project-tying refers to a donor's 
demands that its aid be used only on projects which are 
acceptable to it. This is the most common of the aid
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strings. In fact it is often taken for granted because 
most of the developmental aid is provided in connection 
with specified projects. As explained in the third 
chapter, project-tying can be used deliberately to distort 
the development strategy of a recipient country.10 In 
that case, foreign aid political effectiveness is assessed 
in terms of whether the recipient country has been unable 
to implement its chosen strategy.
Procurement-tying refers to a donor's demands that 
its aid be used only on capital goods from the donor 
country. This type of aid-strings has now gained impor­
tance because many developing countries are in need of 
what is called, "programme aid" as opposed to "project 
aid." The latter is that aid which is provided for 
specific projects. The term is in itself evidence that a 
good part of aid has had project-tying or project strings.
Programme aid is that aid which is provided without 
reference to any specific project. It is in great demand 
because of the balance of payment problems which many 
developing countries are facing. Its purpose is to enable 
a recipient country to import the necessary capital goods 
for the execution of development projects. It can be used 
by a donor to change the pattern of external trade of a 
recipient country.
Programme aid requires no further attention here 
because it is a new development. For example Malawi began
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to receive it in 1985. Of interest at the moment are what 
might be described as traditional procurement strings. 
These have not been part and parcel of project aid. In 
other words, donors have also often demanded that the 
capital goods which are to be used in a project should be 
purchased from them. In this case, foreign aid political 
effectiveness is assessed in terms of whether the donor's 
trade to the recipient country has indeed increased as a 
result of the aid.
The analysis is largely impressionistic. It involves 
no systematic efforts. The determination of the changes, 
if any, in the recipient country's development strategy and 
pattern of external trade is largely a matter of an 
individual's judgment. There are no guiding concepts and 
there is no way of knowing whether the changes have really 
been brought about by foreign aid. Moreover, the potential 
of these strings to distort either the development strategy 
or the pattern of external trade is not as high as it might 
appear. For example, the procurement-tying is almost 
meaningless if the donor and the recipient are traditional 
trading partners like Malawi and Britain. Similarly, 
project tying may not bring about changes in a recipient 
country's development strategy because project formulation 
remains the initiative of the recipient country.
In contrast, foreign aid economic effectiveness is 
systematically assessed. The method includes a wealth of 
analytical concepts such as "aid effectiveness" which is
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distinguished from "aid efficiency"/ and "project 
appraisal" which is distinguished from "project evalua­
tion", to mention a few.1'*' It also includes the 
concepts of "internal rate of return" and "cost-benefit
analysis." The result is a rational assessment of foreign
aid economic effectiveness.
It is true that the analysis has its own short­
coming. For example, the outcome of the analysis can be 
misleading because of a failure to distinguish between
political and economic effectiveness of foreign aid. The 
talk is often simply that of aid effectiveness or aid
efficiency. Perhaps it is often assumed that the context 
of the analysis makes it clear that the assessment is 
about foreign aid economic effectiveness. However, to the 
uncritical mind^ the results of the exercise can be 
understood also to mean political effectiveness of foreign 
aid. Therefore, the results of the economic analysis of 
foreign aid effectiveness have to be interpreted with care.
Project evaluation, for example, implicitly assumes
the humanitarian character of foreign aid. The analysis,
in fact, makes nonsense of the claim that foreign aid is
political, or commercial such as Guy Arnold's claim that
12foreign aid is "big business." It is not used in 
assessing the effects of foreign aid in relation to the 
political objectives of the donor countries and 
organizations. For example, the exercise does not enquire 
into whether the implementation of a project has enabled,
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or is going to enable, a donor country to realize its goal 
of promoting capitalism in a recipient country. Instead, 
project evaluation enquires into whether a hospital which 
was funded with foreign aid is benefiting the local people 
of the area in which the hospital is established.
The practical results of the analysis, too, have not
been encouraging. Despite Cassen's findings, no one is
yet certain if indeed foreign aid is economically
effective. For example, even the U.S.A.I.D. which has
been consistent in carrying out project appraisal and
evaluation has admitted that its aid programme has been a
failure despite the tens of billions of dollars which it
has spent for the past twenty years on helping developing
13nations stem poverty.
Despite the shortcoming, the analysis has the merit 
of using a tangible economic activity - project - as a 
reference point such as a road construction or a leprosy 
vaccination campaign in an area. It also makes the
distinction between a project with commercial return such
a hydro-electric power project and a project without a 
commercial return such as a rural hospital. The former is 
appraised by using the internal rate of return while the 
latter is appraised by using the cost-benefit analysis 
technique.
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The internal rate of return is calculated by 
computing the revenues (returns) which the project is 
expected to earn each year up to the last year of the
expected life-span of the project. The computed revenues
are then compared to the cost of constructing the project 
and of maintaining the project each year up to the last 
year of the expected life-span of the project. The 
difference between the revenue and the cost of the project 
each year is what is called internal rate of return. A 
project is said to be viable, or economically sound, if 
the internal rate of return is positive and a project is 
said to be economically unsound if the internal rate of 
return is negative.
Project appraisal establishes the feasibility of a 
project or the economic viability of a project. It does 
not establish the economic effectiveness of a project. 
The latter is assessed by means of project evaluation. 
The two methods are the same. The difference is that
project appraisal is done before the start of the 
implementation of a project while project evaluation is 
done after the implementation of the project. It looks at 
the real returns and costs of a project as opposed to the 
computed (expected) returns and costs of a project. A 
project is said to be economically effective if the
internal rate of return is positive and vice versa.
The cost-benefit analysis is the more complicated 
technique. It involves computing the expected benefits
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each year of a project up to the last year of the expected 
life-span of the project. The computed benefits are then 
compared to the costs of constructing a project (if it is 
a rural hospital) and of maintaining the project each year 
up to the last year of the expected life-span of the 
project. The difference between the computed benefits and 
the computed costs of each year are not called internal 
rate of return. They are simply the positive or negative 
values of benefits. A project is said to be beneficial, 
or socially sound, if the computed benefits are consis­
tently higher than the computed costs of the project.
As with projects which have commercial returns, 
project appraisal uses the cost-benefit technique to 
establish the soundness of a project and is also done 
prior to the implementation of a project. The effective­
ness of the project is also established by means of 
project evaluation which also uses the cost-benefit 
technique. This is also done after the implementation of 
a project.
With projects which have no commercial return, 
project evaluation is a more complicated matter. This is 
because the benefits still have to be computed after the 
implementation of a project. The real costs become known 
but not the benefits. The process actually involves 
comparing a new situation with an old one; that is 
comparing an area without a hospital and the same area 
with a hospital. To facilitate the process, a study of
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the area is done prior to the implementation of a project. 
This is called a baseline study which provides a basis for 
the evaluation of the project after its implementation.
Of the two techniques, the internal rate of return is 
the more reliable technique. For example, the estimated 
costs of the projects with commercial returns are reliable 
because they are reasonably well known in advance in terms 
of the cost of construction, the cost of imported material, 
the cost of labour and wear and tear during the life time 
of the project. The revenues, too, are often estimated on 
the basis of the imports of the same product which the 
project is designed to produce. Its only major weakness 
is that it assumes some sort of development already in 
place. The cost-benefit analysis is less reliable because 
the benefits are computed on the basis of one's impression 
of a given local situation. The benefit figures are 
always rough estimates and one can never be certain about 
their accuracy. Nevertheless, the use of the technique is 
a considerable advance on the impressionistic analysis of 
the political effectiveness of foreign aid.
In short, the assessment of economic effectiveness of 
foreign aid is fairly systematic and rational. This has 
been made possible for two reasons. One of them is that 
the assessment is based on a tangible unit of economic 
activity - the project. The other one is the cooperation 
of both the donor and the recipient on the matter. On the
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other hand, a systematic and rational assessment of 
political effectiveness of foreign aid has yet to be done.
Instances Of Foreign Aid Influence
Although foreign aid political effectiveness is still 
unknown, an attenpt will now be made at identifying some 
influences in Malawi which can reasonably be attributed to 
foreign aid. Influence in this case is here understood to 
mean the same as impact or something brought about by 
foreign aid regardless of one's wishes. This is intended 
to show that arguments like the ones which have been 
examined here are to a large extent a misinterpretation of 
the impact of foreign aid in the recipient countries 
including Malawi.
It has to be made clear at the outset that no 
instance of foreign aid political effectiveness can be 
dealt with here. This is because the political objectives 
of the donor countries have merely been assumed. There 
has been no effort to identify them because the thesis is 
written from the perspective of a recipient country. In 
addition, the objectives for which the Malawi Government 
seeks and accepts foreign aid are largely economic. Malawi 
accepts foreign aid in order to achieve economic 
development. Indeed, it is probably correct to say that 
foreign aid political effectiveness cannot be examined 
from a recipient country's perspective because recipient 
countries receive foreign aid mainly for economic reasons.
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Instances of foreign aid influence will be identified 
by focusing on a tangible economic activity - project.
The exercise is a matter largely of indicating the 
initiator of this or that project. This is because 
initiating a project is indeed a good indication of
foreign aid influence. In addition, the exercise will 
involve an examination of the impact which a project, or a 
group of projects, has had in Malawi. The result is a 
number of instances of influence most of which were most 
probably not intended by the donors.
Since 1964, Malawi has implemented hundreds of
development projects. It would be almost impossible to
deal with each one of them as a basis for assessing a 
specific instance of foreign aid influence. To make 
matters easier, instances of foreign aid influence are 
examined in reference to a specific donor country, or 
organization in connection with the type of projects which 
it has funded or is funding in Malawi. However, a few 
instances of foreign aid influence are examined without
reference to a specific donor.
The donors to be considered include the World Bank, 
Britain, West Germany, and the United Nations. This 
leaves out the United States, Canada, African Development 
Bank (A.D.B.), Denmark, and Japan, which will be mentioned 
only in passing. This is not because their funded projects have 
not been important but because it is not easy to pinpoint 
a specific influence arising from their funded projects in
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Malawi. Therefore, attention will centre on the first 
four donor organizations and countries of Malawi.
With regard to the World Bank, a distinction is made 
here between SAL and the World Bank loans. This is done 
because the name World Bank is used also in reference to 
the International Development Association (I.D.A.). The 
latter is actually the aid-giving arm of a cluster of 
organizations now commonly referred to as "World Bank", 
though the term came into use largely as a shorthand for 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(I.B.R.D.). The I.B.R.D. itself has also given to Malawi 
loans some of which were part of SAL one and two referred 
to earlier. These were loans and not aid. Therefore, the 
"World Bank," will be used mainly in reference to the 
I.D.A.
The World Bank, as explained here, has funded a host 
of projects which include secondary and tertiary 
educational expansion projects, the Zomba/Lilongwe road 
project which was referred to in the fourth chapter, 
piped-water schemes, and several hydro-electric power 
projects. The Bank's new major funded project include the 
Wood Energy Development Project, and District Road 
Improvement and Maintenance Project (DRIMP) which was 
referred to in the third chapter. However, its best known 
funded projects have been the large integrated rural 
development projects which include Lower Shire Valley 
Development Project, Lilongwe Land Development Project,
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and Karonga Rural Development Project. These are large
projects each covering thousands of acres and families.
For example, the Lilongwe Land Development Project covered
almost half a million acres. The Wood Energy Project and
DRIMP are from birth to implementation stage, the
brain-child of the World Bank. In terms of Gordenker's
project-initiating criterion, they are instances of
influence by the World Bank in Malawi. The rest of the
projects listed were not initiated by the World Bank.
However, Gordenker portrayed the Lower Shire Valley
Development Project and the Lilongwe Land Development
Project as if they were the brain-child of the World
Bank. "In contrast to the role it played in the Tanzanian
and Zambian projects, however, the World Bank," Gordenker
14said, "exerted direct influence on the plans." How
did the World Bank come to be associated with the two
projects?
To answer the foregoing question, it is necessary to 
look at the way the operational activities of three
relevant international organizations are differentiated. 
These are the World Bank, the United Nations Development 
Programme (U.N.D.P.) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (F.A.O.). The World Bank and U.N.D.P. are 
both funding organizations. However, their operational 
activities are differentiated on the basis of the level at 
which investment is to be made. The Bank is supposed to 
fund investment activities, or simply project implemen­
tation, while the U.N.D.P. is supposed to fund
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pre-investment activities or simply project formulation. 
The F.A.O. is concerned with food and agricultural 
activities and collaborates with both the U.N.D.P. and the 
Bank on any food or agricultural development project.
A procedure/ in keeping with this demarcation of 
responsibilities, was instituted whereby an agricultural 
development project had to be submitted through the F.A.O. 
and U.N.D.P. before it could be considered for funding by 
the World Bank. The Bank would consider funding such a 
project only if it were put together and recommended by 
the F.A.O. The U.N.D.P. came in when the F.A.O. decided 
that a pre-investment feasibility study of some sort be 
conducted before the project could be recommended for 
World Bank funding. During the 1960s, this meant 
recommending a pre-investment study to one of the U.N.D.P. 
predecessor bodies, United Nations Technical Assistance 
Board (UNTAB) and the United Nations Special Fund. The 
latter was the body which was responsible for providing 
the necessary funds for a proposed pre-investment 
feasibility study while the former was the body which was 
responsible for providing technical experts for a proposed 
pre-investment feasibility study. The U.N.D.P. now does 
both. The procedure was instituted largely to justify 
what in reality was a proliferation of inter-governmental 
organizations.
The procedure was incredibly bureaucratic and served 
as a source of inter-agency conflict. The agencies
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themselves sometimes by-passed each other. Moreover the 
procedure proved to be a source of conflict between the
F.A.O. and the developing countries. This was because it 
blurred the distinction between project proposal and 
project submission. The Lower Shire Valley Project 
illustrated the point which is rather distorted in 
Gordenker's account. As stated in the last chapter, the 
project was compiled out of the results of some 
agricultural pilot schemes conducted by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and funded by the British Government. The 
first stage of the implementation of the project was a 
survey of the whole valley because the pilot schemes 
covered only a small portion of the area. This was the 
stage at which the Malawi Government, in accordance with
the laid down procedure, approached the F.A.O. for World
Bank funding of the project and the stage at which 
Gordenker incorrectly thought the project originated.
The F.A.O. apparently saw Malawi's request as a mere 
project proposal and responded to it, not by offering to 
conduct a survey of the valley as the Malawi Government 
expected, but by demanding that it be allowed to re-conduct 
the pilot schemes. In effect, this amounted to telling 
the Malawi Government that the pilot schemes which it had 
conducted were wrong and useless. This F.A.O. response
naturally met a stiff opposition from the country's 
leader, then the Prime Minister, and from the British 
expatriates who had themselves conducted the pilot 
schemes. As a result, a conflict arose among the Malawi
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Government/ the F.A.O./ U.N.D.P./ and the World Bank,
15which Gordenker covered in his book. Relations
between Malawi and the F.A.O. are now back on a sound 
footing. The F.A.O.has of late had a resident representative 
in Malawi and the organization is now increasingly getting 
involved in the country's agricultural development 
projects. However, the result of the conflict was that 
the Malawi Government and the World Bank left the F.A.O. 
on the wayside in relation to the Lower Shire Development 
Project and to many other agricultural development 
projects in Malawi.
In a sense, the conflict marked a watershed in inter­
agency relations. Since the start of the implementation 
of the Lower Shire Valley Development Project, the 
excessive intergovernmental bureaucratic red tape was 
drastically curtailed. The World Bank broke free and has 
since then, at least in Malawi, funded agricultural 
development projects without being fussy about F.A.O. 
participation. This is how the World Bank came to be 
exclusively associated with the Lower Shire Valley 
Development Project.
Of all the World Bank funded projects listed earlier, 
the Lilongwe Land Development Project has been the most 
famous and the one which passes as the paragon of World 
Bank influence in Malawi. The start of its implementation 
formed part of the saga which Gordenker covered in detail 
among the F.A.O., the World Bank, the U.N.D.P., and the
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Malawi Government in relation to the Lower Shire Valley 
Development Project. ^  A look at its origin is also 
necessary so that the World Bank influence in Malawi is 
placed in its correct perspective. The point which has to 
be made clear is that the project/ like the Lower Shire 
Valley Development Project, was not fashioned in 
Washington, D.C. and brought as a blue-print to Malawi. 
It was formulated in Malawi.
Versions about its origin vary. One version 
attributes its origin to an initiative by local agricul­
tural experts, or agricultural instructors as they are 
known in the country, who are said to have thought about
a project which could embody soil conservation measures on 
17a large scale. The implementation of the project did, 
indeed, include the construction of large drainages called 
miaula. in the local language, intended to protect the 
soil from water erosion. However, it is inconceivable 
that the local agricultural experts thought out in detail 
the complex shape and content of the project. Therefore, 
much need not be made of this version.
Another version attributes the origin of the project
to an initiative by Mr. Bruno Barnister, a British
expatriate, on the ground that he was the Permanent
Secretary for the Country's Ministry of Agriculture at the
time that some agricultural pilot schemes, which preceded
18the implementation of the project, were conducted.
The version amounts to saying that because he was the
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Permanent Secretary, he must have initiated the pilot 
schemes. However, the conduct of the pilot schemes 
implies doubts about, rather than enthusiasm for, the 
project. Therefore, the version is probably incorrect.
A third version attributes the origin of the project
to an initiative by a local chief, Chief Tsabango, who is
said to have approached the Government to look into the
19state of agriculture in his area. The pilot schemes,
Tsabango Agricultural Pilot Schemes, were, indeed,
conducted in his area, the results of which were compiled
into a project which later came to be known as Lilongwe 
Land Development Project. This version implies that the 
project evolved out of the Government's attempt at finding 
a response to Chief Tsabango's request. It sounds a more 
plausible version; that is, the project evolved out of
some tentative steps about how to improve the country's 
small holder agriculture.
The three versions, though varied, all attribute the 
origin of the project to local initiative. So it seems 
probable that the project was formulated on the basis of 
the Tsabango Agricultural Pilot Schemes. No doubt, the 
World Bank provided, at a later stage, the intellectual 
concepts for the project such as the term "integrated 
rural development projects? which were later reflected in 
the retitling of the project from Lilongwe Land Development 
Project to Lilongwe Rural Development Project. The
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Project, however, was something from which the Bank itself 
learnt a lot.
Therefore, the integrated rural development projects, 
particularly the Lilongwe and Lower Shire Valley Projects, 
cannot be interpreted, in terms of the project-initiating 
criterion, as World Bank influence. They were not 
initiated by the World Bank. However, these projects are 
in another sense evidence for World Bank influence in 
Malawi. For one thing, they are, or were, large and 
involved heavy capital outlay. Without the World Bank, 
Malawi would not have implemented many of them. There­
fore, they are examples of World Bank influence in the 
sense that they are evidence of a large-scale approach to 
promoting small holder agricultural development which 
Malawi would not have sustained without the World Bank 
funding.
With regard to Britain, several distinctions have to 
be made. The first distinction is that between Britain as 
a donor country and Britain as the former colonial power. 
Instances of influence arising from the latter will not 
receive attention here because they are part and parcel of 
the country's colonial legacy. It would be incorrect to 
regard the continued and widespread use of English in the 
country as an instance of foreign aid influence. Use of 
English would continue even if Malawi were to be cut off 
from British foreign aid. The Guineans in West Africa 
continued with the use of French language despite the
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unceremonious and drastic break which France made with 
them at the time that they demanded independence.
Some neo-colonialist, or dependency, arguments make
no distinction between the colonial legacy and great power
attempts at subverting the sovereignty of the developing
countries. Everything to do with the former colonial
powers is apparently neo-colonialism or dependence. For
example, Borger explains Lesotho's dependence in terms of
Lesotho's trade flows, largely Lesotho's imports from 
20South Africa. The arguments have produced some of the 
most bizarre and puerile nationalist reactions in Africa 
including an abandonment of the term "Mr." in favour of 
authentic African cultural identity. Apparently the 
point is that a country must have a complete break with 
everything to do with its former colonial power for it to 
be genuinely independent.
However, probably no country can make a complete 
break with its past. Even the mighty America did not do 
away with everything British. Trade between Britain and 
America continued long after the American War of Indepen­
dence, or the American Revolution, as the Americans call 
it. The use of English and even the colonial term, 
"governor" has been preserved to the present day. In 
short, neo-colonialist or dependency arguments commit an 
error by failing to distinguish between the colonial 
legacy and great power subversive activities against 
developing countries.
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One of the foreign aid influences in Malawi which
Morton refers to illustrates the importance of making the
distinction between colonial legacy and foreign aid
influence. The influence in question is the Malawi
Government's operational rules and procedures. These are
referred to as an example of influence on Malawi by
21Britain as a donor country. Apparently everything
British ceased on the day that Malawi became independent.
This is another example of some of the problems which the 
dependency scholars create. It is true that many of the 
Malawi Government's operational rules and procedures are 
British. However# a large proportion of them were those 
of the predecessor Nyasaland Government and not of Britain 
as a donor country. Therefore# it is important to make 
the distinction between Britain as an aid donor and 
Britain as a former colonial power.
The second distinction to be made is between Britain 
as an aid donor and Britain as the home country of the 
expatriates. Instances of influence arising from both
will receive attention here. The point is that such
instances of influence are better treated separately.
This is done here on the ground that a good deal of 
influence arising from the latter# from Britain as the 
home country of the expatriates# was quite unintended. It
was not the result of any attempt by the expatriates at
implementing O.D.A. political objectives.
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The third distinction to be made is between British 
expatriates who were supported by Britain and British 
experts who were supported by international organizations. 
Instances of influence arising from the latter is here 
attributed to international organizations. Andrew Mercer, 
who was the Manager of the Lilongwe Land Development
Project was a British expert working for the World Bank. 
Therefore, he was not one of the British expatriates. The 
distinction may look absurd, but it is important to 
maintain it so as to make it possible to separate 
instances of influence by international organizations from 
instances of influence by donor countries.
Britain as a donor country funded the agricultural
pilot schemes, the results of which gave rise to the large
integrated rural development projects. However, Britain
has, as already stated, so far funded only the Phalombe
Rural Development Project. Its taste as donor country has
been for funding small development projects which included
the Blantyre/Zomba road project which was referred to in
the third chapter, a district hospital, an afforestation
project, a fisheries research project, and a number of
small agricultural development schemes some of which were
22referred to in the third chapter. Apart from the
Phalombe Rural Development Project and the afforestation 
project, most of its funded projects have been small, 
requiring small capital outlay. Therefore, the influence 
of Britain as a donor country has been the promotion of a 
small-scale approach to agricultural development.
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Several other instances of influence by Britain as a 
donor country also exist in terms of the project initiating 
criterion. One of them is the establishment of a Govern­
ment department. The department in question was what for 
a long time had been the country's Economic Planning 
Division (E.P.D.), now part of Department of Economic 
Planning and Development. The E.P.D. was, at least 
according to Morton, set up at the suggestion- of the
O.D.A. and had been an important planning section of the
23Government. Another instance of influence are the
O.D.A. manuals on project appraisal, or evaluation, in
developing countries which were referred to in the third 
24chapter. Incidentally, these were resented by some of 
the expatriates who regarded the use of them as an 
academic exercise.25
Since their introduction, the manuals have influenced 
project formulation in Malawi. Almost any project 
formulated in the country incorporates results of a
feasibility study of some sort in which either the 
internal rate of return or the cost-benefit analysis 
technique is used. One of the criticisms against the 
Malawi Government which was referred to in the third 
chapter was that it selected projects "on the basis of its 
political needs." Projects are normally initiated, in the 
first place, on the basis of intuition. However, the use 
of these appraisal techniques has meant that most of the 
projects are implemented only after some sort of a 
feasibility study has been conducted.
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Still another instance of influence by Britain as a
donor country has also to do with initiation of projects.
Morton expressed a feeling that Britain probably had not
2 6initiated any project. Such a feeling is incorrect. 
Britain as a donor country has initiated some of the 
projects which have been implemented in Malawi. The 
Leprosy Control Project, which was dealt with in detail in 
the third chapter, is a good example. This was directly 
initiated in Britain and is a sister project to the one 
which Britain has also implemented in India.
Instances of influence by Britain as the home country
of the expatriates are many, but some of these are not
easy to separate from the country's colonial legacy. The
formulation of the integrated rural development projects
is an example of the work of the expatriates which cannot
be separated from colonial legacy. Nonetheless instances
of influence by the expatriates in the post-independence
period exist. One of them consists of the three documents
on operational development which were covered in detail in
27the third chapter. These are the Estimates of
Government Expenditure on Development, the Three-year 
Rolling Development Programme, and the Statement of 
Development Policies (DEVEPOL). These were not the only 
documents which the expatriates introduced. Others were 
the normal government operational documents such as the 
Annual Statement of External Trade, Annual Economic 
Report, a Compendium of National Statistics, and various 
Departmental Annual Reports. However, the three documents
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are special because they were introduced in response to 
Malawi's type of operational approach to development.
The publication of the first two documents has 
continued up to now uninterrupted. A second DEVEPOL 
should have been produced by 1982. However, nothing 
happened for a period of nearly six years. A new DEVEPOL 
has now been published. This covers the period -1987 to 
1996, and differs from its predecessor in two ways. The 
first is that it has an appendix which is a broad summary 
of how sectoral projections spelt out in the new DEVEPOL 
are to be realised, an innovation which brings Malawi 
closer to economic development planning in a conventional 
sense. The second is that it does not contain the 
statement which made it clear that the earlier DEVEPOL was 
not a Government's commitment. The new DEVEPOL in this
case should be a Government's commitment to action.
However, the new DEVEPOL is very much like its
predecessor. In the first place, it covers too long a
period to be a development plan in the conventional sense
although provision is made to have it reviewed if not
rewritten at the end of the 5th year. In the second
place, it is also described as being not "a detailed and
28quantified blueprint for action." The expression in 
the open and closed inverted commas reflects continued 
Government reluctance to adopt conventional development 
planning. The new DEVEPOL is also essentially a mere
statement of Government's development policies.
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Therefore, the three documents still remain a distinct 
contribution of the British expatriates in the post­
independence period of the country.
Another instance of influence by the expatriates is 
the extension and deepening of the British way of doing 
things which is readily noticeable in Malawi. Development 
in the colonial era was confined to a small area in the 
south of the country. Independence brought a national 
dimension to it. The objective is now to spread 
development to every part of the country. Since project 
implementation was largely in the hands of the British 
expatriates, this has meant the spread of British influence 
in the form of architecture, engineering tradition, road 
design and construction, and town and country planning, 
almost everywhere in the country. No doubt a different 
group of expatriates would have brought about a different 
way of doing things. This is not to endorse arguments for 
neo-colonialism. It is simply to pinpoint an instance of 
influence which was quite unintended by the expatriates who 
had, for example, to design a road the way they knew a road 
had to be designed.
Perhaps the most important contribution by the 
British expatriates to Malawi is an excellent record of 
project implementation. Malawi enjoys, at the moment, a 
high reputation of successful implementation of projects. 
Comparison is not easy to make, but no project for which 
external funding was obtained has failed to take shape.
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Every project planned and funded has been implemented 
except those that have lacked funding.
Certainly this good record of project implementation 
is a legacy of the expatriates. As Permanent Secretaries, 
Deputy Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Chief Education or 
Building Officers, the expatriates had the implementation 
of projects wholly in their hands. Therefore, they were 
the ones who set the country's excellent record of project 
implementation. The problem is how to maintain it now 
that most of the country's bureaucracy has been localized. 
The exorbitant claims that the expatriates made the 
country's economic and foreign policies do no justice to 
this equally honourable and proud record of the British 
expatriates.
The expatriates also made some other important 
innovations in the field of clean water development. Some 
British expatriates working for Malawi's Department of 
Lands, Valuation and Water produced a pump for pumping 
water from the ground called MALDEV, an innovation which 
was made in connection with the country's shallow wells 
water development scheme. This may sound an insignificant 
invention but, in the developing world, it is an important 
innovation which has attracted the attention of other 
developing countries. For example, the pump is currently 
competing for adoption, or recognition, among other such 
pumps invented in India and Kenya. Therefore, MALDEV is
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also a distinct contribution by the expatriates to the 
country's economic development.
Finally, the expatriates, as explained in the last 
chapter, are not only those who worked or are working for 
the Malawi Government. Some are businessmen, missionaries, 
and farmers. Some of these expatriates have also made a 
significant contribution to the country's economic 
development. The Christian Churches, in particular, joined 
hands and formed the Christian Service Committee of the 
Churches of Malawi (C.S.C.). This took place soon after 
the country attained independence. This is now the 
country's largest unofficial aid-receiving agency 
supplementing the work of the Government. It solicits and 
gets a lot of aid in money and kind from charity 
organizations in Britain, Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United States, and Switzerland. In comparison 
the amount of foreign aid which is channelled through the 
Government it is indeed, nothing. However, on its own 
terms, it is important. It spends sometimes as much as £1 
million on development projects such as boreholes or 
school-roofing materials throughout the country in and year 
and is one of the most highly organized Christian aid 
institutions in independent Africa. Its work is a distinct 
contribution by the expatriate missionaries to the 
country's economic development.
The Federal Republic of Germany is in this regard 
easier to handle because it has had fewer experts of its
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own in the country. Its aid to Malawi has been mainly
financial, a good part, if not the most, of which has been 
given to Malawi on a grant basis. The country has also 
funded many projects including a road in the northern part 
of the country which was the beginning of the lake shore 
road referred to several times in the previous chapters, 
radio equipment for the country's Broadcasting 
Corporation, a sewage plant and public markets in the
country's main towns of Blantyre and Lilongwe, another 
section of the lake shore road in the centre of the
country, a steamer for transport service on the lake, and 
the country's first two new district hospitals in the
north and centre of the country. The Federal Republic of 
Germany was also the first bilateral donor to fund an 
integrated rural development project in the country, the 
Salima Lake Shore Development Project which was referred 
to several times in the third chapter, and is currently 
financing a second one called Liwonde Rural Development 
Project.
The Germans have also initiated some projects. One 
of its foreign aid officials is said to have suggested the 
adoption of a National Rural Development Programme 
(N.R.D.P.). Indeed Malawi is currently implementing such 
a programme. This has involved the implementation of an 
integrated rural development project in almost every part 
of the country.
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Hewitt and Kydd attribute the origin of N.R.D.P. to a
29World Bank basic economic report on Malawi of 1973. They 
say that: the Malawi Government and the World Bank jointly 
developed the framework of the programme. This appears to 
be a reference to the World Bank endorsement of the Malawi 
Government's proposals rather than to a formulation of the 
N.R.D.P. For example, the two British experts on foreign 
aid reckon that this was the same time that the World Bank 
was critical of the integrated rural development project 
and demanded modification in it so as to reduce the heavy 
capital outlay involved in its implementation. The 
N.R.D.P. was, indeed, endorsed by the World Bank on 
condition that subsequent integrated rural development 
projects, which are the main feature of the programme, 
would involve less intensive input.
Distinct German initiative is also apparent in the 
type of projects which the country has funded. A look at 
the projects reveals an approach to project funding which 
is quite distinct from that of Britain. While Britain, as 
a donor country, has insisted on funding only projects 
which have economic returns or "the economically sound 
project," the Federal Republic of Germany has, in contrast, 
gone for projects which have social benefits, "or the 
socially sound projects." The Germans, it seems have 
often posed the question: "economically sound" for what?
In response to this apparent question, they have funded 
some of the most popular development projects in the the 
country.
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A project which is socially sound and represents a
distinct influence of German foreign aid is one which was
initially called# "rural growth centre," now retitled,
"rural growth area," on the ground that the term, "growth
centre," was restrictive. The reasoning is that these
projects are to serve as growth points in the rural
areas. According to Hewitt and Kydd, the idea was first
implemented in some peripheral areas of Germany and has,
. 30therefore, been transferred wholesale to Malawi. The 
two British foreign aid experts have subjected the idea to 
some incisive criticisms reflecting in part British 
pre-occupation with the economic soundness criterion for 
judging a development project.
The framework of the project is the Government policy 
on labour migration to urban areas. This was prompted by 
a low industrial base which the country inherited at the 
attainment of its independence. Its purpose has been to 
induce people to stay in the rural areas rather than to 
migrate to the urban areas where there are no jobs. To 
some extent, the policy has been successful so that Malawi 
is free of squatter settlement problems in its urban 
areas, unlike many other African countries. Despite the 
success, the urban areas have still attracted people from 
the rural areas, particularly young people/ who are easily 
facinated with modern urban amenities. Therefore, the 
Germans came up with the idea of a rural growth centre in an 
effort to help the Government to enforce it policy on 
labour migration to urban areas.
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The project consists of the construction of public 
facilities which include a primary school, a clinic, a 
post office, a public market, butchery, and a public hall, 
a sort of prototype municipal centre. The idea is to 
bring such facilities as a post office or community centre 
hall, which are available in towns, to the rural 
communities. The Germans initially funded only two of the 
projects on a grant basis. One of them is situated.in what 
was really virgin bush at the time of its construction 
in the centre of the country. As a result, doubts 
initially arose about the extent to which the rural 
community would make use of the growth areas. These have 
now disappeared. The project has proved so popular that 
there has been a public demand for similar facilities in 
every district of the country. Indeed, the Federal 
Republic of Germany had to be persuaded to fund more 
growth areas in the rest of the country.
Two projects give a good comparison between the 
"economically sound" approach to funding projects and the 
"socially sound" approach to funding projects. The former 
is illustrated by a small holder Sugar Scheme called, 
Dwangwa Small Holder Sugar Scheme. This is situated in 
the centre of the country and is funded by the O.D.A. It 
is part of a second sugar project in the country and is 
itself a successful scheme. It consists of small growers 
who are guided in growing sugar cane and sell their cane 
sugar to a refinery plant nearby. It is a scheme which 
is, indeed, "economically sound." For example, the
392
growers now earn a much higher income a year while Malawi, 
as a state, also benefits from the scheme in the form of 
foreign exchange which is earned by exporting part of the 
sugar produced. Its shortcoming is that its beneficiaries 
are limited in number since not everybody can participate 
in such a scheme. As a result, the scheme is surrounded 
by onlookers who cannot directly benefit from it.
In contrast, the rural growth centre exists for use 
by everybody in an area and has no distinct beneficiaries. 
Everybody can go and sell his produce at the market or go 
and buy anything from the market. It is, indeed a scheme 
which is socially sound. This is because the project is 
infrastructural and its shortcoming is that its mainte­
nance could very soon pose problems. However, the 
project is another distinct influence of German foreign 
aid in Malawi.
The United Nations has also funded a number of 
projects in Malawi. By United Nations is meant here the 
United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), United 
Nations Children's Emergency Fund (U.N.I.C.E.F.), United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (U.N.I.D.O.) 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(I.F.A.D.). The exceptions are the United Nations 
specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization 
(W.H.O.) and the United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). They are excluded from 
consideration partly because some of them have not
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actively participated in Malawi's Economic development and 
partly because some of them, particularly the World Bank, 
have already received attention in their own right. The 
term, "United Nations," will, therefore, be used in 
reference to its specialized agencies proper; that is the 
U.N.D.P., U.N.I.C.E.F., I.F.A.D., U.N.I.D.O., and others.
Projects with the United Nations involvement are not 
easy to pinpoint. This is due to the supplementary role 
which the organization has played in relation to the World 
Bank and the donor countries. The organization is 
required to confine itself to pre-investment operations. 
However, the United Nations has funded the implementation 
of some projects in its own right. For example, I.F.A.D. 
is currently funding a modified version of the integrated 
rural development project in the central part of the 
country while the United Nations Fund for Population 
Activities funded the first two national censuses of the 
country.
The newest project which is funded by the United
Nations is a low-cost rural housing scheme. This involves
teaching people how to construct in stages a modern house
using local materials. According to Hewitt and Kydd, the
31idea originated at a U.N.D.P. meeting. The implemen­
tation of the scheme has gone on very well partly because 
Malawi has fine building material resources. Indeed, the 
scheme is already seen as a model to other countries to
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the extent that Malawi was awarded in 1987 a certificate of 
distinction by the United Nations.
Other United Nations initiatives include the country's 
Export Promotion Council which was initiated by an expert 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in Geneva, and another project called, Small-Scale 
Enterprise Development of Malawi (SELOM) which- was 
initiated by a U.N.I.D.O. official. Perhaps the most 
important innovative idea of the United Nations is a scheme 
on the development of a clean water supply. The project, 
as listed earlier, is funded by the World Bank and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, but it was initiated by a 
British expert working for UNICEF.
Malawi is ideal for such a project because it has 
some of the finest water resources in Africa. Its major 
lake, the third largest in Africa and the tenth largest in 
the work, contains fresh water. Its rainfall can in some 
parts be as high as 44 ins. a year. As a result, the 
country has mountains and plateaux from which streams and 
rivers with fresh clean water flow down to low lying 
areas. The scheme involves tapping the water from such 
streams and rivers as they flow down the mountains and 
plateaux by means of pipes installed on the basis of 
self-held by the local people. The scheme now covers vast 
areas in the country and has been supplemented by shallow 
wells schemes in areas where the gravity water is not 
available. Malawi is the one developing country which
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should achieve the United Nations goal of clean water for 
everybody by the year 2000.
Understandably, the significance of such a scheme is 
hard to appreciate in the developed world where the supply 
of clean water is taken for granted. However, the scheme 
is of great significance in the developing world where the 
supply of clean water is a major problem. It has made 
Malawi to be a class apart among the developing countries 
since it covers a greater proportion of its population.
It is clearly a distinct contribution by the United Nations 
to Malawi's economic development.
The danger of assessing foreign aid influence on the 
basis of funded projects is that the assessment can easily 
degenerate into a mere list of projects funded by each 
donor country or organization. Therefore, suffice it to say that 
Denmark has funded some of the country's major hospitals 
while the Netherlands started to fund some important 
projects late. Canada has funded a major railway project, 
a dairy project, and a Natural Resources College, but the 
pattern of its foreign aid to Malawi has been somewhat 
erratic so that apart from these projects there is not yet 
anything which one might regard as Canadian foreign aid 
influence. The African Development Bank (A.D.B.), too, 
has funded, or helped to fund, some of the country's major 
projects including the country's international airport and 
hydro-electric power plants. However, its aid has 
consisted of soft commercial loans more or less like those
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of the I.B.R.D. They have not been aid in the strict 
sense except some new loans which have been earmarked for 
agricultural development projects.
The United States is perhaps, a good example of a 
major donor country which has so far left no trace of its 
influence in Malawi in spite of the face tnat it has funded some
or the country's major institutional and infrastructural 
development projects. The projects which it has funded 
include the country's Polytechnic and Agricultural 
Colleges and several new major roads. However, apart from 
these project nothing can really be interpreted as 
influence of its foreign aid to Malawi. This is obviously 
due to the irregular manner in which the United States has 
provided aid to Malawi.
Japan is now among Malawi's major donors. In terms 
of initiating projects, there is nothing much which can be 
said of it. However, its aid is probably a good example 
of a foreign aid which has also promoted a donor country's 
trade to a recipient country. For example, at indepen­
dence, almost all the Malawi Government vehicles were 
European, mainly British. It was almost unthinkable then 
that a Government vehicle could be any model other than 
British Leyland and Ford models. These were associated 
with quality, reliability, and durability. That myth in 
Malawi has now gone. Today, almost half of the Government 
vehicles are Japanese. It is true that this is, in part, 
a reflection of the world-wide Japaneses success as an
\
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industrial power. However, Japanese donations of fleets
of vehicles to the Malawi Government have no doubt
contributed to the current popularity of Japanese cars in 
32the country.
The other country whose foreign aid has, to some 
extent, served the purpose of promoting its trade is 
probably South Africa. Table IX on the next page shows 
Malawi's imports from Britain, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. 
Imports from Britain have steadily increased over the 
years 1964 to 1986 while imports from Zimbabwe remained 
steady during the rest of 1960s, sharply increased in 1974 
and 1975 and then fell sharply after 1975, and started to 
pick up in 1981. In other words, trade between Britain 
and Malawi has remained normal while trade between 
Zimbabwe and Malawi had been erratic. The reasons for 
this are the economic sanctions against Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) and the establishment of import-substitution 
industries in Malawi.
Compared to Zimbabwe and Britain, South Africa was 
the smaller trading partner. The imports from it doubled 
in 19 68 and have hence been on the increase. It will be 
observed from the Table that the increases are in 1968, 
1972, and 1978. Imports from Zimbabwe remained constant 
from 1968 to 1972, but those from South Africa were on the 
increase. The increase in the latter has to be attributed 
to the two South African loans for the construction of 
Nacala Railway and the start of the infrastructure work at
TA
BL
E 
IX
MALAWI'S BIPORTS ijNL EXTORTS IN MILLION OF KWACHA 
1964 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 7 ? 73 74 7? 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 ',83 84 85
BRITAIN IMPORTS 6 .7 10 .3 16 .8 14.5 17.9 18.2 19 .0 25.2 31.0 28.5 36.5 52.9 42.4 39.4 56.8 60.? 67 .2 44.2 4 9 .8 48.9 49.5 73 .8
- EXPORTS 1 1 .0 12.8 13 .3 18 .2 17 .0 16.8 19 .5 21.6 23.7 26.7 32.5 4 2 .3 66.6 7 7 .0 70.7 . 74 .0 63.9 •5-1.6 6 8 .2 73.1 137 .5 142.1
ZBJBAB.VE . IMPORTS 11 .2 14.9 1 2 .3 10.6 10 .5 10.4 1 5 .5 . 13 .2 16.8 17.1 20.1 25.7 9 .3 5 .7 6 .0 4 .8 12.7 19 .2 1 9 .3 20.0 23.4 29.4
exports 3 .2 2 .8 1 .6 1 .3 1 .6 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.4 4 .5 7 .2 7 .4 3.0 2 .1 1 .3 1 .3 1 2 .3 20.0 1 6 .2 16.7 16. 6, 10 .0
S. AFRICA IMPORTS 1 .7 2 .2 3.9 3.9 6 .4 8 .8 9 .0 9 .4 13.0 20.6 36.5 52.8 55.2 77 .6 109.0 134.5 131.5 103.0 116 .5 141.1 154.2 1^7 .3
EXPORTS 1 .2 1 .1 1 .0 0 .9 1 .5 1 .2 1 .7 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.7 5 .6 7 .3 12.4 6 .7 8 .6 7 . r 12.1 1.1. Q 22.0 32.1 2 6 , r
JAFAN BTORTS 1 .3 2.7 2.7 4 .3 2.8 3.2 3.8 6 .8 7 .5 7.4 8 .6 16 .5 14.5 18.4 28.8 30.8 25.0 19 .6 16.7 24.9 31.4 38.2
EXPORTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.S.A. IMPORTS 0 .6 1 .1 1 .7 1 .4 3.2 2 .4 3.7 3 .6 . 1 .9 2 .6 4 .8 7 .6 6 .4 10 .5 13 .2 10.5 12.1 13.4 9 .6 11 .0 1 5 .0 74.0
EXPORTS 0 .7 0 .7 0*8 1 .1 1 .6 2 .3 1 .2 2 .3 3.0 5 .3 8 .6 8 .6 18 .5 16 .5 8 .3 12 .3 39.1 57.9 17 .8 15.6 38.6 44 .3
NETHERLANDS IMPORTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EXPORTS . 0 .7 1 .2 1.4 1 .7 1 .4 1 .4 1 .8 2 .4 2.9 3.8 7 .6 7 .6 9 .2 15 .1 13.6 18.1 20.6 15.4 1 5 .4 15.9 28.7 ?? *7
GERMANY IMPORTS 0 .6 1 .2 1 .3 1 .4 2 .1 2 .2 227 3.7 *311 3 .8 7 .2 8 .7 7 .0 8 .1 9 .1 17.1 18.1 24.2 23.4 28.8 14 .5 27.4
EXPORTS 0*2 0 .4 0 .8 0 .7 1 .1 1 .0 1 .2 1 .0 1 .3 1 .8 1 .4 4 .3 ■ 4 .6 8 .4 9 .4 16.7 17.1 16.7 23 .5 17.1 4 0 .3 34.6
IRELAND BIPORTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EXPORTS 0 .2 0 .9 1 .1 0 .9 1 .5 1 .0 1 .1 2 .3 2.6 3.2 3.7 4 .0 2 .6 2 .1 2.1 4 .9 3.4 1 .7 3 .3 1 .9 6 .2 1 .7
ZAMBIA IMPORTS 0 .9 0 .7 5 .2 3.5 2 .3 2 .6 2 .5 3.1 3.6 5 .3 5 .0 4 .6 5 .0 2 .4 2 .1 6 .6 7 .7 4 .6 7 .4 1 4 .6 17.1 8 .3
EXPORTS 0 .2 0 .2 0 .4 0 .8 0 .8 3.1 1 .5 2 .3 1 .8  • 3.1 4 .0 3 .5 3 .3 4-5 4 .4 4 .8 5 .3 3.7 2 .5 4 .8 12 .0 27.0
ALL OTHER COON IMPORTS 5*5 7 .8 1 0 .2 11.8 12.8 13.8 15 .2 24.9 26.0 29.3 39.2 49.7 48.7 47 .5 59'. 8 54.9 82.° 64.5 78.4 75.5 7 6 ./! 60,6
EXPORTS 5 .6 7 .0 7 .3 7 .6 7 .1 7 .4 9 .2 11.9 13.4 17 .3 20.8 ?3 .0 25.9 33.8 32.3 35.6 55.0 50.3 7 4 .6 97.2 124.3 111.1
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review. Volume XV111 -  Number 4 , 1986, pa’.es 87 and 89
399
the new capital site in Lilongwe. While imports from 
Zimbabwe sharply declined after 1975, those from South 
Africa continued to rise. South Africa by then had proven 
to be an alternative source of imports. The latter sharp 
increase in the imports from South Africa is due to the 
Civil War in Mozambique which cut off Malawi's traditional 
shorter routes to the sea thereby making South Africa a 
more convenient source of imports for the country. .
The foregoing does not mean that all the increase in 
imports from South Africa is the result of South
African foreign aid to Malawi. It does not mean that. 
What it means is that the increase in imports from South 
Africa during the years 1968 to 1972 was, indeed, the 
result of the South African loans to Malawi for the 
construction of the Nacala Railway Project and for the 
start of the infrastructure work at the new capital site 
in Lilongwe. Both loans had procurement strings. The 
rest of the big increase was probably due to the other 
factors which included sanctions against Rhodesia and the 
political instability in Mozambique.
Therefore, South African foreign aid has probably 
promoted South African exports to Malawi in two ways. The 
first was the increase in imports for the years 1968 to 
1972 as a result of the two loans. The second is that the 
two loans clearly served to introduce South Africa as an 
alternative source of imports to Malawi. Without that, 
Britain would probably have completely taken over the
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share of the Malawi market lost by Zimbabwe since its 
trade with Malawi has also been on the increase.
However, those attributable to Japan and South Africa 
are minor instances of foreign aid influence. The major 
ones are those which are attributable to the World Bank, 
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United 
Nations.
Other Instances of Aid Influence
The following are some other instances of foreign 
aid. These cannot be attributed to any one donor country or 
organization. One of them is institutional building. 
This is not to endorse the familiar argument that foreign 
aid leads to bureaucratic expansion but merely to mention 
a specific instance. The Malawian experience is in fact, 
a mixed bag. What leads to bureaucratic expansion is 
not foreign aid per se but the fact of development which, 
as often stated in this thesis, is an extra-governmental 
activity.
When development began, the Malawi Government had to 
set up planning units in a number of its Ministries. In 
that case, foreign aid led to bureaucratic expansion. 
That foreign aid does not necessarily lead to bureau­
cratic expansion is also amply demonstrated by the size of 
the country's Ministry of Works and Supplies. This is one 
of the key operational Ministries of the Government and
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has been instrumental in successful implementation of most 
of the country*s infrastructural development projects. It 
has been responsible for the construction of major new 
roads, hospitals, the country's new capital city, and its 
international airport to mention a few. However, its 
expansion as a bureaucracy has been modest because most of 
the projects which it is supposed to executive, are 
tendered to private companies.
On the other hand, foreign aid has in other areas of 
the Government undoubtedly contributed significantly to a 
remarkable expansion of bureaucracy. The Ministry of 
Agriculture is a good example. It is true that even in the 
most this was one of the large departments of the 
Government. It consisted of a head office with various 
sections including an extension aid branch and several 
research stations. However, foreign aid has contributed to 
its unprecedented expansion. Today, it also includes what 
are called agricultural development divisions (A.D.D.) 
which are clearly the result of foreign aid.
The bureaucratic expansion seems to arise, in part, 
out of the nature of agricultural activities. Unlike road 
of building construction projects, for which the Ministry 
of Works and Supplies has been responsible, the agricult­
ural development projects are partly infrastructural and 
partly innovative or transformatory. The latter has been 
an important element in the integrated rural development 
projects and has necessitated direct Government involve-
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ment in the execution of the projects. The larger the
project, the greater the expansion which a Government 
Ministry responsible for the implementation of such a
project experiences.
The advent of the integrated rural development 
project led to the creation of the A.D.D.s in the country. 
Each A.D.D. is responsible for the implementa-tion of 
several integrated rural development projects. As a 
result, the Ministry now consists of a headquarters, the 
research stations, a Natural Resources College, and about 
eight A.D.D.s each of which is almost as large as some of 
the Government's small ministries. That each A.D.D. has 
come into being as a result of foreign aid is borne out by 
the fact that the A.D.D.s were originally integrated rural 
development projects. These are Lilongwe, Ngabu, and
Karonga A.D.D.s reflecting the Lilongwe Land Development 
Project, Lower Shire Valley Project, and Karonga Rural 
Development Project respectively. In this case, foreign 
aid clearly led to significant institutional building.
Another instance of influence of foreign aid is a 
little difficult to explain. This has to do with the 
increase in Government expenditure. Development 
necessarily leads to a substantial increase in Government 
expenditure. This is normal and is not what is referred 
to here. What is referred to is something peculiar to
foreign aid. Hewitt and Kydd have also referred to it in
33 .passing. Here it will receive a little more attention.
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Each item of foreign aid is often matched with what is
called, counterpart, or local, contributions. The latter 
is made by the recipient country and often includes free 
housing and transport and a local salary for the experts 
of the donor country or organization who are to serve as 
technical advisers or managers of the projects on which 
the foreign aid is to be used. The housing and local 
salary aspects are understandable and often present no 
problems. The problem is the provision of free transport 
which often involves providing a foreign expert with a 
free new saloon car, or land rover, and free fuel. The 
fuel in the case of a country like Malawi is expensive 
because it is imported and scarce. The spare parts for 
the motor vehicle are expensive, too, because they are 
imported and scarce. Moreover, the use of the transport 
is not restricted so that it is not uncommon to see the 
experts use it during their leisure time. No doubt, this 
is a significant proportion of the country's new deficit 
on the recurrent account although the Government is yet to 
pay attention to it.
Still another instance of foreign aid influence is 
the exposure of the recipient country to various foreign 
influences including those that have already been covered 
here. This is simply the fact of foreign aid and is 
probably the most valuable aspect of foreign aid from the 
point of view of the donor countries and organizations. 
The provision of any foreign aid is often followed by the 
recruitment and dispatch of experts who have to take up
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posts of technical advisers or managers of the projects on 
which the foreign aid is to be spent. India, with a huge 
reservoir of its own expertise is one of the exceptions to 
this rule. However, many of the developing countries, 
including Malawi, have to accept experts from the donor 
country or organization from which the financial assistance 
for a project is obtained.
The exposure is now taken advantage of in the forms of 
resident representation of donor organizations. Almost all 
the donor organizations have now resident representation in 
the recipient countries. The E.E.C., the U.N.D.P., 
U.N.I.C.E.F., W.H.O., and the World Bank all have resident 
representatives in Malawi. The exceptions are the African 
Development Bank and I.F.A.D. The U.N.D.P. was the first 
donor organization to have resident representation. It has 
even emulated the practice of sovereign states of running 
a diplomatic bag service between its resident 
representation office in a recipient country and its head 
office in New York. No doubt the other donor organizations 
have a similar service. This is a new aspect of 
international politics which has come about as a result of 
foreign aid.
The exposure has also led to the rise of organized 
volunteer technical assistance service. Britain has the 
Volunteer Service Overseas (V.S.O.) while Japan has the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency. (J.I.C.A.).
The United States has the famous Peace Corps while 
Canada has the less known Canadian University Service
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Overseas (C.U.S.O.). Each of these technical services or 
programmes has its experts working in Malawi at the moment 
because foreign aid made their presence in the country 
possible.
Finally/ another "general instance" of influence of 
foreign aid is the excessive belief in the efficacy of 
the government which it fosters among the ordinary people 
of a recipient country. This is not to endorse Bauer's 
argument that "unconditional aid supports or underwrites
harmful policies" or the argument that foreign aid buys
. . 34public support for a recipient government. Such an
argument, as already stated, is held here invalid or 
unsound because it overlooks the problem of illiteracy in 
many of the developing countries. What is referred to 
here is the belief in the efficacy of the government as 
such or of the government as an institution and not of a 
group of persons who may constitute the government of the 
day of a country.
The belief in the government's ability to do anything 
required for its people is probably widespread these 
days. However, foreign aid has fostered an excess of this 
belief in the minds of the ordinary people in developing 
countries. Perhaps the health service in Malawi 
illustrates the point. This consists of Government's 
hospitals and clinics and non-Government hospitals and 
clinics. It began with hospitals and clinics which were 
first introduced and run by Scottish Missionaries. Today
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various Christian churches still run hospitals and clinics 
in the country. These come under an association called, 
Private Hospital Association of Malawi (P.H.A.M.), a term 
which is a misnomer. It is true that the patients in 
P.H.A.M. hospitals or clinics are charged for any treatment 
which they get, but in many of them the charge is minimal, 
largely designed to defray the cost of running the 
hospitals. Otherwise these hospitals are not run to make 
a profit and would accurately be referred to as non­
governmental .
The main part of the service is made up of the 
Government hospitals and clinics in which service is 
offered by and large free of charge to patients. These 
include two central (or major) hospitals, one general 
hospital, some twenty-four district hospitals and a host of 
rural hospitals and clinics. Denmark has funded the 
construction of one Central Hospital and another major 
hospital while the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, 
and the E.E.C. have funded a number of district hospitals. 
With foreign aid, the Government expects to rebuild every 
other remaining district hospital. This is what P.H.A.M. 
cannot easily do. As a result Government hospitals are 
better, larger, and even more modern.
The effect of this upon the ordinary person has been 
that the Government can provide not only the required 
services, but also provide them better. The argument among 
the ordinary people often is: "this clinic, bridge, or
postal agency, will remain in a poor shape, or will not
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get better, unless it is taken over by the Government." A 
good part of any parliamentary session in Malawi is often 
devoted to question and answer time. The Hansard reveals 
that the questions are actually requests for the Government 
to construct a bridge, a police station, a clinic, a post 
office or a veterinary deeping tank is this or that part of 
the country, or to instruct a bus company to introduce a 
bus service on a particular route or a wholesale company to 
open a wholesale depot or shop in a particular area. 
Almost no limit is thought to Government activities. The 
notion that things are done better through private 
enterprise will have to take root in future. It is simply 
not the case at the moment. Foreign aid has, no doubt, 
contributed considerably to this belief in the Governments 
ability to provide almost everything and better.
Conclusion
Foreign aid is believed to have the power to reduce 
recipient countries to dependent states for two reasons. 
The first one is that development is believed to be "the 
stuff of politics" in the developing countries. This 
means that donors' decisions are crucial for each aid 
recipient country since most of the developmental 
activities are financed with foreign aid. The second 
reason is that foreign aid itself is believed to have the 
power of enabling the donors to realise their political 
objectives in relation to the aid recipient countries.
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This is really the usual belief that "money is power" or 
that "money can buy anything."
However, the belief in the power of foreign aid to 
reduce recipient countries to dependency state is probably 
mistaken. Certainly development is not the "stuff of
politics" at least in Malawi where it is even dealt with in
a separate section of the national budget. The foreign aid
political effectiveness, too, is something which has not 
yet been systematically assessed so that no one as yet is 
certain about it. Perhaps the sort of influence in Malawi 
which can reasonably be attributed to foreign aid is proof 
that the belief in the potency of foreign aid as an
instrument of foreign policy is probably mistaken. This is 
because the influences are unintended and are hardly 
evidence for the dependence argument.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis has been to challenge the 
prevailing conviction that foreign aid accounts for 
Malawi's behaviour in international relations. To that 
end, the thesis has examined the effects which the 
politics of foreign aid are said to have had on Malawi. 
Its conclusion is that the evidence is insufficient for 
the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's 
behaviour in international relations.
The conviction finds expression in three arguments.
The first one is that Malawi's foreign and domestic
policies were adopted for reasons of attracting foreign
aid. The second argument is that Malawi's economic
policy, particularly the development strategy, were
decided upon by foreign experts. The third argument is
that the British expatriates were de facto decision makers
of the country. These arguments are advanced by Carolyn
McMaster, Philip Short, Kathryn Morton, and anonymous
authors of a pamphlet which is with the School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS) Library in London and are now
emulated by a number of other writers.1 -They portray
Malawi as a typical example of a new state which foreign
2aid has reduced to dependency or neo-colonialist status.
The first argument is not extreme because it is
:confined to the question of perceptions. I t  leaves some
room for a decision-making role by the Malawi authorities
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who are seen to have, at least, made the decisions. Its 
point of contention is that the perceptions of the Malawi 
authorities, particularly those of the President, were 
influenced by the availability of foreign aid in South 
Africa and the Western countries, which was at the same 
time urgently needed for the country's development.
Underlying the argument is the assumption that foreign 
aid is politically effective: that is, it has the power
to influence the perceptions of the decision-makers of a 
recipient country into the direction which is favoured.by 
the donor countries and organizations. This assumption is 
enforced, or strengthened, by the belief that developement 
is "the stuff of politics" in the developing countries. 
This means that donors' decisions are a powerful influence 
on the perceptions of the decision-makers of an aid 
recipient country since most of the development work in 
the developing countries is funded with foreign aid.
The second and third arguments are both more 
extreme. These go beyond the question of perceptions. 
They deny the Malawi authorities a decision-making role 
by portraying them as ineffective decision makers. Under­
lying the arguments in question is the assumption that it 
is the bureaucrats who are really the decision-makers of 
any country. With regard to Malawi, this belief is held 
on the ground that foreign experts, particularly the 
British expatriates, dominate or dominated, the country's 
civil service. Apparently, the point is that because they
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dominate, or dominated, the country's civil service, the 
expatriates must be the ones who make, or made, the 
country's policies, particularly the development strategy.
The evidence which is often offered in support for
these arguments varies considerably. It includes
quotations from statements and speeches made by the
President, and the nature of the country's economic system
3and development strategy. Apparently these
demonstrate the direction into which the President's
perceptions were, or have been, influenced by foreign
aid. In addition, the evidence includes references to
certain events which apparently are proof that Malawi's
foreign and domestic policies were undertaken for reasons
of attracting foreign aid, and the origin of the country's
foreign policies which apparently demonstrates that the
policies were Malawi's response to South Africa's outward
looking policy which included offers of aid to African 
4countries.
Further, the evidence includes the country's 
geography which is seen to have dictated the country's 
foreign policies, a reference to some development schemes 
which apparently are proof that the Malawi decision-makers 
have not been effective rulers, and the mere presence of 
foreign experts which is taken to mean that the Malawi
5
civil service has not yet been localized. In addition, 
Malawi's allegedly foreign aid-oriented policies apparently have 
had the desired results. As a result, Malawi is said to
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be favoured by donor countries and organizations for aid
and is seen as the largest per capita recipient of aid in
• 6 Africa.
In sharp contrast to these arguments is the
President's attitude towards foreign aid. At no time has
the President said, or implied, that the acquisition of
foreign aid is the main objective of the country's foreign
and domestic policies. On the contrary, the President
separates foreign aid from politics. He treats the former
strictly as a matter of debt every penny of which has to
be repaid to the creditor. "The final factor", reported
Michael Holman, for example, "involves the role of the
President himself who, it is understood, found the need to
7reschedule a bitter pill to swallow."
Also in sharp contrast to these arguments is the
aid-handling process in Malawi. It is true that 
occasionally Malawi diplomats abroad get involved in
negotiations on annual aid agreements. It is also true 
that occasionally Malawi's heads of diplomatic missions 
abroad are authorized to sign aid agreements on behalf of 
the country's Minister of Finance. However, the diplomats 
get involved in such negotiations only as members of a 
delegation of the Ministry of Finance which is responsible 
for aid negotiations. Otherwise the Ministry of External 
Affairs is not involved in them.
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The aid-handling responsibilities in Malawi are indeed 
scattered among a number of government units. These 
include Parliament itself, Justice, Economic Planning & 
Development, Education, Agriculture, Works, and Health to 
mention a few. Compared to even any of these units, the 
Ministry of External Affairs is still the least involved 
in matters concerning foreign aid. It is hardly given any 
responsibility for project execution. Foreign aid is 
simply handled as if there were no politics to it.
Therefore, these arguments, though popular, are wide 
of the mark. What they say is almost the opposite of what 
really Malawi is as an aid recipient.
Examined in this thesis, neither of the major
assumptions nor each piece of evidence cited is a sound 
ground for these arguments. One of the assumptions is 
even false while the other is still very much the 
unknown. The evidence is partial, controversial, and in 
some cases simply false. Acquisition of foreign aid has 
not been the main objective of Malawi's foreign and 
domestic policies and the country's behaviour in inter­
national relations has been wrongly interpreted in terms 
of its supposed quest for foreign aid.
The assumption that foreign aid is politically 
effective is largely a matter of faith. No doubt foreign 
aid is in some situations a potent instrument of foreign 
policy. One such situation which easily comes to mind is
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that in which foreign aid is given for a clear political 
objective which is made known to a recipient. In that 
sort of situation, foreign aid is most probably politically 
effective because the terms on which it is provided are 
equivalent to almost a genuine commercial exchange. 
However, such situations are rare because many of the 
political objectives for which foreign aid is said to be 
disbursed are often kept secret from the aid recipients. 
As a result, it is not easy to assess foreign aid 
political effectiveness and the foreign aid literature 
hardly contains systematic efforts to assess it. There­
fore, the arguments which have been considered in this 
thesis are based on an assumption which is still very much 
unknown.
The assumption that development is the "stuff of 
politics" in the developing countries is even false. The 
"stuff of politics" in the developing countries is not
development but the traditional activities of government: 
defending the country, maintaining peace and calm in the 
country, administering justice, and collecting taxes to 
mention a few. Development is an option which is under­
taken only when the provision of these other services is
adequate.
That this assumption is an error is amply 
demonstrated at least by Malawi's national accounting 
procedures. These place the expenditure on development in
a separate section of the country's national budget
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called/ development account, on which it is regarded as 
normal for a developing country to have a deficit. In 
contrast, the procedures place the expenditure on the 
traditional activities of government in another section 
called, recurrent account, on which it is regarded as a 
serious even for a developing country to have a
o
deficit. This means that it is matters such as 
defending Malawi, maintaining peace and calm in the 
country, and administering justice which are actually on 
the overriding priority list of the responsibilities of 
the Malawi Government. Development is not.
With regard to the evidence, the quotations from the 
statements and speeches by the President are partial and 
in some . cases sheer distortions of the statements and 
speeches. Moreover, the quotations are made without any 
reference to the circumstances to which the statements and 
speeches were addressed. Therefore, they are not proof 
that the President's perceptions were influenced by 
foreign aid when he decided on the country's foreign and 
domestic policies.
That foreign aid did not influence the President's
- f'
perceptions then is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of
foreign aid transfers to recipients in Africa of the late
91970 s and early 1980s. It is a pattern which
reflects a foreign aid boom. Its major beneficiaries in 
Southern and Eastern Africa have been those that espouse 
anti-South Africa rhetoric. If foreign aid did influence
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the President's perceptions at the beginning of Malawi's 
independence, this foreign aid boom should have similarly 
influenced the President's perceptions at the end of the 
1970s. That it has not so far swayed Malawi away from 
its current policies towards South Africa is proof that 
the President's perceptions were not in the first instance 
influenced by foreign aid.
The statements and speeches from which the quotations 
are often made actually make it clear that the President's 
perceptions have to do with the President's understanding 
of history. The President, himself a historian, intended 
to make the policies rest on hard, or down-to-earth 
analysis of international political issues. His speech
before the United Nations General Assembly in 19 64 and his 
speech before the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the OAU in Cairo in 1964, tell a lot about the
President's understanding of history. Therefore, it was 
the President's perceptions of history rather than foreign 
aid which indeed influenced Malawi's foreign and domestic 
policies.
The events which are referred to by some writers like 
Short and Ajala are not evidence that the country's 
policies were undertaken to attract foreign aid.10 The
events are made to look like such evidence simply by
juxtaposing them or quoting them out of their sequence. 
This is a familiar journalistic technique of marshalling 
unrelated events into producing an intended effect. David
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Williams makes more or less the same point at the end of 
his book where he reviews briefly the book by Philip 
Short. No correlation emerges among these events when 
they are placed in their proper sequence.
Perhaps it is the country's geography which is seen 
as the strongest evidence that the country's foreign and 
domestic policies were undertaken for economic reasons. 
This is because it is seen as having left Malawi with no 
option but to adopt the sort of policies which Malawi has 
followed since independence. However, the country's 
geography is such evidence depending on how one interprets 
it. If human-like features, or motives, are attributed to 
it, the geography becomes strong and almost irrefutable 
evidence for the argument considered in this thesis.
The Malawian experience suggests otherwise. 
Differences arose among the country's leaders on how much 
importance should be attached to geography in the policy 
of the country. These are evidence, or at least an 
indication, that geography might have been overlooked, or 
down-played, in the policy making of the country. That 
the policy of "contact and dialogue" did indeed take 
account of the country's geography is not proof that 
geography dictated policy or constrained policy options. 
Rather it is evidence of the judgement which the country's 
leaders exercised in decision-making in relation to the 
country's geography.
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It is no business of this thesis to prescribe 
policy. Therefore, it cannot tell about the best 
judgement which can be made of Malawi's geography. 
However, it disputes the claim that "contact and dialogue" 
was an easy option just because it took account of the 
country's geography.11 The option was the more 
difficult to take from the decision-making point of view 
because it was opposed by many in Pan-Africanist circles. 
Therefore, its adoption required courage on the part of 
the leaders since they had to shoulder the consequences of 
such a policy option directly.
The nature of the country's economic system and
development strategy are not evidence for the arguments
examined in the thesis because they themselves have been a
12subject of conflicting interpretations. Some writers 
say that the Malawian economy is open or market-oriented. 
Others say that it is under a good deal of state control. 
The conflict has arisen because of the tendency by each 
group of writers to emphasize only the partial features of 
the economy. Actually, the economy has been a mixed one 
in which public enterprise has thrived side by side with 
private enterprise. This is almost exactly the type of 
economic system for which the President expressed his 
preference at the beginning of the country's independence. 
Therefore, the nature of the country's economic system is 
not evidence that the country's economic policies were 
undertaken to attract foreign aid because such an economic
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system is hardly an attraction to Malawi's donor countries 
and organizations.
The reference to some agricultural development schemes
is evidence that Malawi's development policies were made
by foreign experts only if the Achikumbe scheme were
really identical to the country's past colonial schemes of
13"master farmer" and "estate agriculture". However/
the identity, or similarity between the Achikumbe scheme 
on one hand and the past colonial schemes of "master 
farmer" and "estate agriculture", on the other, is a 
mistaken one. The scheme is identical neither to the 
"master farmer" scheme nor to the "estate agriculture" 
scheme because it is not a land ownership scheme. It has 
nothing to do with successful implementation of certain 
prescribed methods of farming as was the case with the 
"master farmer" scheme and its participants do not enjoy 
any privileges either by way of special treatment in the 
marketing of - their crops or by way of access to credit 
facilities of farm inputs as did the "master farmers" 
enjoy. The Achikumbe is simply a certificate of 
distinction award scheme.
Malawi's operational approach to development is 
neither an effort to please the donor countries and 
organizations nor evidence that the expatriates decide, or 
decided, or policy for the country. On the contrary, the 
approach is itself evidence that the President has 
occupied an important opposition on matters concerning
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development. This is because the President has not only-
initiated some of the country's major development projects
but also retained control over allocation and modification
of any development project. In fact, the approach evolved
out of efforts to accommodate the President's determination
14to exercise such firm control over development.
Finally, the mere presence of foreign experts in 
Malawi is clearly misinterpreted. This is taken wrongly 
to mean that the localization of the country's civil 
service is still incomplete. That is a misinterpretation 
of the presence of foreign experts in the country. 
Localization had to do not with mere presence of the 
expatriates in the country, but with the domination of the 
civil service by the expatriates. As such, it ceased to 
be a problem over a decade ago. Moreover, many of the 
foreign experts do not work in the civil service and even 
if all of them did, their number would still be insigni­
ficant in relation to the civil service as a whole which 
has expanded considerably since independence.
In addition, the domination of the civil service 
during the early days of the country's independence can be 
regarded as a sound ground for claiming that the 
expatriates were de facto decision-makers of the country 
only if it is the bureaucrats who really make policy in 
any country. However, the role of bureaucrats in decision­
making is still a controversial question. It is not known
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for certain yet whether the bureaucrats are the ones who 
really play such a role in any country.
With regard to Malawi, the role of the bureaucrats in
decision-making is even more of a controversy for two
reasons. The first is that the existence of bureaucracy
in a new state like Malawi is itself doubted at least by
some experts in the field of foreign policy analysis. The
other one is that, in general, experts in the field of
foreign policy analysis believe that bureaucracy in a new
state like Malawi is less important in decision-making
because it is said to be "incoherent and less auto- 
15nomous". Therefore the domination of the Malawi
civil service by the expatriates during the early days of 
independence is not a sound ground for claiming that the 
expatriates were de facto decision-makers in Malawi. Such 
a claim only compounds the controversy in the field of 
foreign policy analysis about the role of bureaucrats in 
decision-making.
In short, the thesis has been critical of the popular 
argument that foreign aid accounts for Malawi's behaviour 
in international relations because the major assumptions 
on which it is based are either false or controversial. 
It has been critical of the argument also because almost 
all the evidence which is cited in support of it is 
incomplete, irrelevant, controversial* and in some cases 
plainly false. Foreign aid is simply too controversial a
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premise for explaining the country's foreign and domestic 
policies.
By implication, the thesis has touched upon a number 
of wider issues. The first is the question of whether 
foreign aid is humanitarian. This is the oldest question 
in the foreign aid literature. It is still unresolved.16 
By definition, foreign aid ought to be humanitarian since 
the word, "aid" or "assistance", refers to an element of 
help. However, the humanitarian character of foreign aid is 
hotly disputed. Indeed, the current fashion is to 
attribute a political character to foreign aid. The term, 
"politics of foreign aid", or "politics of food aid", is a 
case in point. The point is that donors provide foreign 
aid for their self-interest.
This thesis has not wholly endorsed this view for two 
reasons. The first is that the transactions called aid 
are so heterogeneous that it is incorrect to bundle all of 
them under one political label. The second is that even 
the official aid which has been considered here is not per 
se political. This aid is political only on the ground 
that it consists of transactions which take place in the 
government context. From time to time, such transactions 
do indeed take the political character of governments like 
when officials try to justify the provision of foreign aid 
in terms of some worthwhile political objectives. There­
fore, it is only in this limited sense that the aid which
427
will be considered in this thesis will be regarded as 
political.
The second issue is the question of whether foreign 
17aid is effective. This is a new issue concerning
foreign aid which has arisen largely as result of poor
economic performance on the part of the developing
countries in recent years despite the millions of dollars
which they have received as aid from donor countries and
organizations. The current debate is unlikely to settle
it because it is treated in a misleading manner. For
example, the question which has been raised in connection
18with it is: "does aid work?" Left on its own, this
is an ambiguous question in that it presupposes an 
economic, a political, or even a humanitarian character of 
foreign aid. Since it has been raised as result of the 
poor economic performance of the recipient countries, the 
question presupposes a humanitarian character of foreign 
aid which is itself still disputed.
It is true that some political objectives for which
foreign aid might be provided are perfectly compatible
19with some humanitarian objectives. For example, there 
is no reason for not expecting the American aid to Egypt 
to promote economic development just because it is 
provided largely as a reward for Egypt's willingness to 
sign the Camp David Accord. However, some political 
objectives for which foreign aid might be provided to a 
recipient country are simply incompatible with
428
humanitarian objectives. If the political objective for 
which food aid is provided is to prevent the people of a 
recipient country from achieving self-sufficiency in food 
such aid should not be expected to be effective in 
eradicating hunger in a recipient country. Therefore, some 
political objectives are simply incompatible with economic 
or humanitarian objectives.
The foregoing means that it is important to specify
the type of foreign aid effectiveness with which one is 
concerned. Otherwise, the issue is deceptive. Economists 
obviously deal with economic effectiveness of foreign 
aid. Similarly, foreign policy analysts ought to specify 
the type of foreign aid effectiveness which is of interest
to them. Obviously, this ought to be the foreign aid
political effectiveness. The mistake is to talk simply 
about "foreign aid effectiveness" because it is an 
expression which is meaningless on its own.
Though relevant, foreign aid political effectiveness 
has not been of central concern to this thesis and has
been dealt with largely as one of the assumptions under­
lying the arguments considered in the thesis. The point 
is that this is still very much the unknown in the field 
of foreign policy analysis. The foreign aid literature 
hardly contains systematic or rational efforts to assess 
it so that it is simplistic, or indeed misleading, to 
claim that foreign aid has been politically effective in 
Malawi.
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Perhaps the importance of a systematic assessment of 
foreign aid political effectiveness is well illustrated by 
the following events in Africa. The first one which 
easily comes to mind was the change of Government in 
Ethiopia over a decade ago. This took place in a country 
which up to the time of the change of Government was one 
of the major recipients, if not the major recipient, of 
American foreign aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it 
used to be regarded as conservative and pro-Western.
After the change in government, Ethiopia steadily 
took the road to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Today it has 
a Marxist-Leninist regime. No doubt American aid is not 
meant to prevent all changes from occurring in the 
government of its recipient country. However, given the 
American commitment to eliminating communism, one of the 
political objective for the American aid to Ethiopia must 
have been to keep Ethiopia away from communism. There­
fore, the emergence of the Marxist-Leninist regime in 
Ethiopia raises the question of whether foreign aid is 
indeed politically effective.
Finally, another event which also easily comes to 
mind was the expulsion of Soviet Union experts from Egypt 
after the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. This took place despite the f 
that the Soviet Union had in the past provided much needed 
funds for the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. No 
doubt the Soviet Union provides aid for a variety of 
reasons. However, given its commitment to eliminating
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capitalism, the Soviet Union must have funded the 
construction of the Aswan Dam with a view to winning Egypt 
away from capitalism. Therefore, the ease with which 
President Sadat of Egypt expelled Soviet Union experts 
after the Arab/Israeli War raises the question of whether 
foreign aid is really politically effective.
The third issue which the thesis has also touched on
is the question of whether geography is important in the
20foreign policy making of a country. This is likely to 
remain a chronic problem in foreign policy analysis 
because it is not easy to avoid what the Sprouts have 
called, "deterministic rhetoric"; that is the habit of 
seeing geography as "pressurising" or "dictating policy". 
This is because geography provides an easy and readily 
available explanation for foreign policy making.
As repeatedly pointed out in this thesis, Malawian 
experience points to a possibility that the importance of 
geography might have been down-played in the policy making 
of the country. For this reason, it bears out the Sprouts' 
argument that it is not geography per se but ultimately 
human judgement which is important in policy making. 
However, this is a line of thought which is not easy to 
maintain. Probably some expressions have been used even 
in this thesis which present geography as "dictating 
policy" despite efforts to stick to the Sprouts* line of 
thought.
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The fourth issue which has also been touched on by
this thesis is the question of whether bureaucracy is
21important m  policy making. The popular belief is 
that in a democratic system of government/ it is the 
elected officials who make policy and the bureaucrats who 
implement policy. However/ the bureaucratic politics 
school in foreign policy analysis says that it is the 
bureaucrats who actually make policy. In this regard, the 
elected officials merely endorse policy which is made by 
bureaucrats.
This is also an issue which is likely to keep 
cropping up in foreign policy analysis. This is because 
the demarcation between the responsibilities of the elected 
officials and those of the civil servants is not in 
practice clear-cut. Civil servants are part and parcel of 
the decision-making machinery in the executive branch of 
any modern government. Moreover, the dividing line 
between decision and implementation is not clear-cut. 
Implementation also involves making a series of decisions. 
Therefore, from time to time there are bound to be some 
scholars who will emphasize the importance of the 
bureaucrats in decision-making..
The Malawian experience at the moment is not in 
accord with the bureaucratic politics school of thought. 
The President has simply dominated the decision-making in 
the country. This is not a unique experience. The 
Nixon-Kissinger combination in the United States White
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House is similarly acknowledged to have dominated decision-
22making in the United States Perhaps this means only 
that there are times when a country elects people who 
really make decisions for it.
Finally, the fifth issue which this thesis has also
touched upon is the question of sovereignty, a concept
23which has undergone changes over the years. Imper­
meability was in the past thought to be its important 
feature. Sovereignty was in that case meant not only 
supreme authority over a given territory and people but 
also immunity from foreign influences. However, sovereign 
states are today heavily penetrated by foreign cultures, 
ideologies, and multinational corporations. The latest 
inroad into sovereignty is the satellite television which 
will transmit programmes to many places regardless of 
national boundaries. Further, military technology has 
brought about wide disparities in military capabilities 
among states. In addition, some international treaties, 
particularly the United Nations Charter, are outright
infringements of sovereignty. As a result, some experts
24think that the concept is no longer valid.
However, other experts think otherwise. These say
that there is a hard core of responsibilities which each
state, regardless of the disparities in military
capability, carries out. The responsibilities include
those of taxation, defense, maintenance of law and order,
25and administration of justice. These have in fact
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increased so that today the state is also responsible for
health, education, postal services, administration of
civil aviation, and even housing. Many of these new
responsibilities have some about as a result of the
emergence of the welfare state which has led to a
2 6deepening of state control over human lives.
The latest development which points into the
direction of the survival of the sovereign state is the
27practice of debt rescheduling. Many developing
countries including Malawi have found it very difficult to 
repay their debts on schedule. In the past, failure to 
repay foreign debts was ground for depriving a weak state 
of its sovereignty. Today, debt-defaulting countries are 
not deprived for their sovereignty. Instead, the debts 
are either cancelled or rescheduled.
Accordingly, experts who hold this view define
sovereignty in a manner which takes account of the
realities of the modern world. Their emphasis is not on
impermeability. Instead, they take the concept to mean
simply supreme competence to make law within the frontiers
of a state and a status of legal equality of a state with
28any other state in international law. The latter
feature is at the heart of Mayall's article on the impli-
29cations of the enlarged EEC on the African States. 
This is because the Lome Convention did away with the 
principle of reciprocity and embraced instead the 
principle of mutual advantage. The latter does away even
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with the legal equality between the EEC countries and the 
African countries.
With regard to the developing countries, sovereignty 
is more of a problem. This is because many of the 
developing countries are believed to have "neo-colonialist" 
or "dependency" status. This means that many developing 
countries are even "less sovereign" than the developed 
countries apparently because the constraints on their 
sovereignty are more than the constraints which are on the 
sovereignty of the developed states. One such extra­
constraint on the sovereignty of the developing countries, 
so to speak, apparently is foreign aid. The mere fact of
receiving it is said to be evidence of a "dependency" or 
"neo-colonialist" status because foreign aid allegedly 
establishes a dependency relationship.
This is a topical issue in Africa. It colours the
vision which many scholars on the continent, including
some former heads of state and government, have of inter-
30national issues. Apparently, the intention is to
throw neo-colonialism into disrepute through frequent 
verbal attacks against it. It is a noble and achievable 
goal. For example, to be called the greatest imperialist 
of all the time was at one time in some countries in 
Europe an honour or a badge of respectability. Now it is 
no longer so.
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However, the dependency argument has another side
which should cause concern among its proponents in the
developing countries. It can boomerang. This is because
the argument enforces the already existing prejudice among
the developed states against the developing states. Such
prejudice is not new. Older states have had difficulties
in the past in accepting newly emerged states as equals or
as real states. This was the case in the 19th century
when many countries in Central and South America emerged
as sovereign states and the same was also true early in
the 20th century when many countries in Eastern Europe
31emerged as sovereign states. The new states m  Asia, 
Africa, the Caribbean, and South Pacific have not been 
immune from the prejudice of the older states.
The dependency argument has gained popularity at the 
time that older states are still adjusting to the reality 
of the existence of new states in Asia, Africa, the
Caribbean, and the South Pacific;and are still questioning 
whether these countries should really be treated as 
sovereign states. For example, the national day 
celebrations of many developing countries in the capitals
in Europe and North America are hardly attended by
important elected officials of the host governments in 
these places. Therefore, the dependency argument is
detrimental to the sovereignty of the developing countries 
because it enforces this prejudice of the older states 
against the new ones.
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The argument actually obscures the true nature of 
colonialism which involved an unequal relationship between 
the conquerors and the conquered. Its highest expression 
is that which one sees, or reads about, in South Africa. 
It involved no freedom of choice on the part of the 
conquered. Everything depended on the conqueror. Nothing 
like it exists in many parts of the world today. For 
example, Ghana started independence with a per capita 
income equal to that of South Korea. The latter country 
has now achieved development. If there is neo-colonialism, 
why has it been particularly pernicious to Ghana and not 
to South Korea?
The thesis shares the view that dependency or neo­
colonialism is a vague concept which is quite inappropriate 
for objective political analysis. For example, neo­
colonialist charges against Malawi contrast sharply with 
Malawi's actual experience. Be it on project choice or 
foreign policy making, to say nothing of the political 
system of government the Malawian authorities have 
unquestionably exercised freedom of choice. They do not 
regard foreign aid as a constraint on decision-making.
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NOTES
1. See pages 49 to 58 of the thesis.
2. See page 257 of the thesis.
3. See pages 86 to 89, 112 to 117, and 150 to 152 of the
thesis.
4. See page 89 and 118 of the thesis.
5. Pages 281 to 282 of the thesis.
6. Pages 233 of the thesis.
7. Financial Times of 16th April, 1985, article by 
Michael Holman.
8. See footnote 4 on page 409 of the thesis.
9. See pages 137 to 138 and 244 to 245 of the thesis.
10. See pages 100 and 133 of the thesis.
11. See page 126 to 132 of the thesis.
12. See pages 161 and 194 of the thesis.
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13. See pages 174 to 193 of the thesis
14. See page 222 of the thesis.
15. See pages 308 to 310 of the thesis.
16 See pages 16 to 19 of the thesis
17. See pages 20 to 23 and 360 to 369 of the thesis.
18 See footnote 14 on page 63 of the thesis.
19. See page 21 to 22 of the thesis.
20. See pages 120 to 121 of the thesis.
21. See pages 303 to 313 of the thesis.
22. The writer is here reflecting the view of Mr. Peter
Rodman, Security Counselor, U.S. National Security 
Council, who addressed a group of diplomats, 
including the writer, in Washington D.C. on 4th May, 
1989.
23. See pages 342 to 360 of the thesis.
24. This is in reference to Professor Herz's views which
he latter revised: Herz J.H., "The Territorial State
Revisited: Reflections on The Future of the Nation
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State", International Politics and Foreign Policy, 
Rosenau, J.N., Revised Edition the Free Press, New 
York, 1969, page 76.
Also a number of articles in the book Conflict in 
World Society, by Banks, M ., Editor, Wheatsheaf 
Books Ltd., London, 1984, at least imply that 
sovereignty has eroded to the extent that states are 
no longer the chief actors in international politics.
25. Waltz, K.N., Theory of International Politics: 
Addison - Wesley Publishing Company Inc. Philippines, 
1979, page 96.
26. Hill, C., "Theories of Foreign Policy for Developing 
Countries", Foreign Policy Making In Developing 
States. by Clapham, C. and Wallace, W. Editors Saxon 
House 1977, pages 2 to 15.
27. Hill, C., Op Cit. page 12.
•
28. Northedge, F.S., The International Political 
System. Faber and Faber, London, 1976, pages 142 to 
144.
29. See footnote 5 on page 409 of the thesis.
30. The scholars include Amin S., author of 
Neo-colonialism in West African. Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1973, and Mazrui, A., author of many
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books on African politics and history. His latest 
one is entitled: The Africans, Little, Brown, and 
Company, Boston, 1986. The relevant pages are 213 
to 239. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, former President of 
the United Republic of Tanzania is one of those African 
leaders who embrace the concept of dependence or neo­
colonialism. This can be seen at least from his 
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